Book Review: The Price of Victory: A Naval History of Britain, 1815-1945
The MOC
By
Ken Brown
October 15, 2025
Rodgers is an engaging author whose prose is a pleasure to read. The current volume is solidly embedded in this style. This volume is the third in a three-volume series addressing Britain and its relationship with its navy. The series covers the period 660 to 1945. This volume, The Price of Victory: A Naval History of Britain, 1815-1945, discusses the end of the Napoleonic wars to the end of World War II, although there is some mention of the post-war period. The epilogue extends the narrative from the end of World War II through 2024 and the war in Ukraine. However, there is short shrift given to events after WWII, for example the Falkland’s warranted a portion of an extended paragraph and the incursion into the Suez Canal, a page.
The book is organized in recurring chapter themes covering naval operations, administration and personnel/social history within a chronological structure. The preface declaims that the book is not exclusively about the Royal Navy. It is. Although there are occasional digressions about the merchant marine and coast guard, the Royal Navy is always squarely at the center of the text. Given that caveat, the sweep of themes and perspectives makes for a comprehensive look at the Senior Service.
This volume opens at the dawn of Pax Britannica. The conquest of Napoleon left Britain as the sole power with absolute suzerainty over the world’s oceans. The British fleet of over 100 ships of the line were more than a match for any potential combination of rivals, especially a possible alliance between Russia and France. This was the nascent Two-Power standard. Not only are the consequences of the British victory over France explained, but the post-war scientific and anti-slavery endeavors of the Navy discussed. The organization of the Admiralty and the travails of the officers are shown. The incompetence of the British and French is shown against the Russians in Crimea. The technical developments of steam and paddle wheels replacing sails and the adoption of iron hulls is discussed, not only as a new technology, but also its implications for the development of an engineer officer group. Of particular interest for American readers is the contrast between the relatively smooth adoption of steam -savvy officers into the ranks of the Royal Navy (as opposed to the protracted struggle in the US Navy). The recurring problem of reconciling the needs of the service and available numbers and adequately trained men is a recurring issue throughout the Service’s history in this volume.
The operations of the Royal Navy in World War I are not recounted in great detail. Here Rodgers is to be given credit for avoiding such a digression. The operations of the navy during the World Wars have been recounted extensively elsewhere. The battle of Jutland’s estimation within the Service is given more space than the gyrations of the opposing fleets. Arguably the great feud that resulted from the battle between Beatty and Jellicoe (commanders of the Battlecruiser squadron and the Grand Fleet, respectively) is not, in my estimation, given sufficient space. The battle of Jutland, one of the most important battles in modern naval history, is afforded four pages of description. However, the thrust of the book does not recount battles. The tactics of the battle of Jutland has been explored and recounted by the legion. Throughout the book battles are used to discuss issues that are derived from them. I was able to correspond with the grandson of Sir John Jellicoe, Nicholas Jellicoe, who has written books on the battle of Jutland, the scuttling of the High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow and the role of his grandfather in the convoy battles of World War I, among others. I asked him to respond to passages related to the battle of Jutland. I asked about the damage wrought upon the High Seas’ battle cruiser squadron’s escape and the failure of Admiral Jellicoe to destroy the German fleet. Rodger asserts that Jellicoe squandered the opportunity to annihilate the German fleet.
This was the moment for Jellicoe to claim his victory by a close pursuit, but he was still obsessed by the thought of destroyer or submarine trap, though he knew that the Germans had been caught by surprise, and it was rationally impossible for them to set up such a thing in the past few hours of hard steaming. (p. 248)
Nicholas Jellicoe reacted to this as follows:
I don’t think it was exposure that caused so much damage to the BC (battle cruiser) fleet. More that Beatty failed to use some of the advantages he had: superiority of numbers (even without waiting to get even heavier support from the Queen Elizabeths’ 15” guns. JRJ (Admiral Sir John Jellicoe) warned him against his “fox-hunting” nature saying the Germans would play it against him), an Nelsonic obsession with “closing the enemy” rather that using his slight range and speed advantages (the speed issue of speed has been over-stated), poor gunnery and plotting (a difference with JRJ’s more logical, slower opening rates with more rapid commencing ONLY when range was acquired. Lion’s opening salvos massively overshot), bad signaling (he should have gotten rid of Seymour (Admiral Beatty’s Flag Lieutenant) after Dogger Bank and thought about what had gone wrong), slovenly ammunition handling (this applies to the BF ships as well) etc.
He also added:
Talking of Nelson, the RN (Royal Navy) has never been able to shake itself free from the mythologised shadow of Trafalgar or Nelson’s personal role, not denying his brilliance as a commander. The physical separation of BCF (Battle Cruiser Fleet) and BF (Battle Fleet) bases, necessary as it was in many respects, led to Beatty’s desire to be an independent fleet to be underlined. There was a certain amount of animosity between Scheer and Hipper, but Hipper did a superb job as commander of the Aufkarungsgruppe. Beatty left RJR in the dark at a critical moment in the evolving battle.
In relation to Admiral Jellicoe’s character, Nicholas added:
JRJ lacked the toughness of character needed in a commander to deal with subordinates who needed to be replaced (though his request to remove the equivalent of the “Funf minutes” ships (the armoured cruisers) was, sadly, ignored).
Furthermore, Rodgers stated: “The British reacted to their almost-victory with anguished disappointment. It was obvious that failures of British training, organization and equipment had allowed the High Seas Fleet to escape from immanent destruction.” (p. 249).
In reaction to Rodger’s assertion that the British public felt let down by the Navy, Nicholas Jellicoe had this retort.
Media created the public’s expectations, was exceptionally badly handled until Churchill cleared the picture a little, and eventually it was the media that JRJ’s downfall was prepared by LG etc. Beatty, here, understood media far better. JRJ, however, went to work immediately, once back in Scapa, setting up committees to try to get to the bottom of most of the major issues though he later lamented that he lessons “never seemed to be learned.” Again, media steered the debate back to the two personalities and the camps that often took their own direction much against the wishes of either admiral. It still goes on today. Good for writers, but the fact of the debate so often falls back on the sacred Nelson tenet of the offensive a la Andrew Gordon or even, at the time, Eric Grove.
The attention to World War I is considerable, as it should be. The angst that the U-boats caused and the scramble to develop countermeasures is recounted. The administrative and organizational changes wrought by that conflict are given their due and the increasing competition with the United States Navy is shown. The interwar years are discussed. The various treaties limiting naval development are recounted. A significant omission is the lack of discussion of Admiral Jellicoe’s ‘Empire Cruise’ from 1919-1920. In my estimation this was an important incident in the development of the Dominion navies and the strategic difficulties that faced the Royal Navy after the First World War.
World War II terminates the monograph. The epilogue takes the narration through to 2024. However, there is less than two pages to discuss the Falklands War so, although there is narration up to today, the analysis effectively ends when World War II does.
Overall, Rodger’s work is a worthy addition to the groaning literature on the Royal Navy. There is nothing here that breaks new ground. However, he brings together issues of administration, personnel and technology, in addition to the typical operations and organization analysis. As an introduction to the history of the 20th century Royal Navy, this work is a good overview of issues related to the evolution of the Senior Service.
Ken Brown is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Plymouth (UK) in naval history and is a District Manager at Bronx Community Board 5 in New York City.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Ken Brown
Rodgers is an engaging author whose prose is a pleasure to read. The current volume is solidly embedded in this style. This volume is the third in a three-volume series addressing Britain and its relationship with its navy. The series covers the period 660 to 1945. This volume, The Price of Victory: A Naval History of Britain, 1815-1945, discusses the end of the Napoleonic wars to the end of World War II, although there is some mention of the post-war period. The epilogue extends the narrative from the end of World War II through 2024 and the war in Ukraine. However, there is short shrift given to events after WWII, for example the Falkland’s warranted a portion of an extended paragraph and the incursion into the Suez Canal, a page.
The book is organized in recurring chapter themes covering naval operations, administration and personnel/social history within a chronological structure. The preface declaims that the book is not exclusively about the Royal Navy. It is. Although there are occasional digressions about the merchant marine and coast guard, the Royal Navy is always squarely at the center of the text. Given that caveat, the sweep of themes and perspectives makes for a comprehensive look at the Senior Service.
This volume opens at the dawn of Pax Britannica. The conquest of Napoleon left Britain as the sole power with absolute suzerainty over the world’s oceans. The British fleet of over 100 ships of the line were more than a match for any potential combination of rivals, especially a possible alliance between Russia and France. This was the nascent Two-Power standard. Not only are the consequences of the British victory over France explained, but the post-war scientific and anti-slavery endeavors of the Navy discussed. The organization of the Admiralty and the travails of the officers are shown. The incompetence of the British and French is shown against the Russians in Crimea. The technical developments of steam and paddle wheels replacing sails and the adoption of iron hulls is discussed, not only as a new technology, but also its implications for the development of an engineer officer group. Of particular interest for American readers is the contrast between the relatively smooth adoption of steam -savvy officers into the ranks of the Royal Navy (as opposed to the protracted struggle in the US Navy). The recurring problem of reconciling the needs of the service and available numbers and adequately trained men is a recurring issue throughout the Service’s history in this volume.
The operations of the Royal Navy in World War I are not recounted in great detail. Here Rodgers is to be given credit for avoiding such a digression. The operations of the navy during the World Wars have been recounted extensively elsewhere. The battle of Jutland’s estimation within the Service is given more space than the gyrations of the opposing fleets. Arguably the great feud that resulted from the battle between Beatty and Jellicoe (commanders of the Battlecruiser squadron and the Grand Fleet, respectively) is not, in my estimation, given sufficient space. The battle of Jutland, one of the most important battles in modern naval history, is afforded four pages of description. However, the thrust of the book does not recount battles. The tactics of the battle of Jutland has been explored and recounted by the legion. Throughout the book battles are used to discuss issues that are derived from them. I was able to correspond with the grandson of Sir John Jellicoe, Nicholas Jellicoe, who has written books on the battle of Jutland, the scuttling of the High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow and the role of his grandfather in the convoy battles of World War I, among others. I asked him to respond to passages related to the battle of Jutland. I asked about the damage wrought upon the High Seas’ battle cruiser squadron’s escape and the failure of Admiral Jellicoe to destroy the German fleet. Rodger asserts that Jellicoe squandered the opportunity to annihilate the German fleet.
This was the moment for Jellicoe to claim his victory by a close pursuit, but he was still obsessed by the thought of destroyer or submarine trap, though he knew that the Germans had been caught by surprise, and it was rationally impossible for them to set up such a thing in the past few hours of hard steaming. (p. 248)
Nicholas Jellicoe reacted to this as follows:
He also added:
In relation to Admiral Jellicoe’s character, Nicholas added:
Furthermore, Rodgers stated: “The British reacted to their almost-victory with anguished disappointment. It was obvious that failures of British training, organization and equipment had allowed the High Seas Fleet to escape from immanent destruction.” (p. 249).
In reaction to Rodger’s assertion that the British public felt let down by the Navy, Nicholas Jellicoe had this retort.
Media created the public’s expectations, was exceptionally badly handled until Churchill cleared the picture a little, and eventually it was the media that JRJ’s downfall was prepared by LG etc. Beatty, here, understood media far better. JRJ, however, went to work immediately, once back in Scapa, setting up committees to try to get to the bottom of most of the major issues though he later lamented that he lessons “never seemed to be learned.” Again, media steered the debate back to the two personalities and the camps that often took their own direction much against the wishes of either admiral. It still goes on today. Good for writers, but the fact of the debate so often falls back on the sacred Nelson tenet of the offensive a la Andrew Gordon or even, at the time, Eric Grove.
The attention to World War I is considerable, as it should be. The angst that the U-boats caused and the scramble to develop countermeasures is recounted. The administrative and organizational changes wrought by that conflict are given their due and the increasing competition with the United States Navy is shown. The interwar years are discussed. The various treaties limiting naval development are recounted. A significant omission is the lack of discussion of Admiral Jellicoe’s ‘Empire Cruise’ from 1919-1920. In my estimation this was an important incident in the development of the Dominion navies and the strategic difficulties that faced the Royal Navy after the First World War.
World War II terminates the monograph. The epilogue takes the narration through to 2024. However, there is less than two pages to discuss the Falklands War so, although there is narration up to today, the analysis effectively ends when World War II does.
Overall, Rodger’s work is a worthy addition to the groaning literature on the Royal Navy. There is nothing here that breaks new ground. However, he brings together issues of administration, personnel and technology, in addition to the typical operations and organization analysis. As an introduction to the history of the 20th century Royal Navy, this work is a good overview of issues related to the evolution of the Senior Service.
Ken Brown is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Plymouth (UK) in naval history and is a District Manager at Bronx Community Board 5 in New York City.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.