Demonstrating the NATO Maritime Strategy in Neptune Strike 25-3
The MOC
By
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
September 26, 2025
NATO’s new maritime strategy was put to the test this month. Published in July 2025, the language in the introduction of the NATO Maritime Strategy is both sobering and foreboding:
The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. An attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be discounted, therefore, the Alliance must be prepared for the “fight tonight” and the “fight tomorrow.”
The assertion that the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace played out throughout the region, starting with Russian violations of Polish airspace with multiple drone incursions on 10 September. NATO air policing units responded and several of the drones were shot down, while the rest crash landed in Poland after loitering on station.
The next event occurred on 19 September with a brazen Russian Federation Air Force incursion into Estonian air space with armed MiG-31 fighter jets that remained for 12 minutes. This was not pilot error and heretofore unprecedented for that length of time. In response, Italian F-35s on a NATO Air Policing mission were able to respond and escort the Russian MiGs out of Estonia’s airspace.
The Russian operation was a deliberate violation of Estonian sovereignty and a clear provocation by the Russian Federation. Since then, there has been an uptick in elicit drone activity in the vicinity of Oslo and Copenhagen international airports, shutting down the air space in the vicinity and disrupting numerous flights.
Poland and Estonia called for Article 4 consultations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Article 4 is part of the Washington Treaty of 1949 that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and it reads as follows:
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
After the recent consultations, the North Atlantic Council, composed of one ambassador from each of the NATO member countries, resolved to:
Employ, in accordance with International law, all necessary military and non-military tools to defend ourselves.[2]
Since the Polish airspace incursion, NATO has also activated operation “Eastern Sentry” along NATO borders in Eastern Europe to increase its ability to further respond to such events. [3]
While all this has been going on in the air domain, NATO navies have been busy in the maritime domain. The new NATO maritime strategy maintains that NATO maritime power provides freedom of action across multiple warfare domains and in all three dimensions (physical, informational, and human). Maritime forces employ their unique characteristics and versatility to deploy, deter, sustain and secure the Alliance across the Peace-Crisis-Conflict Spectrum.
The good news is that Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) was already at sea during the Article 4 consultations in Brussels, fulfilling the requirements of the NATO Maritime Strategy with enhanced vigilance activity Neptune Strike 25-3. This is the third iteration of Neptune Strike this year and the international contributions of ships and capabilities was indeed impressive. The list includes the world’s newest and most advanced aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford and her destroyer escorts, Türkiye’s amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu and her escorts, Italy’s amphibious landing ship, ITS San Giorgio, and the command and control ship USS Mount Whitney. A host of other NATO nations also joined Neptune Strike with activities spanning across the North Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic region.
It is important to remember that an undertaking of the size and scope of Neptune Strike requires seamless integration of multi-national NATO warships across a large expanse of ocean. Aggregating this force at sea to conduct complex naval maneuvers to assure deterrence requires good training, maintenance, and interoperability. The syllabus for Neptune Strike 25-3 is full of tactical serials including air-to-air interactions with the carrier air wing operating in tandem with land-based aircraft from various Allied nations, air refueling operations, amphibious operations at sea and ashore, missile defense and gunnery exercises, and maritime interdiction operations, just to name a few.
The main reason for an enhanced vigilance activity continuum like Neptune Strike is to keep naval forces at the ready, in the event that the threat environment increases above normal, as it did on 10 – 19 September. In fact, today’s environment is anything but normal.
One can conclude from the events of this week at sea that Neptune Strike 25-3 was indeed a resounding success. The Center for Maritime Strategy looks forward to future robust and dynamic interactions of the Neptune Strike series under the leadership and command and control of STRIKFORNATO.
Admiral James Foggo (ret.) is the Dean of The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
NATO’s new maritime strategy was put to the test this month. Published in July 2025, the language in the introduction of the NATO Maritime Strategy is both sobering and foreboding:
The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. An attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be discounted, therefore, the Alliance must be prepared for the “fight tonight” and the “fight tomorrow.”
The assertion that the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace played out throughout the region, starting with Russian violations of Polish airspace with multiple drone incursions on 10 September. NATO air policing units responded and several of the drones were shot down, while the rest crash landed in Poland after loitering on station.
The next event occurred on 19 September with a brazen Russian Federation Air Force incursion into Estonian air space with armed MiG-31 fighter jets that remained for 12 minutes. This was not pilot error and heretofore unprecedented for that length of time. In response, Italian F-35s on a NATO Air Policing mission were able to respond and escort the Russian MiGs out of Estonia’s airspace.
The Russian operation was a deliberate violation of Estonian sovereignty and a clear provocation by the Russian Federation. Since then, there has been an uptick in elicit drone activity in the vicinity of Oslo and Copenhagen international airports, shutting down the air space in the vicinity and disrupting numerous flights.
Poland and Estonia called for Article 4 consultations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Article 4 is part of the Washington Treaty of 1949 that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and it reads as follows:
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
After the recent consultations, the North Atlantic Council, composed of one ambassador from each of the NATO member countries, resolved to:
Employ, in accordance with International law, all necessary military and non-military tools to defend ourselves. [2]
Since the Polish airspace incursion, NATO has also activated operation “Eastern Sentry” along NATO borders in Eastern Europe to increase its ability to further respond to such events. [3]
While all this has been going on in the air domain, NATO navies have been busy in the maritime domain. The new NATO maritime strategy maintains that NATO maritime power provides freedom of action across multiple warfare domains and in all three dimensions (physical, informational, and human). Maritime forces employ their unique characteristics and versatility to deploy, deter, sustain and secure the Alliance across the Peace-Crisis-Conflict Spectrum.
The good news is that Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) was already at sea during the Article 4 consultations in Brussels, fulfilling the requirements of the NATO Maritime Strategy with enhanced vigilance activity Neptune Strike 25-3. This is the third iteration of Neptune Strike this year and the international contributions of ships and capabilities was indeed impressive. The list includes the world’s newest and most advanced aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford and her destroyer escorts, Türkiye’s amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu and her escorts, Italy’s amphibious landing ship, ITS San Giorgio, and the command and control ship USS Mount Whitney. A host of other NATO nations also joined Neptune Strike with activities spanning across the North Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic region.
It is important to remember that an undertaking of the size and scope of Neptune Strike requires seamless integration of multi-national NATO warships across a large expanse of ocean. Aggregating this force at sea to conduct complex naval maneuvers to assure deterrence requires good training, maintenance, and interoperability. The syllabus for Neptune Strike 25-3 is full of tactical serials including air-to-air interactions with the carrier air wing operating in tandem with land-based aircraft from various Allied nations, air refueling operations, amphibious operations at sea and ashore, missile defense and gunnery exercises, and maritime interdiction operations, just to name a few.
The main reason for an enhanced vigilance activity continuum like Neptune Strike is to keep naval forces at the ready, in the event that the threat environment increases above normal, as it did on 10 – 19 September. In fact, today’s environment is anything but normal.
One can conclude from the events of this week at sea that Neptune Strike 25-3 was indeed a resounding success. The Center for Maritime Strategy looks forward to future robust and dynamic interactions of the Neptune Strike series under the leadership and command and control of STRIKFORNATO.
Admiral James Foggo (ret.) is the Dean of The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.