Basing U.S. Vessels in the Indian Ocean: Pros and Cons
The MOC
By
Michael D. Purzycki
December 5, 2024
In discussions of the United States’ national security interests in the Indo-Pacific, the “Indo” part often gets short shrift. So much of America’s attention is focused on China and the threats it poses in the Western Pacific—to Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines, not to mention America’s own Pacific territories—that it is easy to ignore the Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy should consider basing ships in the Indian Ocean to ensure this vast expanse of water (stretching more than 6,200 miles from east to west at its widest point) to ensure it can quickly respond to threats in the region.
The United States already invests significant time and resources in the Indian Ocean, particularly in coordination with the region’s largest country. In recent decades, India and the United States have dramatically increased their security cooperation. While they are not full-fledged allies, the two countries understand they have many common interests: notably confronting Chinese aggression, but also trade and tackling non-state threats like terrorists and pirates. Both countries, along with Australia and Japan, are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which has emerged as a prime forum for security coordination by the Indo-Pacific’s major democratic powers.
Washington also has other security interests in and along the Indian Ocean. India’s historic rival Pakistan is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) with a long (and sometimes fraught) security relationship with the United States. Furthermore, because the Indian Ocean connects the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea with the Pacific, Iranian oil headed to China passes through it. China imports more than one and a half million barrels of oil per day from Iran, accounting for 15 percent of the People’s Republic’s oil imports. The interplay between these nations (all nuclear-armed except for nuke-seeking Iran) gives ample reason to pay close attention to the Indian Ocean even as the Pacific grabs more headlines.
When the U.S. Navy deploys vessels from the Pacific Fleet to confront threats like the Houthis in Yemen, those ships must cross the Indian Ocean. U.S. destroyers have played a key role in multilateral efforts to contain the Houthis, part of American-led efforts to weaken Iran and its proxies in their fight against Israel, Arab states, and other American partners. Rotating ships to the Middle East, however, has significant drawbacks. It can take two weeks or more for ships homeported on the West Coast to reach the Middle East. At a time when the Navy’s shipyards are struggling to clear backlogs of ship maintenance, the more the United States can maintain a presence in the region without the strain of long travels, the better.
While ships can travel from the East Coast to the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, or Persian Gulf via the Suez Canal, that approach has its own risks. Despite being a longtime ally of the United States which receives more than a billion dollars a year in American military aid, Egypt is not guaranteed to continue playing that role. From 2016-2021, Egypt bought more Russian weapons than American weapons, and according to 2023 reports, Egypt allegedly planned to supply Russia with rockets for its war in Ukraine. It would not be surprising if Moscow tried to leverage this relationship to deny the U.S. Navy access to the Suez Canal at some point in the future.
These factors provide reasons for Washington to consider basing ships in or around the Indian Ocean, rather than rotating them as is done at present. Doing so would let the United States confront threats like Iran and its minions, and respond other threats that may arise, without putting the stress of a weekslong journey across two oceans on Navy vessels. The question then becomes, which country or countries should Washington ask to host American ships?
All possible options have drawbacks as well as advantages. If the United States decides to base ships in any of them, it will have to accept a certain amount of risk, such as security risk or the threat of souring relations with countries other than the host nation. But while no choice is a panacea, the convenience of having strategically placed ships may outweigh the disadvantages.
Certain Arab countries of the Gulf region, such as Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are possible hosts. The UAE’s port at Jebel Ali, one of the world’s largest, frequentlyhosts U.S. vessels. Oman’s coast along the Arabian Sea, meanwhile, is a practically ideal location for basing ships that could be deployed both southwest to the Yemeni coast, northeast toward Iran, or southeast through the Arabian Sea directly into the heart of the Indian Ocean.
Unfortunately, the UAE might present security risks, as the country also pursues close security and technological ties with China. Meanwhile, Oman has thus far refused to sign the Abraham Accords and recognize Israel. If negotiations on ship basing become entangled with the possibility of Oman signing the Accords, it could complicate U.S.-Israel relations at an extremely sensitive time.
At the western edge of the Indian Ocean, Kenya is a good possibility, both for sending ships into the ocean and north to fight foes like the Houthis. Earlier this year, Kenya became the first sub-Saharan African country to receive MNNA status. It has partnered with the United States in fighting the terrorist group al-Shabab in Somalia. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Kenya’s ambassador to the United Nations gave an eloquent condemnation of Moscow’s aggression.
Washington would have to be careful, however, not to force Kenya to pigeonhole itself. Like many African countries, Kenya has seen large inflows of Chinese investment, money it will be very wary about jeopardizing. America would have to perform a delicate balancing act of getting the most of its relationship with a new ally without pushing them in a direction it does not want to go.
In the middle of the Indian Ocean sits Diego Garcia. While best known for its air base, it is also the home port of several U.S. prepositioning ships. The idea of basing destroyers or other warships in such a central location is an intriguing one. A major risk to this option is climate change—Diego Garcia is one of many American military facilities around the world threatened by worsening storms and rising sea levels.
Finally, if the U.S. sought a dramatic upgrade in its relations with India, one aspect might be a request to base destroyers in India itself. This choice, however, might be the riskiest of all. For one thing, Pakistan would be furious. For another, it would go against India’s long tradition of geopolitical non-alignment. Furthermore, while India is a member of the Quad, it is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a multinational security forum led by China and Russia. The fact that India sees China as a rival does not mean India does not wish to avoid conflict with the People’s Republic.
A U.S. Navy tasked with protecting interests around the world is one in need of as many friendly ports as possible. If any countries very far from the continental United States are willing to host American warships, that is something Washington should take advantage of. It will require careful balancing, but it will be worth the effort.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. The views expressed here are entirely his own.
The views expressed above are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of any current or former employer, nor do they express an official view of the U.S. government.The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Michael D. Purzycki
In discussions of the United States’ national security interests in the Indo-Pacific, the “Indo” part often gets short shrift. So much of America’s attention is focused on China and the threats it poses in the Western Pacific—to Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines, not to mention America’s own Pacific territories—that it is easy to ignore the Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy should consider basing ships in the Indian Ocean to ensure this vast expanse of water (stretching more than 6,200 miles from east to west at its widest point) to ensure it can quickly respond to threats in the region.
The United States already invests significant time and resources in the Indian Ocean, particularly in coordination with the region’s largest country. In recent decades, India and the United States have dramatically increased their security cooperation. While they are not full-fledged allies, the two countries understand they have many common interests: notably confronting Chinese aggression, but also trade and tackling non-state threats like terrorists and pirates. Both countries, along with Australia and Japan, are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which has emerged as a prime forum for security coordination by the Indo-Pacific’s major democratic powers.
Washington also has other security interests in and along the Indian Ocean. India’s historic rival Pakistan is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) with a long (and sometimes fraught) security relationship with the United States. Furthermore, because the Indian Ocean connects the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea with the Pacific, Iranian oil headed to China passes through it. China imports more than one and a half million barrels of oil per day from Iran, accounting for 15 percent of the People’s Republic’s oil imports. The interplay between these nations (all nuclear-armed except for nuke-seeking Iran) gives ample reason to pay close attention to the Indian Ocean even as the Pacific grabs more headlines.
When the U.S. Navy deploys vessels from the Pacific Fleet to confront threats like the Houthis in Yemen, those ships must cross the Indian Ocean. U.S. destroyers have played a key role in multilateral efforts to contain the Houthis, part of American-led efforts to weaken Iran and its proxies in their fight against Israel, Arab states, and other American partners. Rotating ships to the Middle East, however, has significant drawbacks. It can take two weeks or more for ships homeported on the West Coast to reach the Middle East. At a time when the Navy’s shipyards are struggling to clear backlogs of ship maintenance, the more the United States can maintain a presence in the region without the strain of long travels, the better.
While ships can travel from the East Coast to the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, or Persian Gulf via the Suez Canal, that approach has its own risks. Despite being a longtime ally of the United States which receives more than a billion dollars a year in American military aid, Egypt is not guaranteed to continue playing that role. From 2016-2021, Egypt bought more Russian weapons than American weapons, and according to 2023 reports, Egypt allegedly planned to supply Russia with rockets for its war in Ukraine. It would not be surprising if Moscow tried to leverage this relationship to deny the U.S. Navy access to the Suez Canal at some point in the future.
These factors provide reasons for Washington to consider basing ships in or around the Indian Ocean, rather than rotating them as is done at present. Doing so would let the United States confront threats like Iran and its minions, and respond other threats that may arise, without putting the stress of a weekslong journey across two oceans on Navy vessels. The question then becomes, which country or countries should Washington ask to host American ships?
All possible options have drawbacks as well as advantages. If the United States decides to base ships in any of them, it will have to accept a certain amount of risk, such as security risk or the threat of souring relations with countries other than the host nation. But while no choice is a panacea, the convenience of having strategically placed ships may outweigh the disadvantages.
Certain Arab countries of the Gulf region, such as Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are possible hosts. The UAE’s port at Jebel Ali, one of the world’s largest, frequently hosts U.S. vessels. Oman’s coast along the Arabian Sea, meanwhile, is a practically ideal location for basing ships that could be deployed both southwest to the Yemeni coast, northeast toward Iran, or southeast through the Arabian Sea directly into the heart of the Indian Ocean.
Unfortunately, the UAE might present security risks, as the country also pursues close security and technological ties with China. Meanwhile, Oman has thus far refused to sign the Abraham Accords and recognize Israel. If negotiations on ship basing become entangled with the possibility of Oman signing the Accords, it could complicate U.S.-Israel relations at an extremely sensitive time.
At the western edge of the Indian Ocean, Kenya is a good possibility, both for sending ships into the ocean and north to fight foes like the Houthis. Earlier this year, Kenya became the first sub-Saharan African country to receive MNNA status. It has partnered with the United States in fighting the terrorist group al-Shabab in Somalia. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Kenya’s ambassador to the United Nations gave an eloquent condemnation of Moscow’s aggression.
Washington would have to be careful, however, not to force Kenya to pigeonhole itself. Like many African countries, Kenya has seen large inflows of Chinese investment, money it will be very wary about jeopardizing. America would have to perform a delicate balancing act of getting the most of its relationship with a new ally without pushing them in a direction it does not want to go.
In the middle of the Indian Ocean sits Diego Garcia. While best known for its air base, it is also the home port of several U.S. prepositioning ships. The idea of basing destroyers or other warships in such a central location is an intriguing one. A major risk to this option is climate change—Diego Garcia is one of many American military facilities around the world threatened by worsening storms and rising sea levels.
Finally, if the U.S. sought a dramatic upgrade in its relations with India, one aspect might be a request to base destroyers in India itself. This choice, however, might be the riskiest of all. For one thing, Pakistan would be furious. For another, it would go against India’s long tradition of geopolitical non-alignment. Furthermore, while India is a member of the Quad, it is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a multinational security forum led by China and Russia. The fact that India sees China as a rival does not mean India does not wish to avoid conflict with the People’s Republic.
A U.S. Navy tasked with protecting interests around the world is one in need of as many friendly ports as possible. If any countries very far from the continental United States are willing to host American warships, that is something Washington should take advantage of. It will require careful balancing, but it will be worth the effort.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. The views expressed here are entirely his own.
The views expressed above are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of any current or former employer, nor do they express an official view of the U.S. government. The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.