Remember the Indianapolis: The CMV-22B Osprey as the Centerpiece of Modern Naval CSAR
The MOC
By
Tom King
March 4, 2025
Anyone who has watched the movie Jawsknows of the fate of the crew of the USS Indianapolis. During the closing days of World War II, a Japanese submarine torpedoed and sank the heavy cruiser, which was returning from delivering the first atomic bomb to Tinian Island under great secrecy. Of 1,195 crew members aboard, 860 survived the initial sinking.
For four days, those men floated in the Pacific with almost no lifeboats, food or water, and faced increasingly horrific conditions, including swarming sharks. On the fourth day, a seaplane spotted the men in the water, and directed ships to help rescue the dwindling number of survivors, which by the end totaled a mere 317.
War planners must remember this history as tensions escalate in the vast Western Pacific. Should conflict erupt, one grim likelihood seems certain: American service members will find themselves in the water and in need of rescue, whether they are downed pilots or even the crew of a stricken U.S. naval vessel. Given the nature of distributed warfare at sea, they may find that help is not close at hand when they need it most.
To conduct successful distributed operations in a contested environment, the U.S. Navy will require an organic combat search and rescue capability that must possess speed, range, runway independence, and operational flexibility. Only a tiltrotor like the CMV-22B Osprey can provide all of these attributes. The U.S. Navy must prioritize the creation of concepts of operation and follow-on tactics, techniques, and procedures around the CMV-22B and the Combat Search and Rescue mission to ensure U.S. service members have the best possible chance of rescue at sea.
In the event of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), U.S. air, naval, and ground forces will likely find themselves operating inside the PRC’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) envelope. That system involves layers of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, submarines, surface ships, fighters, bombers, and non-kinetic weapons and is designed to keep U.S. and allied warships at arm’s length. In the most extreme example, the DF-26 “Guam Killer” ballistic missile is estimated to have a range of at least 4,000 km, capable of striking aircraft carriers or land bases within the South China Sea—or farther afield in the Pacific or Indian Oceans
In that environment, slow-moving aircraft or ships with large radar signatures will be especially vulnerable. Ships could be disabled or sunk quickly and aircraft shot down in significant numbers as the United States and its allies attempt to counter a PRC attack against Taiwan, the Philippines, or another friendly country in the Western Pacific.
Imagine a U.S. carrier strike group facing off against Chinese warships near Taiwan. A sudden, coordinated assault—potentially involving torpedoes and anti-ship missiles launched from land, air, and sea—could cripple multiple vessels in minutes, as a famous wargame conducted by the Center for Strategic & International Studies has demonstrated. Even with the most advanced damage control, the speed and intensity of such an attack could overwhelm a ship’s defenses, leaving hundreds of Sailors struggling for survival in the open water.
The challenges facing those adrift would be immense. Exposure, dehydration, injuries sustained during the attack, and psychological trauma could take a heavy toll. The experience of the crew of USS Indianapolis and countless other U.S. Navy vessels lost during World War Two gives us a glimpse of their plight.
Given this stark reality, the United States must examine the forces it has today and determine which platforms have the capabilities that are best suited for Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). Modern CSAR demands speed, range, and the ability to operate in contested environments.
The CMV-22B is ideally suited for the CSAR role because of the inherent advantages of speed and range it enjoys over the traditional helicopters, with a cruising speed of 250 knots, and a range of 1150 nm. While the CMV-22B is intended primarily to carry out Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) missions as a replacement for the aging fleet of fixed-wing C-2 Greyhounds, it can also be adapted to the CSAR role when needed, supplementing or even replacing current CSAR helicopters.
The CMV-22B’s unique tiltrotor capabilities enable it to take off, hover and land like a helicopter. However, it can also fly horizontally at high speed and long range like a fixed-wing aircraft.
The speed of the CMV-22B can provide commanders with faster recovery, which increases the chances of injured personnel receiving medical aid during the so-called “Golden Hour”—the critical window of time after traumatic injury when medical interventions have the highest rate of success. The speed of the tiltrotor also reduces the likelihood that an adversary captures downed aircrew or sailors before friendly forces can arrive. The U.S. Air Force has ably demonstrated the tiltrotor’s effectiveness in the CSAR role with their CV-22 Osprey variant.
The versatility of the CMV-22B means it can operate from a variety of platforms, from flat-deck aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships to smaller aviation-capable vessels. The CMV-22B also benefits from not being limited to a launch catapult like most fixed-wing aircraft, allowing it to operate from a variety of naval vessels, and it has aerial refueling capability as well, essentially giving it unlimited range.
Some have advocated for resurrecting seaplanes for the CSAR role, but they have significant limitations. During World War Two, seaplanes were all the Navy had and were naturally commonplace, with an entire ecosystem built around seaplane support and sustainment, including dedicated seaplane tenders spread throughout the fleet.
However, none of the Navy’s seaplane infrastructure exists any longer and would have to be rebuilt from scratch. As the Navy increasingly adopted rotorcraft, seaplanes dwindled due to their inferior mission flexibility and capability.
Seaplane operations are heavily dependent on sea state and weather conditions. Rough seas can make takeoff and landing extremely dangerous, if not impossible. In a combat environment, where time is of the essence, such limitations could prove fatal. Indeed, in the case of the USS Indianapolis, seaplanes were specifically ordered not to land near the survivors, and the one that did was unable to take off again.
In a modern USS Indianapolis disaster scenario, multiple CMV-22Bs could fly in low, swiftly converge on the site, drop aid and hoist survivors, then ferry them to safety without risk to more ships, irrespective of sea state.
The CMV-22B is very simply the best-suited, most capable platform for the CSAR mission in the Indo-Pacific. The program of record for the Navy is set to procure 48 CMV-22Bs, but war planners should think long and hard as to whether that number will be enough.
Moreover, effective CSAR is not just about having the right equipment; it’s about training and practice. The Navy must prioritize the development and implementation of robust CMV-22B-based CSAR tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Regular exercises involving CSAR units, fixed-wing pilots and surface navy personnel are essential to ensure that everyone knows their role and can execute it effectively under pressure.
Sailors and aviators need to have the confidence that no matter how risky the mission inside the Chinese A2/AD environment, they have a reasonable chance of rescue if they end up in the water. Likewise, their commanders need to know the resources and tools are in place to affect a rescue before they order Sailors and aviators into harm’s way. Without confidence in CSAR capabilities, the Navy’s ability to conduct combat operations will be limited.
America has not had to conduct large-scale CSAR operations in a contested maritime environment since World War Two. It is essential to start preparations now, including developing the necessary TTPs, investing in the right equipment, and conducting regular training exercises.
The USS Indianapolis disaster serves as a constant reminder of the stakes involved. The Navy should anticipate the need to conduct mass rescue in the Pacific. The Navy needs to be planning for that contingency now, with the CMV-22B as the centerpiece of its approach.
Tom King is a former CSAR-qualified naval aircrewman and rescue swimmer.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Tom King
Anyone who has watched the movie Jaws knows of the fate of the crew of the USS Indianapolis. During the closing days of World War II, a Japanese submarine torpedoed and sank the heavy cruiser, which was returning from delivering the first atomic bomb to Tinian Island under great secrecy. Of 1,195 crew members aboard, 860 survived the initial sinking.
For four days, those men floated in the Pacific with almost no lifeboats, food or water, and faced increasingly horrific conditions, including swarming sharks. On the fourth day, a seaplane spotted the men in the water, and directed ships to help rescue the dwindling number of survivors, which by the end totaled a mere 317.
War planners must remember this history as tensions escalate in the vast Western Pacific. Should conflict erupt, one grim likelihood seems certain: American service members will find themselves in the water and in need of rescue, whether they are downed pilots or even the crew of a stricken U.S. naval vessel. Given the nature of distributed warfare at sea, they may find that help is not close at hand when they need it most.
To conduct successful distributed operations in a contested environment, the U.S. Navy will require an organic combat search and rescue capability that must possess speed, range, runway independence, and operational flexibility. Only a tiltrotor like the CMV-22B Osprey can provide all of these attributes. The U.S. Navy must prioritize the creation of concepts of operation and follow-on tactics, techniques, and procedures around the CMV-22B and the Combat Search and Rescue mission to ensure U.S. service members have the best possible chance of rescue at sea.
In the event of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), U.S. air, naval, and ground forces will likely find themselves operating inside the PRC’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) envelope. That system involves layers of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, submarines, surface ships, fighters, bombers, and non-kinetic weapons and is designed to keep U.S. and allied warships at arm’s length. In the most extreme example, the DF-26 “Guam Killer” ballistic missile is estimated to have a range of at least 4,000 km, capable of striking aircraft carriers or land bases within the South China Sea—or farther afield in the Pacific or Indian Oceans
In that environment, slow-moving aircraft or ships with large radar signatures will be especially vulnerable. Ships could be disabled or sunk quickly and aircraft shot down in significant numbers as the United States and its allies attempt to counter a PRC attack against Taiwan, the Philippines, or another friendly country in the Western Pacific.
Imagine a U.S. carrier strike group facing off against Chinese warships near Taiwan. A sudden, coordinated assault—potentially involving torpedoes and anti-ship missiles launched from land, air, and sea—could cripple multiple vessels in minutes, as a famous wargame conducted by the Center for Strategic & International Studies has demonstrated. Even with the most advanced damage control, the speed and intensity of such an attack could overwhelm a ship’s defenses, leaving hundreds of Sailors struggling for survival in the open water.
The challenges facing those adrift would be immense. Exposure, dehydration, injuries sustained during the attack, and psychological trauma could take a heavy toll. The experience of the crew of USS Indianapolis and countless other U.S. Navy vessels lost during World War Two gives us a glimpse of their plight.
Given this stark reality, the United States must examine the forces it has today and determine which platforms have the capabilities that are best suited for Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). Modern CSAR demands speed, range, and the ability to operate in contested environments.
The CMV-22B is ideally suited for the CSAR role because of the inherent advantages of speed and range it enjoys over the traditional helicopters, with a cruising speed of 250 knots, and a range of 1150 nm. While the CMV-22B is intended primarily to carry out Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) missions as a replacement for the aging fleet of fixed-wing C-2 Greyhounds, it can also be adapted to the CSAR role when needed, supplementing or even replacing current CSAR helicopters.
The CMV-22B’s unique tiltrotor capabilities enable it to take off, hover and land like a helicopter. However, it can also fly horizontally at high speed and long range like a fixed-wing aircraft.
The speed of the CMV-22B can provide commanders with faster recovery, which increases the chances of injured personnel receiving medical aid during the so-called “Golden Hour”—the critical window of time after traumatic injury when medical interventions have the highest rate of success. The speed of the tiltrotor also reduces the likelihood that an adversary captures downed aircrew or sailors before friendly forces can arrive. The U.S. Air Force has ably demonstrated the tiltrotor’s effectiveness in the CSAR role with their CV-22 Osprey variant.
The versatility of the CMV-22B means it can operate from a variety of platforms, from flat-deck aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships to smaller aviation-capable vessels. The CMV-22B also benefits from not being limited to a launch catapult like most fixed-wing aircraft, allowing it to operate from a variety of naval vessels, and it has aerial refueling capability as well, essentially giving it unlimited range.
Some have advocated for resurrecting seaplanes for the CSAR role, but they have significant limitations. During World War Two, seaplanes were all the Navy had and were naturally commonplace, with an entire ecosystem built around seaplane support and sustainment, including dedicated seaplane tenders spread throughout the fleet.
However, none of the Navy’s seaplane infrastructure exists any longer and would have to be rebuilt from scratch. As the Navy increasingly adopted rotorcraft, seaplanes dwindled due to their inferior mission flexibility and capability.
Seaplane operations are heavily dependent on sea state and weather conditions. Rough seas can make takeoff and landing extremely dangerous, if not impossible. In a combat environment, where time is of the essence, such limitations could prove fatal. Indeed, in the case of the USS Indianapolis, seaplanes were specifically ordered not to land near the survivors, and the one that did was unable to take off again.
In a modern USS Indianapolis disaster scenario, multiple CMV-22Bs could fly in low, swiftly converge on the site, drop aid and hoist survivors, then ferry them to safety without risk to more ships, irrespective of sea state.
The CMV-22B is very simply the best-suited, most capable platform for the CSAR mission in the Indo-Pacific. The program of record for the Navy is set to procure 48 CMV-22Bs, but war planners should think long and hard as to whether that number will be enough.
Moreover, effective CSAR is not just about having the right equipment; it’s about training and practice. The Navy must prioritize the development and implementation of robust CMV-22B-based CSAR tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Regular exercises involving CSAR units, fixed-wing pilots and surface navy personnel are essential to ensure that everyone knows their role and can execute it effectively under pressure.
Sailors and aviators need to have the confidence that no matter how risky the mission inside the Chinese A2/AD environment, they have a reasonable chance of rescue if they end up in the water. Likewise, their commanders need to know the resources and tools are in place to affect a rescue before they order Sailors and aviators into harm’s way. Without confidence in CSAR capabilities, the Navy’s ability to conduct combat operations will be limited.
America has not had to conduct large-scale CSAR operations in a contested maritime environment since World War Two. It is essential to start preparations now, including developing the necessary TTPs, investing in the right equipment, and conducting regular training exercises.
The USS Indianapolis disaster serves as a constant reminder of the stakes involved. The Navy should anticipate the need to conduct mass rescue in the Pacific. The Navy needs to be planning for that contingency now, with the CMV-22B as the centerpiece of its approach.
Tom King is a former CSAR-qualified naval aircrewman and rescue swimmer.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.