Building Maritime Operations from the Bottom Up; Review of Essays in Honor of Captain Wayne Hughes
The MOC
By
Dr. Steven Wills
September 5, 2025
Figure 1: The Late Naval Postgraduate School Professor Wayne P. Hughes, Captain, US Navy retired.
Many books about naval strategy by such renowned authors as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, speak of the discipline in a “top down” way, where national goals create operational objectives which are in turn served by naval tactical action. A new book from the Naval War College Press, Essays in Honor of Captain Wayne P. Hughes, speaks of naval strategy from the “bottom up” view, where naval strategy is formed from what technology creates in the tactical space, which in turn influences naval operations and ultimately strategy. The essays in the Hughes book serve to develop this thesis, especially around the choices in fleet force structure needed to best engage probable U.S. adversaries in high end tactical naval combat. The preferred “bimodal” fleet force structure Hughes advocated that included single mission platforms such as missile corvettes and diesel submarines in turn suggested a quite different U.S. navy acquisition program with more focus on low-end, arguably disposable platforms. These lower-end and more distributive platforms could deliver high volumes of fires (missiles and torpedoes,) but could equally absorb damage as no one platform held the majority of the force’s firepower. The essays in the book focus heavily on these attributes of naval combat to enable favorable operational and strategic results. While there is much fruitful discussion on tactics, communications and force design, there is little content on the logistic enabling of Hughes’ bimodal fleet concept, to include resupply of a larger fleet of smaller ships at sea, especially in terms of fuel and weapons.
Strong Discussion on Tactics and Platforms to Best Execute Them
There’s good discussion of naval tactics in the volume, starting with retired Navy Captain Glen Sears’ look at enabling sea denial operations using Hughes’ concepts. Jeff Cares elevates Hughes’ signature “salvo equations” from smaller groups of vessels to the blue water, fleet scale, with discussion of how he and co-author Tony Cowden applied Hughes thinking to their own book Fighting the Fleet. Longtime Hughes collaborator Jeff Klein looks at the concept of counter-targeting as a method of increasing the lethality of an inferior force, through use of Hughes’ salvo equations. Naval Postgraduate School professor Donald Brutzman explores tactical level of war communications, with the ethos that “less is more” in terms of gaining surprise and achieving Hughes’ manta of attacking effectively first. All are useful in the exploration of fleet tactics regardless of force structure or fleet design.
Moving from Tactics to Fleet Design
From that good start the volume moves into the second parts of Hughes’ research on the alternative fleet force design best suited to win victories using Hughes’ salvo equations. Operations analyst and retired naval officer Phil Pournelle, retired Marine Corps officer Dakota Wood, and Naval Postgraduate School professor James Wirtz all seek to explore the space “left of battle” (in Wirtz’s words,) and understand why the U.S. Navy has not pursued the types of ships Hughes advocated, specifically smaller, single mission vessels armed with cruise missiles, as best suited to win victory, as opposed to the current, smaller fleet of larger, multi-mission surface warships. Retired Navy Captain and former Naval War College Dean of Naval Warfare Robert “Barney” Rubel further pursues the idea of how that alternative, larger fleet of smaller ships might have suited Navy global deployment strategy from the mid-2000’s to the present day.
Other chapters explore the wider use of Hughes bimodal fleet concept, with active duty Navy officer Casey Mahon exploring the power of the “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” of land-based aviation, and Military Sealift Command’s Lee Wahler, Dr. Keenan Yoho and Christopher Kelley examining the use of single mission, maritime support vessels for special operations. The volume concludes with Hughes’ long time friend Captain Robby Harris, USN (ret,) looking back on conversations they two had and what questions he might ask of Hughes today regarding navy force structure and tactics. This is a robust volume, authored by Wayne Hughes students, colleagues and friends over his many decades of service to the nation.
What’s Missing? No festschrift can cover every aspect of a career and every point of contention. While the proponents of the missile-based force structure make a case for winning battles at sea, it remains to be seen if such battles equate winning the war. The vast bulk of the Chinese Military’s missile force is located ashore or is part of their air forces and not based at sea where the bimodal fleet is best placed to engage them. The force structure and fleet design chapters are also light on the logistics needed to support and especially sustain a larger fleet of smaller vessels at sea for long periods. In many cases a mothership is designated to sustain the smaller vessel fleet, but motherships also need re-supply, air defense, and forward bases to sustain their operations. The
U.S. Combat Logistics Force, like the U.S. Navy has shrunk over the last thirty five years and is already challenged to supply and sustain the current, smaller fleet of larger combatants. Supplying the bimodal fleet in battle would have been an additional, worthy chapter.
Conclusion
Captain Wayne Hughes’ decades of naval service and scholarship are well commemorated and explained in this timely book. It is an essential volume for anyone seeking to better understand naval tactics, fleet force design and the quantitative analysis behind these efforts. It’s also a useful guide to understanding the missile combat that has played out in recent months in the Red Sea, and in the skies over Israel and Iran. The book presents a view into the thinking that maritime strategy can be built from the bottom up in terms of tactical success creating the conditions of accomplishing operational and strategic success. The book is missing a look at the logistical underpinnings for Hughes’ bimodal strategy, but overall the book is a solid volume suitable for any navalist or naval officer’s bookshelf next to Hughes’ own Fleet Tactics books.
Dr. Steve Wills, is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
Many books about naval strategy by such renowned authors as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, speak of the discipline in a “top down” way, where national goals create operational objectives which are in turn served by naval tactical action. A new book from the Naval War College Press, Essays in Honor of Captain Wayne P. Hughes, speaks of naval strategy from the “bottom up” view, where naval strategy is formed from what technology creates in the tactical space, which in turn influences naval operations and ultimately strategy. The essays in the Hughes book serve to develop this thesis, especially around the choices in fleet force structure needed to best engage probable U.S. adversaries in high end tactical naval combat. The preferred “bimodal” fleet force structure Hughes advocated that included single mission platforms such as missile corvettes and diesel submarines in turn suggested a quite different U.S. navy acquisition program with more focus on low-end, arguably disposable platforms. These lower-end and more distributive platforms could deliver high volumes of fires (missiles and torpedoes,) but could equally absorb damage as no one platform held the majority of the force’s firepower. The essays in the book focus heavily on these attributes of naval combat to enable favorable operational and strategic results. While there is much fruitful discussion on tactics, communications and force design, there is little content on the logistic enabling of Hughes’ bimodal fleet concept, to include resupply of a larger fleet of smaller ships at sea, especially in terms of fuel and weapons.
Strong Discussion on Tactics and Platforms to Best Execute Them
There’s good discussion of naval tactics in the volume, starting with retired Navy Captain Glen Sears’ look at enabling sea denial operations using Hughes’ concepts. Jeff Cares elevates Hughes’ signature “salvo equations” from smaller groups of vessels to the blue water, fleet scale, with discussion of how he and co-author Tony Cowden applied Hughes thinking to their own book Fighting the Fleet. Longtime Hughes collaborator Jeff Klein looks at the concept of counter-targeting as a method of increasing the lethality of an inferior force, through use of Hughes’ salvo equations. Naval Postgraduate School professor Donald Brutzman explores tactical level of war communications, with the ethos that “less is more” in terms of gaining surprise and achieving Hughes’ manta of attacking effectively first. All are useful in the exploration of fleet tactics regardless of force structure or fleet design.
Moving from Tactics to Fleet Design
From that good start the volume moves into the second parts of Hughes’ research on the alternative fleet force design best suited to win victories using Hughes’ salvo equations. Operations analyst and retired naval officer Phil Pournelle, retired Marine Corps officer Dakota Wood, and Naval Postgraduate School professor James Wirtz all seek to explore the space “left of battle” (in Wirtz’s words,) and understand why the U.S. Navy has not pursued the types of ships Hughes advocated, specifically smaller, single mission vessels armed with cruise missiles, as best suited to win victory, as opposed to the current, smaller fleet of larger, multi-mission surface warships. Retired Navy Captain and former Naval War College Dean of Naval Warfare Robert “Barney” Rubel further pursues the idea of how that alternative, larger fleet of smaller ships might have suited Navy global deployment strategy from the mid-2000’s to the present day.
Other chapters explore the wider use of Hughes bimodal fleet concept, with active duty Navy officer Casey Mahon exploring the power of the “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” of land-based aviation, and Military Sealift Command’s Lee Wahler, Dr. Keenan Yoho and Christopher Kelley examining the use of single mission, maritime support vessels for special operations. The volume concludes with Hughes’ long time friend Captain Robby Harris, USN (ret,) looking back on conversations they two had and what questions he might ask of Hughes today regarding navy force structure and tactics. This is a robust volume, authored by Wayne Hughes students, colleagues and friends over his many decades of service to the nation.
What’s Missing? No festschrift can cover every aspect of a career and every point of contention. While the proponents of the missile-based force structure make a case for winning battles at sea, it remains to be seen if such battles equate winning the war. The vast bulk of the Chinese Military’s missile force is located ashore or is part of their air forces and not based at sea where the bimodal fleet is best placed to engage them. The force structure and fleet design chapters are also light on the logistics needed to support and especially sustain a larger fleet of smaller vessels at sea for long periods. In many cases a mothership is designated to sustain the smaller vessel fleet, but motherships also need re-supply, air defense, and forward bases to sustain their operations. The
U.S. Combat Logistics Force, like the U.S. Navy has shrunk over the last thirty five years and is already challenged to supply and sustain the current, smaller fleet of larger combatants. Supplying the bimodal fleet in battle would have been an additional, worthy chapter.
Conclusion
Captain Wayne Hughes’ decades of naval service and scholarship are well commemorated and explained in this timely book. It is an essential volume for anyone seeking to better understand naval tactics, fleet force design and the quantitative analysis behind these efforts. It’s also a useful guide to understanding the missile combat that has played out in recent months in the Red Sea, and in the skies over Israel and Iran. The book presents a view into the thinking that maritime strategy can be built from the bottom up in terms of tactical success creating the conditions of accomplishing operational and strategic success. The book is missing a look at the logistical underpinnings for Hughes’ bimodal strategy, but overall the book is a solid volume suitable for any navalist or naval officer’s bookshelf next to Hughes’ own Fleet Tactics books.
Dr. Steve Wills, is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.