Taiwan’s USV Development and Strategic Learning from Ukraine
The MOC
By
Tin Pak
June 6, 2025
Taiwan has recognized the effectiveness of Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) in littoral defense, drawing clear lessons from Ukraine’s successful use of USVs to challenge Russian dominance in the Black Sea. In response, Taiwan’s military has recently announced the procurement of a new fleet of indigenous USVs called the Endeavor Manta, which is based on the designs of Ukraine’s most operationally successful models. The adoption of USVs reflects Taiwan’s broader shift toward asymmetric defense capabilities over the past decade, positioning USVs to play a critical role in any future conflict against the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Ukraine’s USV Capabilities & Doctrine
Ukraine’s USVs played a critical role in challenging Russian naval dominance in the Black Sea. Early in the war, Russia’s navy quickly asserted control by destroying most of Ukraine’s modest naval forces and seizing the strategically located Snake Island.
In response, Ukraine turned to asymmetric tactics, employing anti-ship missiles, mines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and later, USVs. The first instance of Ukraine using USVs was on October 29, 2022, when a coordinated attack of seven canoe-shaped Mykola USVs and nine UAVs attacked Russian ships docked at the Sevastopol Naval Base, damaging a frigate and a minesweeper. This operation altered the threat environment for the Russian Navy: attacks became three-dimensional, with missiles, UAVs, and now USVs coordinated by Ukrainian forces to target Russian naval assets in sequence.
Ukraine began pursuing larger USVs capable of carrying more fuel, allowing it to conduct longer-range missions and accommodate an explosive payload more than double the size of Mykola’s. The Security Services of Ukraine used the larger Mamoi USV with a 450 kg payload — double the payload size of the Mykola — to strike a Russian landing ship off the coast of Novorossiysk in 2023. Months later, a pack of three new Ukrainian USVs called the Magura-5, also with a 450 kg payload, unsuccessfully attacked a Russian Navy intelligence ship located near the Bosphorus Strait. Later attacks by swarms of Magura-5 USVs proved more effective, reportedly sinking a Russian corvette off the coast of Crimea in March of 2024.
Ukraine developed its Sea Baby USV based on the success of its Mamai and Magura-5 class USVs. Similar in design, the Sea Baby carries six unguided rockets, each with a range of 1,000 meters, along with a primary charge located in the bow. These rockets are fired to both inflict damage and distract the target’s defense systems so that the USV can deliver its main charge with less difficulty.
Ukraine has also been developing multi-purpose USVs that go beyond single-use suicide attacks. Earlier this month, Ukraine reportedly downed two Russian Su-30 Flanker multirole fighters with unknown air-to-air missiles fired from two Magura-5s. Additionally, Ukraine has begun fielding carrier-USVs with built-in hangars that can deploy up to four FPV drones, which reportedly struck Russian anti-aircraft systems in the southern Kherson Oblast.
Since the initial Russian naval assaults at the beginning of the war, Ukraine has turned the tide dramatically in the Black Sea. Beginning in late 2023, Russia started to transfer most of its naval assets away from its Sevastopol Naval Base and move them further to the East, following successful naval combined operations by Ukraine, including two USV attacks on the base itself. The threat posed by Ukrainian drone attacks has prevented the Black Sea Fleet from exploiting the command of the sea it seized in the opening days of the war.
With Ukraine’s growing diversification of USVs and their experimental applications on the battlefield, it is challenging to pinpoint a clear doctrine guiding their use. Nonetheless, some core features are common to all the systems described that can form an overarching operational framework.
First, USV attacks are most effective when conducted in coordination with UAV and missile strikes. Adding layers of attacks increases the likelihood of destroying the target by overwhelming the enemy’s defense systems. Furthermore, USV attacks are most effective when conducted in packs. Once the target is identified, attacking as a pack requires effective coordination to swarm the target, thereby dispersing the enemy’s defensive measures and increasing the likelihood of landing a hit.
Ukraine has also proven that USVs can conduct long-distance attacks against targets behind enemy lines, as was shown in the case of the Kerch Bridge attack in 2023—the bridge was recently attacked again by what many commentators believe to be a unmanned underwater vehicle—and a strike on a Russian Kilo-class submarine dry-docked in Sevastopol. With the addition of its UAV-carrier USVs, its potential range is further increased by deployable UAVs that can travel inland as well.
Finally, Ukraine utilized USVs as an effective anti-access weapon in littoral waters. USVs, in conjunction with intense mining operations and the conversion of land-based missile systems into anti-ship weapons, helped Ukraine impose a 100-nautical-mile buffer zone in the northeast region of the Black Sea, denying Russia the ability to conduct amphibious operations and offshore battery support, and securing the necessary leeway to allow Ukraine to continue exporting grain and other commodities through the Black Sea.
Taiwan’s USV Development & Strategic Learning from Ukraine:
Taiwan has been closely monitoring developments in the Black Sea. Recognizing the criticality of unmanned warfare in any future conflict, Taiwan has invested large sums in expanding its drone industry. In the naval realm specifically, they have recently developed advanced USVs based on Ukrainian models to enhance their littoral defense. These developments align with Taiwan’s broader shift to incorporate more asymmetric capabilities into its defense posture.
This March, the Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation unveiled an indigenous USV called the Endeavor Manta, which the company states was directly influenced by developments in the Ukraine-Russia War. The USV is a trimaran ship, composed of a main hull in the center and two smaller hulls at its sides, making it more resilient to the rough waters of the Taiwan Strait. It has a payload capacity of one ton and can travel at speeds of up to 65 km/h. The USV can operate across multiple communication channels, including 4G networks, radio signals, and satellites, making it resilient to an assortment of jamming techniques. The ship also features AI-assisted targeting and swarm technology, with a single control tower capable of controlling up to 50 USVs simultaneously.
The Endeavor Manta USV builds directly on Ukraine’s Sea Baby USV concept, as they are both fitted with explosive projectiles alongside the main charge in their bow. The Endeavor Manta is equipped with an unconfirmed number of light torpedoes, an improvement from the Sea Baby’s unguided missiles. At sea, torpedoes would be much more accurate, as the constant bobbing and shifting of the Sea Baby would make accurately firing an airborne missile difficult, whereas the torpedo travels just below the surface of the sea, more easily surfing to the target. The Endeavor Manta is larger than the Sea Baby and capable of carrying a payload of over one ton. However, the Endeavor Manta’s large payload makes it less agile than the Sea Baby, which can travel 90 km/h.
The Endeavor Manta incorporates other recent USV developments from this past year. In October 2024, Taiwanese drone manufacturer Thunder Tiger showcased its domestically produced USV, the SeaShark 400. This USV is almost half the size of the Endeavor Manta, with a reported range of 300 km, making their operations limited to nearshore littoral waters. Its dimensions and canoe-shaped design resemble Ukraine’s Mykola class USVs.
The manufacturers for both the Endeavor Manta and the SeaShark USVs describe them as multi-purpose drone systems, designed for reconnaissance, communication relay, mine identification, and attack purposes. Whether Taiwan continues to pursue a more diverse USV arsenal will largely depend on how successful Ukraine is in utilizing its aerial defense and UAV-carrier USVs. Nonetheless, considering that the Endeavor Manta is larger than the Ukrainian Magura-5s, it is likely able to be equipped with air-to-air missiles or even UAVs.
Beyond the battlefield, Taiwan has also begun to follow the example of Ukraine with regard to its military industrial complex, investing large sums into its indigenous unmanned research and development. From only producing a few thousand drones per year before Russia’s invasion, Ukraine is now one of the global leaders in drone manufacturing, with over 500 drone companies producing millions of drones annually. As of now, Taiwan still relies heavily on imports for critical components of its drone production, and the scale of this industry is significantly smaller than Ukraine’s, having produced only 10,000 drones in 2024. However, Taiwan has begun heavily investing in its drone industry by fast-tracking a program called the “National Drone Team” to rally private drone companies to expand its indigenous production capabilities. With this initiative, Taiwan’s military plans to purchase 3,200 drones from local companies between 2024 and 2028, including USVs.
The Endeavor Manta indicates the steady progress Taiwan is making in developing a resilient indigenous drone industry. The chairman of the Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation claimed that most components of the Endeavor Manta USV were produced in Taiwan, except for the satellite guidance system and the outboard motors, which were sourced from foreign companies, excluding those from the PRC.
Considering the centrality of littoral warfare in a potential People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion, these new USVs would be vital for Taiwan. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that USVs significantly enhance littoral defense. Used in conjunction with its Harpoon missiles and a growing fleet of UAVs, Taiwan can form a buffer zone along its Western coast against PLA amphibious groups. Moving like packs of wolves, Taiwan’s USVs can target isolated ships approaching its shores, utilizing swarming technologies to surround and disorient their targets, increasing their chances of scoring a direct hit either with their torpedoes or by ramming enemy ships directly with their explosive-filled hulls. USVs would, therefore, be part of the first line of defense against any attempted PLA amphibious assault.
Furthermore, Taiwan could utilize its USVs for long-range strikes, as Ukraine did against Russian ports and bridges, against Chinese ports, and merchant shipping passing through the strait. These interdiction operations would be critical in projecting Taiwanese naval power beyond the median line of the strait, disrupting the PLA’s supply chain as its forces cross the channel and bringing the war directly to the mainland.
The integration of USVs into Taiwan’s defense posture is a logical step in the nation’s strategic shift towards asymmetric capabilities. This builds upon the Overall Defense Concept (ODC) doctrine, developed by Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, the former Chief of Staff of Taiwan’s military, which served as the foundation for what became colloquially known as the porcupine strategy. This warfighting concept argues that Taiwan should invest in cost-effective systems that target the PLA’s weaknesses to deliver the “maximum tactical impact with minimal effort.” USVs fit perfectly with this description, as a small team of USVs costing a few hundred thousand dollars each could swarm and sink an enemy ship worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Alongside mines, anti-ship missiles, and UAVs, USVs will play a critical role in turning the Taiwan Strait into what Admiral Samuel Paparo, the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, calls a “hellscape” for the PLA and its ships. Taiwan’s ability to do so effectively will depend largely on the lessons drawn from Ukraine’s operations in the Black Sea. With the development of new USVs and the rapid expansion of its drone industry, Taiwan appears to be actively applying these lessons as it prepares for a possible invasion by the PRC.
Tin Pak is a Visiting Scholar at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies at Taiwan’s National Defense University. Tin’s research focuses on East-Asian security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Tin Pak
Taiwan has recognized the effectiveness of Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) in littoral defense, drawing clear lessons from Ukraine’s successful use of USVs to challenge Russian dominance in the Black Sea. In response, Taiwan’s military has recently announced the procurement of a new fleet of indigenous USVs called the Endeavor Manta, which is based on the designs of Ukraine’s most operationally successful models. The adoption of USVs reflects Taiwan’s broader shift toward asymmetric defense capabilities over the past decade, positioning USVs to play a critical role in any future conflict against the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Ukraine’s USV Capabilities & Doctrine
Ukraine’s USVs played a critical role in challenging Russian naval dominance in the Black Sea. Early in the war, Russia’s navy quickly asserted control by destroying most of Ukraine’s modest naval forces and seizing the strategically located Snake Island.
In response, Ukraine turned to asymmetric tactics, employing anti-ship missiles, mines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and later, USVs. The first instance of Ukraine using USVs was on October 29, 2022, when a coordinated attack of seven canoe-shaped Mykola USVs and nine UAVs attacked Russian ships docked at the Sevastopol Naval Base, damaging a frigate and a minesweeper. This operation altered the threat environment for the Russian Navy: attacks became three-dimensional, with missiles, UAVs, and now USVs coordinated by Ukrainian forces to target Russian naval assets in sequence.
Ukraine began pursuing larger USVs capable of carrying more fuel, allowing it to conduct longer-range missions and accommodate an explosive payload more than double the size of Mykola’s. The Security Services of Ukraine used the larger Mamoi USV with a 450 kg payload — double the payload size of the Mykola — to strike a Russian landing ship off the coast of Novorossiysk in 2023. Months later, a pack of three new Ukrainian USVs called the Magura-5, also with a 450 kg payload, unsuccessfully attacked a Russian Navy intelligence ship located near the Bosphorus Strait. Later attacks by swarms of Magura-5 USVs proved more effective, reportedly sinking a Russian corvette off the coast of Crimea in March of 2024.
Ukraine developed its Sea Baby USV based on the success of its Mamai and Magura-5 class USVs. Similar in design, the Sea Baby carries six unguided rockets, each with a range of 1,000 meters, along with a primary charge located in the bow. These rockets are fired to both inflict damage and distract the target’s defense systems so that the USV can deliver its main charge with less difficulty.
Ukraine has also been developing multi-purpose USVs that go beyond single-use suicide attacks. Earlier this month, Ukraine reportedly downed two Russian Su-30 Flanker multirole fighters with unknown air-to-air missiles fired from two Magura-5s. Additionally, Ukraine has begun fielding carrier-USVs with built-in hangars that can deploy up to four FPV drones, which reportedly struck Russian anti-aircraft systems in the southern Kherson Oblast.
Since the initial Russian naval assaults at the beginning of the war, Ukraine has turned the tide dramatically in the Black Sea. Beginning in late 2023, Russia started to transfer most of its naval assets away from its Sevastopol Naval Base and move them further to the East, following successful naval combined operations by Ukraine, including two USV attacks on the base itself. The threat posed by Ukrainian drone attacks has prevented the Black Sea Fleet from exploiting the command of the sea it seized in the opening days of the war.
With Ukraine’s growing diversification of USVs and their experimental applications on the battlefield, it is challenging to pinpoint a clear doctrine guiding their use. Nonetheless, some core features are common to all the systems described that can form an overarching operational framework.
First, USV attacks are most effective when conducted in coordination with UAV and missile strikes. Adding layers of attacks increases the likelihood of destroying the target by overwhelming the enemy’s defense systems. Furthermore, USV attacks are most effective when conducted in packs. Once the target is identified, attacking as a pack requires effective coordination to swarm the target, thereby dispersing the enemy’s defensive measures and increasing the likelihood of landing a hit.
Ukraine has also proven that USVs can conduct long-distance attacks against targets behind enemy lines, as was shown in the case of the Kerch Bridge attack in 2023—the bridge was recently attacked again by what many commentators believe to be a unmanned underwater vehicle—and a strike on a Russian Kilo-class submarine dry-docked in Sevastopol. With the addition of its UAV-carrier USVs, its potential range is further increased by deployable UAVs that can travel inland as well.
Finally, Ukraine utilized USVs as an effective anti-access weapon in littoral waters. USVs, in conjunction with intense mining operations and the conversion of land-based missile systems into anti-ship weapons, helped Ukraine impose a 100-nautical-mile buffer zone in the northeast region of the Black Sea, denying Russia the ability to conduct amphibious operations and offshore battery support, and securing the necessary leeway to allow Ukraine to continue exporting grain and other commodities through the Black Sea.
Taiwan’s USV Development & Strategic Learning from Ukraine:
Taiwan has been closely monitoring developments in the Black Sea. Recognizing the criticality of unmanned warfare in any future conflict, Taiwan has invested large sums in expanding its drone industry. In the naval realm specifically, they have recently developed advanced USVs based on Ukrainian models to enhance their littoral defense. These developments align with Taiwan’s broader shift to incorporate more asymmetric capabilities into its defense posture.
This March, the Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation unveiled an indigenous USV called the Endeavor Manta, which the company states was directly influenced by developments in the Ukraine-Russia War. The USV is a trimaran ship, composed of a main hull in the center and two smaller hulls at its sides, making it more resilient to the rough waters of the Taiwan Strait. It has a payload capacity of one ton and can travel at speeds of up to 65 km/h. The USV can operate across multiple communication channels, including 4G networks, radio signals, and satellites, making it resilient to an assortment of jamming techniques. The ship also features AI-assisted targeting and swarm technology, with a single control tower capable of controlling up to 50 USVs simultaneously.
The Endeavor Manta USV builds directly on Ukraine’s Sea Baby USV concept, as they are both fitted with explosive projectiles alongside the main charge in their bow. The Endeavor Manta is equipped with an unconfirmed number of light torpedoes, an improvement from the Sea Baby’s unguided missiles. At sea, torpedoes would be much more accurate, as the constant bobbing and shifting of the Sea Baby would make accurately firing an airborne missile difficult, whereas the torpedo travels just below the surface of the sea, more easily surfing to the target. The Endeavor Manta is larger than the Sea Baby and capable of carrying a payload of over one ton. However, the Endeavor Manta’s large payload makes it less agile than the Sea Baby, which can travel 90 km/h.
The Endeavor Manta incorporates other recent USV developments from this past year. In October 2024, Taiwanese drone manufacturer Thunder Tiger showcased its domestically produced USV, the SeaShark 400. This USV is almost half the size of the Endeavor Manta, with a reported range of 300 km, making their operations limited to nearshore littoral waters. Its dimensions and canoe-shaped design resemble Ukraine’s Mykola class USVs.
The manufacturers for both the Endeavor Manta and the SeaShark USVs describe them as multi-purpose drone systems, designed for reconnaissance, communication relay, mine identification, and attack purposes. Whether Taiwan continues to pursue a more diverse USV arsenal will largely depend on how successful Ukraine is in utilizing its aerial defense and UAV-carrier USVs. Nonetheless, considering that the Endeavor Manta is larger than the Ukrainian Magura-5s, it is likely able to be equipped with air-to-air missiles or even UAVs.
Beyond the battlefield, Taiwan has also begun to follow the example of Ukraine with regard to its military industrial complex, investing large sums into its indigenous unmanned research and development. From only producing a few thousand drones per year before Russia’s invasion, Ukraine is now one of the global leaders in drone manufacturing, with over 500 drone companies producing millions of drones annually. As of now, Taiwan still relies heavily on imports for critical components of its drone production, and the scale of this industry is significantly smaller than Ukraine’s, having produced only 10,000 drones in 2024. However, Taiwan has begun heavily investing in its drone industry by fast-tracking a program called the “National Drone Team” to rally private drone companies to expand its indigenous production capabilities. With this initiative, Taiwan’s military plans to purchase 3,200 drones from local companies between 2024 and 2028, including USVs.
The Endeavor Manta indicates the steady progress Taiwan is making in developing a resilient indigenous drone industry. The chairman of the Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation claimed that most components of the Endeavor Manta USV were produced in Taiwan, except for the satellite guidance system and the outboard motors, which were sourced from foreign companies, excluding those from the PRC.
Considering the centrality of littoral warfare in a potential People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion, these new USVs would be vital for Taiwan. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that USVs significantly enhance littoral defense. Used in conjunction with its Harpoon missiles and a growing fleet of UAVs, Taiwan can form a buffer zone along its Western coast against PLA amphibious groups. Moving like packs of wolves, Taiwan’s USVs can target isolated ships approaching its shores, utilizing swarming technologies to surround and disorient their targets, increasing their chances of scoring a direct hit either with their torpedoes or by ramming enemy ships directly with their explosive-filled hulls. USVs would, therefore, be part of the first line of defense against any attempted PLA amphibious assault.
Furthermore, Taiwan could utilize its USVs for long-range strikes, as Ukraine did against Russian ports and bridges, against Chinese ports, and merchant shipping passing through the strait. These interdiction operations would be critical in projecting Taiwanese naval power beyond the median line of the strait, disrupting the PLA’s supply chain as its forces cross the channel and bringing the war directly to the mainland.
The integration of USVs into Taiwan’s defense posture is a logical step in the nation’s strategic shift towards asymmetric capabilities. This builds upon the Overall Defense Concept (ODC) doctrine, developed by Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, the former Chief of Staff of Taiwan’s military, which served as the foundation for what became colloquially known as the porcupine strategy. This warfighting concept argues that Taiwan should invest in cost-effective systems that target the PLA’s weaknesses to deliver the “maximum tactical impact with minimal effort.” USVs fit perfectly with this description, as a small team of USVs costing a few hundred thousand dollars each could swarm and sink an enemy ship worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Alongside mines, anti-ship missiles, and UAVs, USVs will play a critical role in turning the Taiwan Strait into what Admiral Samuel Paparo, the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, calls a “hellscape” for the PLA and its ships. Taiwan’s ability to do so effectively will depend largely on the lessons drawn from Ukraine’s operations in the Black Sea. With the development of new USVs and the rapid expansion of its drone industry, Taiwan appears to be actively applying these lessons as it prepares for a possible invasion by the PRC.
Tin Pak is a Visiting Scholar at the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies at Taiwan’s National Defense University. Tin’s research focuses on East-Asian security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.