Infantry Wins Battles, Logistics Wins Wars: The Role of the Army’s “Little Navy” in the Pacific
The MOC
By
Mike Daum
October 24, 2024
On October 14, 2024, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) surrounded Taiwan with reportedly reportedly34 naval vessels and at least153 aircraft as part of its latest “Joint-Sword 2024B” exercise. This is not the first Chinese show of force against the beleaguered island democracy, but it does serve as a stark reminder that America could be drawn into a major conflict in the Pacific at a moment’s notice. This latest exercise follows the equally concerning report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, whichfound that the U.S. military is unprepared to prevail in large-scale combat.
When one thinks about war with China in the Taiwan Strait—or in the Pacific broadly—one may rightly imagine largenaval engagements and heroicbattles led by the U.S. Marine Corps. However, the U.S. Army also plays a critical role in a domain dominated by water.
Not only does the Army have its own fleet of watercraft, but the service is alsoresponsible for sustaining the joint force in the Pacific. Unfortunately, the military’s largest service finds itself unprepared to answer this call at a time when tensions with China are approaching an all-time high. The Government Accountability Office recentlyreported that the Army’s watercraft fleet has been reduced by almost half since 2018 and that less than 40 percent of available vessels are operational. While there are manydeficiencies regarding America’snational defense worthaddressing, Army’s role in the Pacific cannot be ignored. To win a war against China, the Army must rapidly enhance the capacity of itsmaritime logistics fleet.
As General John J. Pershingsaid: “Infantry wins battles, logistics win wars.”
Getting American troops into the fight is relatively easy—the hard part is keeping them there. The U.S. military, including theArmy, has strategically forward deployed“stand-in forces” and prepositionedcaches of warfighting equipment across the Pacific theater. These assets allow American troops and allies to“fight tonight.” However, the ability to stay in the fight over the long term is essential to turn battlefield successes into a victorious campaign.
In a conflict with China, every service will have a role in transporting materiel from American factories to the frontline. The Army’s job is to get that equipment and follow-on forces across the goal-line.
The Air Force will be critical in the initialinter-theater lift of troops and materiel between the continental United States and the Western Pacific. But before support can be distributed along the front lines, the air service must navigate acontested airspace and land on bases activelytargeted by Chinese missiles and aircraft. The Navy has some landing craft available, and isinvesting in a handful ofMedium Landing Ships to support the Marine Corps; however, the bulk of the Navy’s sealift assets must prioritizesustaining the Pacific Fleet’s high operational tempo across vast and contested waters.
Any gaps or delays in the logistics chain from sea-to-shore will leave the forces defending U.S. air and naval assets and holding key terrain exposed to counter-attack. The Army has the lead forintra-theater lift missions to fill these gaps. The Army has done this before—such as the WWII-eraNew Guinea campaign in the Southwest Pacific—but it will need to drastically increase the size of its “little navy” to do it again.
The Army has approximately eightLogistic Support Vessels (LSVs),four of which are in the Pacific. LSVs are the largest vessels in the Army’s fleet and can deliver 24 Abrams tanks or 32 Bradley fighting vehicles to coastlines, inland waterways, and unimproved beaches. Additionally, the Army has around 30Landing Craft Utility (LCU) and 30Landing Craft Mechanism (LCM-8) vessels. LCU’s are smaller than LSVs and can onlytransport one Abrams Tank or 350 combat troops. LCM-8s cancarry either two Humvees, one Stryker, or approximately 100 combat troops. It is unknown how many LCUs and LCMs are currently in the Pacific theater, butreports suggest at least 5 LCUs will be stationed in Japan, with a handful potentially staged in Australia and Hawaii.
TheManeuver Support Vessel (Light)(MSV-L)is the first class of Army watercraft in more than 40 years and is meant to replace the Vietnam War-era LCM-8. The MSV-L doubles the range of the LCM-8 (to 360 nautical miles) and is capable of carrying 82 tons of equipment, which practically allows the transport of either one Abrams tank; two Strykers; or four Joint Light Tactical Vehicles. In 2017, the Armyordered over 30 MSV-Ls for its watercraft fleet but only expectsabout a dozen to be delivered by 2029. This modernization effort is long overdue. A generation of uncontested logistics led the Army to sacrifice effective capacity for efficient capabilities.
In World War Two, the Army’s logistics fleet hadover 100,000 watercraft including around23,400 Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) vessels capable of carrying 36 infantrymen or 8,000-pounds of cargo from ship-to-shore. The Army’s WWII landing craft fleet was over 290 times larger than current levels. Modern MSV-Ls can carry over 20 times more weight than vintage LCVPs; however, when adjusting for this metric the current landing craft fleet is still about 14 times smaller than its WWII counterpart. Because everything is a target in modern warfare, lower capacity and concentration of more cargo on fewer platforms are strategic vulnerabilities that must be addressed immediately.
The Army has taken steps to increase watercraft capacity, including by basing a Composite Watercraft Company in Yokohama, Japan; however, further steps are necessary to fulfill the service’s logistics role in wartime. Increasing the Army’s maritime capacity does not necessarily require a larger active-duty force. Thevast majority of the Army’s watercraft units can remain in reserve while a few active duty units support peacetime operations, such ashumanitarian anddisaster relief. The primary challenge will be delivering landing craft at a suitable speed, cost, and scale to meet wartime requirements.
One suggestion is tointegrate uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) into the logistics chain, which would reduce production costs and the risk to servicemembers of re-supplying forces in a contested environment. The Marine Corpsexperimented with this concept at the Army’sProject Convergence Capstone in February. Around the same time the Deputy Director for Contested Logistics at the Army Futures Command shared hisvision of unmanned aerial systems picking up materials from USVs on the water and delivering them to the frontline ashore. This concept makes sense in theory, but only as a low-cost addition to the current logistics fleet. The Army will still need platforms to carry men and equipment from ship-to-shore if America is to win a conflict in the Pacific.
The ongoing budget battles in Washington will continue, forcing the services to make tough choices to prioritize between platforms. There are many well-known issues to address when it comes to rebuilding America’s military, such as our naval capacity, munition stockpiles, and air defenses. Nevertheless, the Army’s maritime logistics capabilities could prove to be the difference between victory or defeat. The enemy gets a vote, which means time is never on our side. America may be ready to fight tonight, but victory in a war against China may well depend on the capacity of the Army’s little navy.
Mike Daum is a veteran of the 82nd Airborne Division and a current defense and national security policy analyst, focusing on strategic competition with the Chinese Communist Party.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Mike Daum
On October 14, 2024, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) surrounded Taiwan with reportedly reportedly 34 naval vessels and at least 153 aircraft as part of its latest “Joint-Sword 2024B” exercise. This is not the first Chinese show of force against the beleaguered island democracy, but it does serve as a stark reminder that America could be drawn into a major conflict in the Pacific at a moment’s notice. This latest exercise follows the equally concerning report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, which found that the U.S. military is unprepared to prevail in large-scale combat.
When one thinks about war with China in the Taiwan Strait—or in the Pacific broadly—one may rightly imagine large naval engagements and heroic battles led by the U.S. Marine Corps. However, the U.S. Army also plays a critical role in a domain dominated by water.
Not only does the Army have its own fleet of watercraft, but the service is also responsible for sustaining the joint force in the Pacific. Unfortunately, the military’s largest service finds itself unprepared to answer this call at a time when tensions with China are approaching an all-time high. The Government Accountability Office recently reported that the Army’s watercraft fleet has been reduced by almost half since 2018 and that less than 40 percent of available vessels are operational. While there are many deficiencies regarding America’s national defense worth addressing, Army’s role in the Pacific cannot be ignored. To win a war against China, the Army must rapidly enhance the capacity of its maritime logistics fleet.
As General John J. Pershing said: “Infantry wins battles, logistics win wars.”
Getting American troops into the fight is relatively easy—the hard part is keeping them there. The U.S. military, including the Army, has strategically forward deployed “stand-in forces” and prepositioned caches of warfighting equipment across the Pacific theater. These assets allow American troops and allies to “fight tonight.” However, the ability to stay in the fight over the long term is essential to turn battlefield successes into a victorious campaign.
In a conflict with China, every service will have a role in transporting materiel from American factories to the frontline. The Army’s job is to get that equipment and follow-on forces across the goal-line.
The Air Force will be critical in the initial inter-theater lift of troops and materiel between the continental United States and the Western Pacific. But before support can be distributed along the front lines, the air service must navigate a contested airspace and land on bases actively targeted by Chinese missiles and aircraft. The Navy has some landing craft available, and is investing in a handful of Medium Landing Ships to support the Marine Corps; however, the bulk of the Navy’s sealift assets must prioritize sustaining the Pacific Fleet’s high operational tempo across vast and contested waters.
Any gaps or delays in the logistics chain from sea-to-shore will leave the forces defending U.S. air and naval assets and holding key terrain exposed to counter-attack. The Army has the lead for intra-theater lift missions to fill these gaps. The Army has done this before—such as the WWII-era New Guinea campaign in the Southwest Pacific—but it will need to drastically increase the size of its “little navy” to do it again.
The Army has approximately eight Logistic Support Vessels (LSVs), four of which are in the Pacific. LSVs are the largest vessels in the Army’s fleet and can deliver 24 Abrams tanks or 32 Bradley fighting vehicles to coastlines, inland waterways, and unimproved beaches. Additionally, the Army has around 30 Landing Craft Utility (LCU) and 30 Landing Craft Mechanism (LCM-8) vessels. LCU’s are smaller than LSVs and can only transport one Abrams Tank or 350 combat troops. LCM-8s can carry either two Humvees, one Stryker, or approximately 100 combat troops. It is unknown how many LCUs and LCMs are currently in the Pacific theater, but reports suggest at least 5 LCUs will be stationed in Japan, with a handful potentially staged in Australia and Hawaii.
The Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) (MSV-L) is the first class of Army watercraft in more than 40 years and is meant to replace the Vietnam War-era LCM-8. The MSV-L doubles the range of the LCM-8 (to 360 nautical miles) and is capable of carrying 82 tons of equipment, which practically allows the transport of either one Abrams tank; two Strykers; or four Joint Light Tactical Vehicles. In 2017, the Army ordered over 30 MSV-Ls for its watercraft fleet but only expects about a dozen to be delivered by 2029. This modernization effort is long overdue. A generation of uncontested logistics led the Army to sacrifice effective capacity for efficient capabilities.
In World War Two, the Army’s logistics fleet had over 100,000 watercraft including around 23,400 Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) vessels capable of carrying 36 infantrymen or 8,000-pounds of cargo from ship-to-shore. The Army’s WWII landing craft fleet was over 290 times larger than current levels. Modern MSV-Ls can carry over 20 times more weight than vintage LCVPs; however, when adjusting for this metric the current landing craft fleet is still about 14 times smaller than its WWII counterpart. Because everything is a target in modern warfare, lower capacity and concentration of more cargo on fewer platforms are strategic vulnerabilities that must be addressed immediately.
The Army has taken steps to increase watercraft capacity, including by basing a Composite Watercraft Company in Yokohama, Japan; however, further steps are necessary to fulfill the service’s logistics role in wartime. Increasing the Army’s maritime capacity does not necessarily require a larger active-duty force. The vast majority of the Army’s watercraft units can remain in reserve while a few active duty units support peacetime operations, such as humanitarian and disaster relief. The primary challenge will be delivering landing craft at a suitable speed, cost, and scale to meet wartime requirements.
One suggestion is to integrate uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) into the logistics chain, which would reduce production costs and the risk to servicemembers of re-supplying forces in a contested environment. The Marine Corps experimented with this concept at the Army’s Project Convergence Capstone in February. Around the same time the Deputy Director for Contested Logistics at the Army Futures Command shared his vision of unmanned aerial systems picking up materials from USVs on the water and delivering them to the frontline ashore. This concept makes sense in theory, but only as a low-cost addition to the current logistics fleet. The Army will still need platforms to carry men and equipment from ship-to-shore if America is to win a conflict in the Pacific.
The ongoing budget battles in Washington will continue, forcing the services to make tough choices to prioritize between platforms. There are many well-known issues to address when it comes to rebuilding America’s military, such as our naval capacity, munition stockpiles, and air defenses. Nevertheless, the Army’s maritime logistics capabilities could prove to be the difference between victory or defeat. The enemy gets a vote, which means time is never on our side. America may be ready to fight tonight, but victory in a war against China may well depend on the capacity of the Army’s little navy.
Mike Daum is a veteran of the 82nd Airborne Division and a current defense and national security policy analyst, focusing on strategic competition with the Chinese Communist Party.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.