It is very obvious to everyone by now that we are in a shipbuilding revival in the United States. This is by necessity as we counter a rising China and it’s quickly expanding Navy. The current Administration is rightly leading the charge on this, and Congress is providing vast sums of money to improve our capabilities quickly. There are several areas that need focus and resources if we are going to be successful.
One key area is growing the number of skilled workers in this country, something that has atrophied over the last 10-15 years. We need more welders, more machinists, more electricians, more of just about everything. One effort already in operation is the Navy’s Accelerated Training in Defense Manufacturing (ATDM) program in Danville, VA—the leading program in the Nation, first among many. ATDM just graduated it’s 1,000th student in little over 4 years. By the end of 2027 it will be graduating 1,000 new skilled workers per year in Welding, CNC Machining, NDT, Metrology and Additive Manufacturing. More skilled workers are one pillar that supports optimal shipbuilding.
Another pillar is Shipbuilding Infrastructure. There have been many recent articles written about the decay and downright loss of many of our shipyards and ship repair facilities. At least one of our drydocks dates from the late 1700’s. Again, Congress has acted to provide funds to improve current facilities with new docks, new piers and seawalls, new buildings and the latest technology in machines and tooling. The Navy and Industry are working hard to bring the promise of Additive Manufacturing to bear on the issue of parts availability and timeliness. Improved Shipbuilding Infrastructure, Machinery, and Tooling is a second pillar.
The third pillar of shipbuilding is rarely if ever talked about…but is vitally important. It is the piece that allows the thousands of skilled workers, giving 100% day in and day out in the best built and outfitted shipyards in the world, to perform effectively and efficiently together, optimizing output across the entire shipyard. This third pillar is Program Management.
When most people hear Program Management they think, yeah, you build a couple of Gant charts, pick out a critical path, keep that close to on time with an Integrated Master Schedule and it will take care of itself. Nothing could be further from the truth.
To be an electrical engineer you have to go to college for 4 years—then you know enough to get started. To be an accountant you need 4 years of school and then have to pass a certification exam. To be a lawyer, you need 6-7 years of school and then have to pass the bar exam. To be deemed a program manager and be responsible for profit and loss of hundreds of millions of dollars you don’t really need any of that today. An individual might have picked up some Operations Analysis, or Risk Management, or Statistics, or Project Planning as part of their engineering or MBA program. There is the Project Management Program (PMP) certification process—this is expensive and takes an individual’s own time to complete.
We must put some rigor and qualification levels on who can be program managers, like the other professions described above. Let’s upskill current PM’s with Program Management training, hire new PM’s with the right skills, build some shipbuilding specific PM courses and best practices so our PM’s of the future are armed for success.
In the interim there are many areas of effective and efficient shipyard program management that can be adjusted today to drive towards improved program performance. What follows is a start:
Unrealistic Shipyard Performance Expectations—A brand new Navy ship construction program was awarded to a yard several years ago that was already working beyond capacity and fully booked until 2026, or so, with existing orders, and we are surprised when they are 3 years behind schedule? Some of this is due to design delays, but all 1200 workers in that yard were fully utilized in other warship production schedules. Short of hiring another full set of workers there was no way the new ship was going to come out of the gates on time. We also know from experience that the first hull in class takes at least another 30% in build time than later hulls (the VIRGINIA class submarine program is a good example) because there are so many extra things to take care of in the first hull[1]—you make jigs and forms for modules that get used over and over again, among others. The sad part is, we don’t ever plan for that 30%, or even half of it, and add it in…and are again surprised when the first hull is late. If you are going to Perform to Plan (P2P) and build on time, you have to start with achievable expectations.
Unrealistic Schedules and sufficient oversight—When building our Gant charts and IMS we tend to use overly optimistic calendars. In my experience we don’t account for holiday loss of work in the normal year. Christmas and New Years is the big one of course. Most yards shut down for the holiday break about 12/15 or so and don’t resume full tilt until about 1/7. There is a caretaker crew that does some work but most of those 3 weeks is a loss of production—that is a lot of man hours or Full Time Equivalents (FTE’s). Other holidays impact as well, and this really adds up across a year of production. Similarly, we build our milestone schedules to run from start to the advertised finish date with no schedule float (buffer to some)—no open time to allow for growth work, quality deviations, supplier delays, weather impacts, deer season etc. Time is money in the shipyard, so no one likes lots of float, but some is necessary for realistic scheduling and on time performance. Being on schedule is important contractually but also because all of the raw material and OEM and Tier supplier parts are flowing in to the warehouse based on the schedule—the shipbuilding logistics job is hard enough, it is 5 times as hard if you are working with a schedule you know is out of synch with reality by weeks if not months.
Lack of coordination across the Shipyard—Some yards hold a daily yard wide production meeting at 0900, some at 1000. This is pointless. Workers usually are starting at 0700, if not earlier. The production meeting needs to happen before the horn sounds to start work so they know what they are to accomplish that day. A 0600 Production meeting that includes yard leadership, subs, supplier reps, safety, and QA, let’s everyone know where we are going today and how much work must get done. It lets zone foreman deconflict work sites, get hot chits and tagouts lined up, to be efficient with worker time. After the morning meeting the foreman should go back to their workers and explain how much work will get done today—before we go home. Too often the team breaks from the morning Production meeting and the directive is “get out there and see how much you can accomplish”. This approach is a recipe for disaster.
Lack of knowledgeable Shipyard middle management—Used to be skilled shipbuilders stayed at the same company for 25 or 30 years. They were paid above average wages and they were working towards a lifetime retirement pension—good incentive to stay. Now everyone has a transportable 401K and they can frequently make more money at the paper mill, the foundry, or the Amazon warehouse. As a result, the experienced worker who knows how the entire ship gets built, where to pay extra attention to welds or wiring, or how yard specific machines work, is leaving and not only taking that experience with him but not passing it down. To get better and keep strong Foreman and middle leadership we must pay a wage that keeps workers in place and consider going back to a traditional pension system for the truly deserving.
Lack of first time Quality and/or an adequate QA Program—Nothing ruins a well built schedule quicker than poor Quality Control and re-work due to poor quality oversight. Material that has been installed incorrectly, for several months or years and across several hulls, and then has to be ripped out and re-installed correctly, is devastating. We build enough time into the IMS to build the ship once (and add a touch of buffer)—we can’t afford to build it twice.
Ineffective or no incentive to produce on time, or better yet, early—Performance incentives in government shipbuilding now seem to come with strings attached. The strings are called “offsets”. The deal goes something like “if you finish early or on time you will earn an extra $1M—but you must give us offsets and pay for tug services for trials, at sea support for trials, and the christening ceremony”. This can be perceived as a disincentive by shipbuilders: “If I don’t finish early or on time, I still have to pay the offsets…no thanks, we’ll skip the opportunity for $1M. Let’s just go back to making incentives pure incentive. You finish early or on time you earn the award. I have seen this as a huge motivator, and the yard involved finished early!
Fixing a late program—Fix it early and substantially. A lagging program that continues to fall behind over a 5-year build cycle is very difficult to catch up in the 11th hour—fix it when the late deviation occurs and be aggressive. There are only so many levers to pull to do this: Work current workers longer, hire more workers, descope work, reduce quality, leverage automation to be more efficient, or re-work the schedule (re-baselining). Sometimes a combination of these may be required. Work a couple of weekends to get caught up and pretty soon most employees are interested in getting “it” done during normal working hours.
Ineffective status reports—Our weekly status reports tend to be pure reporting, telling the reader there is a problem, likely has a stoplight color, but that is it. There is no description of the actual issue, what the impact is to operations/schedule, what the fix is, when the new part is due in, how long to install and what the Estimated Completion Date (ECD) is—this is the hard part and most important part, what does the outage/shortfall mean and what are we doing to fix it. Also listed on each item should be the Responsible Individual (RI) and company (if a subcontractor)—so leadership will know who to contact to get more information, or lite a fire under. The other problem with status reports is they don’t show progress relative to the whole job. I think of tank closures as an example. We know how many tanks have to close before PCD and how many tanks, on average, we should be expected to close out in a week. Create a glideslope to track closures. Build it backwards starting with some buffer (all tanks closed a week before they need to be) and then track it each week. If there are deviations on the late side, you don’t change the glideslope, you work extra to get back to glideslope and preserve the buffer to the last possible minute. Ideally you track below glideslope—ahead of schedule (“early is on time”).
The Program is King: Sometimes Operations or other entities will have different priorities than the PM’s. In one example the only yard bandsaw that could cut stiffeners went down. The operations team (building foreman) decided to shift the crew to working on different parts that didn’t need the saw. They created these parts for two weeks. The Program office saw this when walking the yard and asked about it. They didn’t need the parts the team was now cutting until 3 months from now, the next parts needed in succession were now also late. Operations should have talked with the PM’s—”the band saw is down for 2 weeks, what do you need us making right now?”
Contracting is another area that needs overhaul. Let’s set the wage levels for the skilled workers (besting regional pay levels for similar work at the foundry, paper mill, Amazon by 10-15%) in the Request for Proposals (RFP’s) so that all bidders compete with wages locked in. Otherwise, wages become one of the discretionary items in trying to win the award with a lower bid. When this happens we can’t hire or keep workers in execution. There are other contracting nuances that should be handled similarly but not enough space here.
In summary, we have the greatest skilled workers in the world, but we need more of them, a lot more. We are upgrading and improving our shipyards and expanding our capacity. We are leveraging technology and Industry 4.0 tools and techniques to improve our production capability. These are all terrific initiatives. The one piece that is missing is the rigor and attention to detail that brings these two together and gets the most out of each as efficiently as possible—we need more and better Program Management. Many shipyard and Navy leaders will tell you, yes, we know all of what has been talked about above. It is one thing to know it. It is quite another to DO IT and do it, not for a day or a week out of the gates, but for 5 years of construction, every day. This is the challenge. Shipbuilding is hard. It takes the whole team, working together and focused on three things every day for the duration of the program: 1. Quality work the first time done safely; 2. Work done on or ahead of schedule; 3. Work done on or under budget. We can be the world’s best and biggest builder of ships again if we focus on the correct things, including world class program management, and performing with a sense of urgency.
Rear Admiral Kent Whalen, USN (Ret.), commanded the VFA-34 Blue Blasters, USS JUNEAU/USS DENVER, USS CARL VINSON, and CSG 12. In retirement he was a shipyard General Manager and Director of Shipyard Operations and now works as a consultant for The Spectrum Group.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
[1] Congressional Research Service. Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Pillar 1 Project: Background and Issues for Congress. July 24, 2024.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Rear Admiral (ret.) Kent Whalen, USN
It is very obvious to everyone by now that we are in a shipbuilding revival in the United States. This is by necessity as we counter a rising China and it’s quickly expanding Navy. The current Administration is rightly leading the charge on this, and Congress is providing vast sums of money to improve our capabilities quickly. There are several areas that need focus and resources if we are going to be successful.
One key area is growing the number of skilled workers in this country, something that has atrophied over the last 10-15 years. We need more welders, more machinists, more electricians, more of just about everything. One effort already in operation is the Navy’s Accelerated Training in Defense Manufacturing (ATDM) program in Danville, VA—the leading program in the Nation, first among many. ATDM just graduated it’s 1,000th student in little over 4 years. By the end of 2027 it will be graduating 1,000 new skilled workers per year in Welding, CNC Machining, NDT, Metrology and Additive Manufacturing. More skilled workers are one pillar that supports optimal shipbuilding.
Another pillar is Shipbuilding Infrastructure. There have been many recent articles written about the decay and downright loss of many of our shipyards and ship repair facilities. At least one of our drydocks dates from the late 1700’s. Again, Congress has acted to provide funds to improve current facilities with new docks, new piers and seawalls, new buildings and the latest technology in machines and tooling. The Navy and Industry are working hard to bring the promise of Additive Manufacturing to bear on the issue of parts availability and timeliness. Improved Shipbuilding Infrastructure, Machinery, and Tooling is a second pillar.
The third pillar of shipbuilding is rarely if ever talked about…but is vitally important. It is the piece that allows the thousands of skilled workers, giving 100% day in and day out in the best built and outfitted shipyards in the world, to perform effectively and efficiently together, optimizing output across the entire shipyard. This third pillar is Program Management.
When most people hear Program Management they think, yeah, you build a couple of Gant charts, pick out a critical path, keep that close to on time with an Integrated Master Schedule and it will take care of itself. Nothing could be further from the truth.
To be an electrical engineer you have to go to college for 4 years—then you know enough to get started. To be an accountant you need 4 years of school and then have to pass a certification exam. To be a lawyer, you need 6-7 years of school and then have to pass the bar exam. To be deemed a program manager and be responsible for profit and loss of hundreds of millions of dollars you don’t really need any of that today. An individual might have picked up some Operations Analysis, or Risk Management, or Statistics, or Project Planning as part of their engineering or MBA program. There is the Project Management Program (PMP) certification process—this is expensive and takes an individual’s own time to complete.
We must put some rigor and qualification levels on who can be program managers, like the other professions described above. Let’s upskill current PM’s with Program Management training, hire new PM’s with the right skills, build some shipbuilding specific PM courses and best practices so our PM’s of the future are armed for success.
In the interim there are many areas of effective and efficient shipyard program management that can be adjusted today to drive towards improved program performance. What follows is a start:
Contracting is another area that needs overhaul. Let’s set the wage levels for the skilled workers (besting regional pay levels for similar work at the foundry, paper mill, Amazon by 10-15%) in the Request for Proposals (RFP’s) so that all bidders compete with wages locked in. Otherwise, wages become one of the discretionary items in trying to win the award with a lower bid. When this happens we can’t hire or keep workers in execution. There are other contracting nuances that should be handled similarly but not enough space here.
In summary, we have the greatest skilled workers in the world, but we need more of them, a lot more. We are upgrading and improving our shipyards and expanding our capacity. We are leveraging technology and Industry 4.0 tools and techniques to improve our production capability. These are all terrific initiatives. The one piece that is missing is the rigor and attention to detail that brings these two together and gets the most out of each as efficiently as possible—we need more and better Program Management. Many shipyard and Navy leaders will tell you, yes, we know all of what has been talked about above. It is one thing to know it. It is quite another to DO IT and do it, not for a day or a week out of the gates, but for 5 years of construction, every day. This is the challenge. Shipbuilding is hard. It takes the whole team, working together and focused on three things every day for the duration of the program: 1. Quality work the first time done safely; 2. Work done on or ahead of schedule; 3. Work done on or under budget. We can be the world’s best and biggest builder of ships again if we focus on the correct things, including world class program management, and performing with a sense of urgency.
Rear Admiral Kent Whalen, USN (Ret.), commanded the VFA-34 Blue Blasters, USS JUNEAU/USS DENVER, USS CARL VINSON, and CSG 12. In retirement he was a shipyard General Manager and Director of Shipyard Operations and now works as a consultant for The Spectrum Group.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
[1] Congressional Research Service. Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Pillar 1 Project: Background and Issues for Congress. July 24, 2024.