The United States needs to go deep (sea) with allies to compete with China
The MOC
By
Anna Matilde Bassoli, Claire Astrid Fuchs
November 20, 2025
In April 2025, the Trump administration issued two Executive Orders (EO) to wean the United States away from China’s dominance in the maritime domain, making deep-sea mining and shipbuilding two of its priorities. However, the United States is still missing a clear strategy to link the two and make deep-sea mining its trump card against China’s grip on shipbuilding. No US shipbuilding plan will succeed without advancements against China’s control of critical minerals, and strategic partnerships with Pacific nations are the policy solutions that the United States must pursue.
On April 9, 2025, the “Restoring American Maritime Dominance” EO initiated a whole-of-government effort to revitalize US shipbuilding after years of decay. Specifically, the EO instructed several US departments to identify areas for investments that expand the US maritime industrial base and counter China’s shipbuilding dominance. Shortly after this EO, on April 24, the Trump administration issued another EO entitled “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources.” This EO sets seabed mineral extraction within the US Outer Continental Shelf as a salient US national security policy. Deep-sea mining would indeed create “robust” domestic supply chains for military preparedness and reindustrialization, tapering the United States off from China’s grasp on critical minerals. This EO also carries another critical implication for US national security: employing deep-sea mining to power the US shipbuilding renaissance.
Why critical minerals are crucial for shipbuilding
Critical minerals power every US military system. Some minerals, such as cobalt, lithium, and tungsten are key for building submarines, a capability in which China is catching up to the United States. Likewise, cobalt and other minerals such as nickel and copper are critical for propulsion systems, sensors, and weapons of surface vessels. Because the Trump administration’s shipbuilding plan hinges upon expanding production of naval capabilities, these minerals are critical to these revitalization efforts.
Further, the 2025 US Navy shipbuilding plan sets the target for 381 battle force ships by 2054. For this plan, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that US shipyards will need to produce more ships than they have in the past 10 years. At present, this result cannot come without sourcing critical minerals from China, whose critical mineral dominance gives it the upper hand on these key supply chains for US shipbuilding. Rare earths, a subcategory of critical minerals that comprise 17 metals, also play an important role. In 2024, the US Government Accountability Office reported that over 70 percent of US imports of rare earths come from China. The overreliance on China for critical minerals constrains the Trump administration’s plans for revitalizing US shipbuilding, forcing the United States to rely on China’s supply chains in the short term while buying time to find alternative sources.
Because minerals are critical to the Trump administration’s shipbuilding renaissance, China’s grip on their extraction and processing is a challenge for the United States. Deep-sea mining, however, can access high-grade critical metallic polymetallic nodules, cobalt-rich ferro-manganese crust, and seafloor massive sulphides, all of which are found with superior metallic grades and in larger amounts compared to land-based mineral deposits. Specifically, conservative estimates assess that 21.1 billion dry tons of polymetallic nodules can be found in the 6 million square km Clarion Clipperton Zone (CCZ) in the Pacific Ocean. Because of their superior quality and quantity, deep-sea deposits could become a critical asset to ensure that US shipbuilding decouples from China’s critical mineral supply chain at the speed and breadth necessary. Yet, to make deep-sea mining the trump card against China’s dominance in both shipbuilding and critical minerals, the United States needs to act now.
How China is trying to get ahead of the deep-sea mining game
China is already targeting deep-sea mining via partnerships as part of its ongoing strategy to maintain critical minerals dominance. In February 2025, China reached an agreement with the Cook Islands to jointly engage in sustainable deep-sea mining activities in the Cook Islands’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). One month later, in March 2025, the Chinese Ambassador to Kiribati, Zhou Limin, held discussions with Kiribati’s Ministry of Fisheries and Ocean Resources to explore a possible deep-sea resource agreement. The area of interest for China is the 75,000 square km area within the CCZ that Kiribati holds exploration rights to, and which has rich deposits of dozens of critical minerals, including nickel, manganese, cobalt and copper. Notably, the CCZ is only 500 miles south of Hawaii and is close to the US Outer Continental Shelf, the Trump administration’s primary geographic target for deep-sea mining.
The CCZ, which spans multiple countries, is managed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), a United Nations body that regulates deep-sea mining initiatives in international waters. In July 2025, the ISA was supposed to produce mining regulations by which miners could abide, yet the code was not finalized. In lieu, the ISA instructed all interested parties to refrain from any and all mining activities in the CCZ until regulations were complete. Despite the code not being finalized, the ISA and China still hosted Kiribati, one of the central countries in the CCZ, for professional training provisions through their Joint Training and Research Centre, signifying continued cooperation.
With or without international regulations, China’s partnership agreements grant it a head start to securing access to the minerals within the Cook Islands’ and possibly Kiribati’s EEZs, a region and industry that US policymakers have attempted to pivot towards. Upon commencement of mining activities, the CCZ will further expand China’s grasp on critical minerals with access to rich deposits of polymetallic nodules, key for manufacturing submarines and naval warfare capabilities. However, at present, the United States is a non-member observer of the ISA and thus cannot apply for American company sponsorship to mine within the CCZ under the ISA’s framework. The US missing presence at the ISA risks a steady growth of Chinese influence in the nascent deep-sea mining industry, while undermining US access to critical minerals.
Limits of current approach to meet the China challenge
The Trump administration’s EO is not the only step the United States has taken to strengthen its critical mineral supply chains. The first National Defense Industrial Strategy by the Biden administration was the first push to invest into land-based domestic mining projects. In July 2025, the US Senate underscored the importance of investments into critical minerals supply chains by adding $5 billion to the Defense Reconciliation Bill. Despite these investments, critical minerals are increasingly becoming less accessible to the United States. Since 2023, China has repeatedly used mineral export controls against the United States, mostly impacting those critical for advanced electronics and radar. China’s latest export controls in October 2025 have explicitly targeted the US defense sector, further threatening the US critical mineral supply chain for the defense industrial base.
China’s decisiveness in weaponizing supply chains has sent the United States into a frenzy seeking alternatives. As the April 2025 EO on deep-sea mining specified, “strengthening partnerships with allies and industry to counter China’s growing influence over seabed mineral resources” is a priority for the Trump administration. Within three months in 2025, the Trump administration has struck a deal with Ukraine, signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, launched the “Quad Critical Minerals Initiative” with Australia, India, and Japan, and struck a $8.5 billion agreement with Australia for “ready-to-go” mining and processing projects. While these initiatives grant the United States access to large deposits of lanthanum, cobalt, and copper, and strengthen allies and partners’ refining capabilities, they cannot provide the same quantity of critical minerals of deep-sea mining. For instance, while Australia produces 19 critical minerals in significant amounts, experts estimate that deep-sea mining in the US OCS contains 37 minerals. Although land-based mining can offer the United States short-term decoupling from China, deep-sea mining can jumpstart long-term resilience for US critical minerals supply chains.
Meeting the China challenge with targeted partnerships
Resorting to allies and partners is the critical strategic nexus to empower US critical minerals supply chains for shipbuilding. Second after China for shipbuilding capacity, South Korea has already proven a key US partner. In 2024, Hanwha bought Philly Shipyards, and since then, South Korean investments into US shipbuilding have steadily increased. A similar pattern is emerging for critical minerals. Korea Zinc, the premier South Korean mining company, has pledged to help the United States decouple from China-dominated supply chains. These are critical partnerships for the United States to secure critical mineral supply chains and increase shipyard automation to fulfill its shipbuilding objectives.
However, land-based partnerships can only provide partial relief to US critical minerals woes. Because deep-sea mining grants access to high-grade polymetallic nodules and cobalt with metal grades higher than those found in land mining, the Trump administration’s shipbuilding plans must engage with deep-sea mining opportunities. Crucially, the plans must include partnerships with countries who have territorial access to the CCZ, such as Nauru and Tonga. Deep-sea mining could be the only way to secure the critical mineral supply chain for US shipbuilding at the speed and breadth necessary to counter China’s dominance. There is no more time to lose.
Anna Matilde Bassoli holds a Master of Arts in Security Studies from Georgetown University and a Master of Letters in Strategic Studies from the University of St Andrews. She also earned a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations at Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, Italy. She currently serves as the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP) Rising Expert in Defense.
Claire Astrid Fuchs is an Eisenhower Global Scholar pursuing a Master of Public Policy at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, where she examines the nexus of national security policies and human rights. Furthermore, she is geopolitical analyst at Janes, specializing in Chinese and Russian investment in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. She analyzes critical sectors like mining and seaports using OSINT tradecraft and multilingual research. She currently serves as the YPFP Rising Expert in Geostrategy where she writes on geopolitical issues affecting military, intelligence and political strategies. She speaks nine languages to varying degrees.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Anna Matilde Bassoli, Claire Astrid Fuchs
In April 2025, the Trump administration issued two Executive Orders (EO) to wean the United States away from China’s dominance in the maritime domain, making deep-sea mining and shipbuilding two of its priorities. However, the United States is still missing a clear strategy to link the two and make deep-sea mining its trump card against China’s grip on shipbuilding. No US shipbuilding plan will succeed without advancements against China’s control of critical minerals, and strategic partnerships with Pacific nations are the policy solutions that the United States must pursue.
On April 9, 2025, the “Restoring American Maritime Dominance” EO initiated a whole-of-government effort to revitalize US shipbuilding after years of decay. Specifically, the EO instructed several US departments to identify areas for investments that expand the US maritime industrial base and counter China’s shipbuilding dominance. Shortly after this EO, on April 24, the Trump administration issued another EO entitled “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources.” This EO sets seabed mineral extraction within the US Outer Continental Shelf as a salient US national security policy. Deep-sea mining would indeed create “robust” domestic supply chains for military preparedness and reindustrialization, tapering the United States off from China’s grasp on critical minerals. This EO also carries another critical implication for US national security: employing deep-sea mining to power the US shipbuilding renaissance.
Why critical minerals are crucial for shipbuilding
Critical minerals power every US military system. Some minerals, such as cobalt, lithium, and tungsten are key for building submarines, a capability in which China is catching up to the United States. Likewise, cobalt and other minerals such as nickel and copper are critical for propulsion systems, sensors, and weapons of surface vessels. Because the Trump administration’s shipbuilding plan hinges upon expanding production of naval capabilities, these minerals are critical to these revitalization efforts.
Further, the 2025 US Navy shipbuilding plan sets the target for 381 battle force ships by 2054. For this plan, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that US shipyards will need to produce more ships than they have in the past 10 years. At present, this result cannot come without sourcing critical minerals from China, whose critical mineral dominance gives it the upper hand on these key supply chains for US shipbuilding. Rare earths, a subcategory of critical minerals that comprise 17 metals, also play an important role. In 2024, the US Government Accountability Office reported that over 70 percent of US imports of rare earths come from China. The overreliance on China for critical minerals constrains the Trump administration’s plans for revitalizing US shipbuilding, forcing the United States to rely on China’s supply chains in the short term while buying time to find alternative sources.
Because minerals are critical to the Trump administration’s shipbuilding renaissance, China’s grip on their extraction and processing is a challenge for the United States. Deep-sea mining, however, can access high-grade critical metallic polymetallic nodules, cobalt-rich ferro-manganese crust, and seafloor massive sulphides, all of which are found with superior metallic grades and in larger amounts compared to land-based mineral deposits. Specifically, conservative estimates assess that 21.1 billion dry tons of polymetallic nodules can be found in the 6 million square km Clarion Clipperton Zone (CCZ) in the Pacific Ocean. Because of their superior quality and quantity, deep-sea deposits could become a critical asset to ensure that US shipbuilding decouples from China’s critical mineral supply chain at the speed and breadth necessary. Yet, to make deep-sea mining the trump card against China’s dominance in both shipbuilding and critical minerals, the United States needs to act now.
How China is trying to get ahead of the deep-sea mining game
China is already targeting deep-sea mining via partnerships as part of its ongoing strategy to maintain critical minerals dominance. In February 2025, China reached an agreement with the Cook Islands to jointly engage in sustainable deep-sea mining activities in the Cook Islands’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). One month later, in March 2025, the Chinese Ambassador to Kiribati, Zhou Limin, held discussions with Kiribati’s Ministry of Fisheries and Ocean Resources to explore a possible deep-sea resource agreement. The area of interest for China is the 75,000 square km area within the CCZ that Kiribati holds exploration rights to, and which has rich deposits of dozens of critical minerals, including nickel, manganese, cobalt and copper. Notably, the CCZ is only 500 miles south of Hawaii and is close to the US Outer Continental Shelf, the Trump administration’s primary geographic target for deep-sea mining.
The CCZ, which spans multiple countries, is managed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), a United Nations body that regulates deep-sea mining initiatives in international waters. In July 2025, the ISA was supposed to produce mining regulations by which miners could abide, yet the code was not finalized. In lieu, the ISA instructed all interested parties to refrain from any and all mining activities in the CCZ until regulations were complete. Despite the code not being finalized, the ISA and China still hosted Kiribati, one of the central countries in the CCZ, for professional training provisions through their Joint Training and Research Centre, signifying continued cooperation.
With or without international regulations, China’s partnership agreements grant it a head start to securing access to the minerals within the Cook Islands’ and possibly Kiribati’s EEZs, a region and industry that US policymakers have attempted to pivot towards. Upon commencement of mining activities, the CCZ will further expand China’s grasp on critical minerals with access to rich deposits of polymetallic nodules, key for manufacturing submarines and naval warfare capabilities. However, at present, the United States is a non-member observer of the ISA and thus cannot apply for American company sponsorship to mine within the CCZ under the ISA’s framework. The US missing presence at the ISA risks a steady growth of Chinese influence in the nascent deep-sea mining industry, while undermining US access to critical minerals.
Limits of current approach to meet the China challenge
The Trump administration’s EO is not the only step the United States has taken to strengthen its critical mineral supply chains. The first National Defense Industrial Strategy by the Biden administration was the first push to invest into land-based domestic mining projects. In July 2025, the US Senate underscored the importance of investments into critical minerals supply chains by adding $5 billion to the Defense Reconciliation Bill. Despite these investments, critical minerals are increasingly becoming less accessible to the United States. Since 2023, China has repeatedly used mineral export controls against the United States, mostly impacting those critical for advanced electronics and radar. China’s latest export controls in October 2025 have explicitly targeted the US defense sector, further threatening the US critical mineral supply chain for the defense industrial base.
China’s decisiveness in weaponizing supply chains has sent the United States into a frenzy seeking alternatives. As the April 2025 EO on deep-sea mining specified, “strengthening partnerships with allies and industry to counter China’s growing influence over seabed mineral resources” is a priority for the Trump administration. Within three months in 2025, the Trump administration has struck a deal with Ukraine, signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, launched the “Quad Critical Minerals Initiative” with Australia, India, and Japan, and struck a $8.5 billion agreement with Australia for “ready-to-go” mining and processing projects. While these initiatives grant the United States access to large deposits of lanthanum, cobalt, and copper, and strengthen allies and partners’ refining capabilities, they cannot provide the same quantity of critical minerals of deep-sea mining. For instance, while Australia produces 19 critical minerals in significant amounts, experts estimate that deep-sea mining in the US OCS contains 37 minerals. Although land-based mining can offer the United States short-term decoupling from China, deep-sea mining can jumpstart long-term resilience for US critical minerals supply chains.
Meeting the China challenge with targeted partnerships
Resorting to allies and partners is the critical strategic nexus to empower US critical minerals supply chains for shipbuilding. Second after China for shipbuilding capacity, South Korea has already proven a key US partner. In 2024, Hanwha bought Philly Shipyards, and since then, South Korean investments into US shipbuilding have steadily increased. A similar pattern is emerging for critical minerals. Korea Zinc, the premier South Korean mining company, has pledged to help the United States decouple from China-dominated supply chains. These are critical partnerships for the United States to secure critical mineral supply chains and increase shipyard automation to fulfill its shipbuilding objectives.
However, land-based partnerships can only provide partial relief to US critical minerals woes. Because deep-sea mining grants access to high-grade polymetallic nodules and cobalt with metal grades higher than those found in land mining, the Trump administration’s shipbuilding plans must engage with deep-sea mining opportunities. Crucially, the plans must include partnerships with countries who have territorial access to the CCZ, such as Nauru and Tonga. Deep-sea mining could be the only way to secure the critical mineral supply chain for US shipbuilding at the speed and breadth necessary to counter China’s dominance. There is no more time to lose.
Anna Matilde Bassoli holds a Master of Arts in Security Studies from Georgetown University and a Master of Letters in Strategic Studies from the University of St Andrews. She also earned a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations at Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, Italy. She currently serves as the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP) Rising Expert in Defense.
Claire Astrid Fuchs is an Eisenhower Global Scholar pursuing a Master of Public Policy at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government, where she examines the nexus of national security policies and human rights. Furthermore, she is geopolitical analyst at Janes, specializing in Chinese and Russian investment in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. She analyzes critical sectors like mining and seaports using OSINT tradecraft and multilingual research. She currently serves as the YPFP Rising Expert in Geostrategy where she writes on geopolitical issues affecting military, intelligence and political strategies. She speaks nine languages to varying degrees.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.