Safety of navigation is not the priority. It’s the minimum. The surface warfare community’s narrow approach to navigation and seamanship training rewards risk-avoidance instead of risk-mitigation and prevents naval officers from mastering the skills needed for their primary duty—waging war at sea.
Charged with operating warships, Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) were particularly impacted by ensuing reforms. Mandatory United States Coast Guard “rules of the road” tests are now periodic with a 90% passing score, and four required courses were revised to include more rigorous seamanship and navigation training. SWOs now complete the Basic Division Officer’s Course (BDOC) and Officer of the Deck (OOD) Phase 1 before reporting to their first ship, and the Advanced Division Officer’s Course (ADOC) and OOD Phase 2 before reporting to their second. The entirety of the OOD courses and at least a quarter of BDOC and ADOC focus on navigation and seamanship, covering everything from broad topics like watch-team management and weather to more nuanced to topics like environmental protection compliance and celestial navigation. Officers also spend hours in hyper-realistic simulators navigating ports, straits, and open oceans. The courses culminate with written exams and pass-fail assessments in simulators. These graduates are well on their way to becoming professional mariners, but naval officers need to do more than navigate from one port to the next.
Many Americans would be surprised to learn that newly commissioned officers assigned to warships do not practice, not a single time, the evasive maneuvers required to defend against an inbound missile, torpedo, or drone before reporting to warships—the topics are not covered in presentations, exams, or simulator scenarios, and are mentioned less than a dozen times throughout BDOC.
While BDOC and ADOC include coursework on maritime warfare, there is no application of these principles to the maneuvering of a warship in naval operations or combat. The only simulator scenarios which explicitly involve maneuvering for naval operations vaguely cover underway replenishments, flight operations, and radio communications. This may have been sufficient training for what most peacetime warships see—routine transits of oceans, straits, and harbors, requiring strict adherence to the COLREGS—but our warships today find themselves in hostile seas with an emboldened near peer competitor on the horizon.
The courses make no effort to answer the real questions that an OOD must concern himself with: when is deviation from the rules of the road necessary to accomplish the mission? What is my role in verifying that missiles fired from the vertical launch system were effective? At what relative bearing will I no longer be able to engage an inbound missile with the close-in weapon system (CIWS)? The sole objective of the courses since their reform is to ensure that warships do not collide with vessels at sea. The result is the streamlined production of timid risk-avoidant professional mariners rather than competent risk-mitigating naval officers.
Some SWOs are willing to admit that the courses do a poor job of preparing them for operations at sea but argue that they can be taught tactical maneuvering upon arrival on their first ship. Others could share their experiences being flown from Rota or Manama to embark a warship sailing into harm’s way within days of their arrival with no time for such on-the-job training. The current practice is akin to having a naval aviator report to an aircraft carrier for his first deployment having never been taught to defend himself from a surface-to-air missile.
Professional mariners should know the principles of celestial navigation. Naval officers must know how to launch a helicopter from a flight deck while sailing in a formation 200 yards astern of another vessel. The easy solution is to lengthen the courses to cover both topics, but ships cannot accept further delays in the arrival of their crew. Prioritization is the only viable option, and the priority is, as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Daryl Caudle, said in his assumption of office remarks, to “deliver violence on behalf of our nation when called upon.”
If an OOD is unsure of environmental laws in international waters, she can find the relevant reference, call a more experienced officer, and take as much time as needed to decide whether to discharge waste over the side. But if that same OOD hears an urgent call on the internal network “missile inbound, starboard side” she has precious seconds to maneuver for optimal defense. While we need OODs prepared for both cases, the priority must always be to prepare for combat vice adherence to environmental laws.
Prioritization does not sacrifice competence, it breeds it. A naval officer able to navigate a mined harbor will be able to navigate the Straits of Gibraltar, but the reverse cannot be said of a professional mariner. Instead of using a simulated slalom course to teach a naval officer how his ship handles, teach him to navigate a narrow route cleared by a mine-countermeasure ship. The task will demand an even higher proficiency in shiphandling and allows the officer to make mistakes executing tactics he will need in a time of war. The only risk in the simulator is a poor mark from an assessor. In combat it is a ten foot by 12-foot hull rupture beneath the waterline.
There is no better place to study and practice high-risk naval operations than in the classroom or simulator. Instead of teaching officers to navigate dense traffic, teach them to maintain station while providing regional ballistic missile defense near dense traffic. An officer placed in a scenario where she must navigate from a harbor without the use of radios, radars, and GPS to deceive an adversary will be more prepared for a peace-time transit with those tools at her disposal. An officer trained to shoulder an adversary frigate while conducting freedom of navigation operations will be better suited to manage vessels within 3 nautical miles. Every sentence on the slides, every question on the exams, every scenario in the simulators must be explicitly related to the realities of modern naval operations and warfare.
The recently commissioned must understand and apply the rules of the road and the principles of seamanship and navigation, not as professional mariners, but as naval officers charged with waging war at sea in defense of their nation and its interests. A continued narrow focus on safety of navigation will jeopardize the surface fleet’s ability to execute its mission.
LT Sean F. Barry, USN, is a native of Long Island, New York, and graduate of Boston College. He serves as the Plans and Tactics Officer and Air Defense Officer aboard USS Jack H. Lucas (DDG 125), the first Flight III Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile Destroyer. He previously deployed to U.S. 5th Fleet and U.S. 6th Fleet in support of operations Prosperity Guardian, Poseidon Archer, and the defense of Israel. LT Barry is an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Warfare Tactics Instructor and is enrolled in the Naval War College’s Fleet Seminar Program.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By LT Sean F. Barry, USN
Safety of navigation is not the priority. It’s the minimum. The surface warfare community’s narrow approach to navigation and seamanship training rewards risk-avoidance instead of risk-mitigation and prevents naval officers from mastering the skills needed for their primary duty—waging war at sea.
In the aftermath of the 2017 USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) collisions the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Committee on Armed Services’ subcommittees, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Department of the Navy found a low standard of seamanship and a poor application of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) to be major contributing factors.
Charged with operating warships, Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) were particularly impacted by ensuing reforms. Mandatory United States Coast Guard “rules of the road” tests are now periodic with a 90% passing score, and four required courses were revised to include more rigorous seamanship and navigation training. SWOs now complete the Basic Division Officer’s Course (BDOC) and Officer of the Deck (OOD) Phase 1 before reporting to their first ship, and the Advanced Division Officer’s Course (ADOC) and OOD Phase 2 before reporting to their second. The entirety of the OOD courses and at least a quarter of BDOC and ADOC focus on navigation and seamanship, covering everything from broad topics like watch-team management and weather to more nuanced to topics like environmental protection compliance and celestial navigation. Officers also spend hours in hyper-realistic simulators navigating ports, straits, and open oceans. The courses culminate with written exams and pass-fail assessments in simulators. These graduates are well on their way to becoming professional mariners, but naval officers need to do more than navigate from one port to the next.
Many Americans would be surprised to learn that newly commissioned officers assigned to warships do not practice, not a single time, the evasive maneuvers required to defend against an inbound missile, torpedo, or drone before reporting to warships—the topics are not covered in presentations, exams, or simulator scenarios, and are mentioned less than a dozen times throughout BDOC.
While BDOC and ADOC include coursework on maritime warfare, there is no application of these principles to the maneuvering of a warship in naval operations or combat. The only simulator scenarios which explicitly involve maneuvering for naval operations vaguely cover underway replenishments, flight operations, and radio communications. This may have been sufficient training for what most peacetime warships see—routine transits of oceans, straits, and harbors, requiring strict adherence to the COLREGS—but our warships today find themselves in hostile seas with an emboldened near peer competitor on the horizon.
The courses make no effort to answer the real questions that an OOD must concern himself with: when is deviation from the rules of the road necessary to accomplish the mission? What is my role in verifying that missiles fired from the vertical launch system were effective? At what relative bearing will I no longer be able to engage an inbound missile with the close-in weapon system (CIWS)? The sole objective of the courses since their reform is to ensure that warships do not collide with vessels at sea. The result is the streamlined production of timid risk-avoidant professional mariners rather than competent risk-mitigating naval officers.
Some SWOs are willing to admit that the courses do a poor job of preparing them for operations at sea but argue that they can be taught tactical maneuvering upon arrival on their first ship. Others could share their experiences being flown from Rota or Manama to embark a warship sailing into harm’s way within days of their arrival with no time for such on-the-job training. The current practice is akin to having a naval aviator report to an aircraft carrier for his first deployment having never been taught to defend himself from a surface-to-air missile.
Professional mariners should know the principles of celestial navigation. Naval officers must know how to launch a helicopter from a flight deck while sailing in a formation 200 yards astern of another vessel. The easy solution is to lengthen the courses to cover both topics, but ships cannot accept further delays in the arrival of their crew. Prioritization is the only viable option, and the priority is, as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Daryl Caudle, said in his assumption of office remarks, to “deliver violence on behalf of our nation when called upon.”
If an OOD is unsure of environmental laws in international waters, she can find the relevant reference, call a more experienced officer, and take as much time as needed to decide whether to discharge waste over the side. But if that same OOD hears an urgent call on the internal network “missile inbound, starboard side” she has precious seconds to maneuver for optimal defense. While we need OODs prepared for both cases, the priority must always be to prepare for combat vice adherence to environmental laws.
Prioritization does not sacrifice competence, it breeds it. A naval officer able to navigate a mined harbor will be able to navigate the Straits of Gibraltar, but the reverse cannot be said of a professional mariner. Instead of using a simulated slalom course to teach a naval officer how his ship handles, teach him to navigate a narrow route cleared by a mine-countermeasure ship. The task will demand an even higher proficiency in shiphandling and allows the officer to make mistakes executing tactics he will need in a time of war. The only risk in the simulator is a poor mark from an assessor. In combat it is a ten foot by 12-foot hull rupture beneath the waterline.
There is no better place to study and practice high-risk naval operations than in the classroom or simulator. Instead of teaching officers to navigate dense traffic, teach them to maintain station while providing regional ballistic missile defense near dense traffic. An officer placed in a scenario where she must navigate from a harbor without the use of radios, radars, and GPS to deceive an adversary will be more prepared for a peace-time transit with those tools at her disposal. An officer trained to shoulder an adversary frigate while conducting freedom of navigation operations will be better suited to manage vessels within 3 nautical miles. Every sentence on the slides, every question on the exams, every scenario in the simulators must be explicitly related to the realities of modern naval operations and warfare.
The recently commissioned must understand and apply the rules of the road and the principles of seamanship and navigation, not as professional mariners, but as naval officers charged with waging war at sea in defense of their nation and its interests. A continued narrow focus on safety of navigation will jeopardize the surface fleet’s ability to execute its mission.
LT Sean F. Barry, USN, is a native of Long Island, New York, and graduate of Boston College. He serves as the Plans and Tactics Officer and Air Defense Officer aboard USS Jack H. Lucas (DDG 125), the first Flight III Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile Destroyer. He previously deployed to U.S. 5th Fleet and U.S. 6th Fleet in support of operations Prosperity Guardian, Poseidon Archer, and the defense of Israel. LT Barry is an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Warfare Tactics Instructor and is enrolled in the Naval War College’s Fleet Seminar Program.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense.