Limitations of German Maritime Security and Defense on NATO’s Eastern Front
The MOC
By
Ewa A. Andryjalowicz
October 10, 2024
German maritime security and defense capabilities play a crucial role in NATO’s collective security, especially on the alliance’s eastern front, which faces increasing threats from metropolitan Russia and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.
In light of this threat, Germany should be essential in supporting its transatlantic partners in this region. However, since the 1990s, Germany’s armed and naval forces, despite the country’s economic strength and central position in Europe, have faced severe constraints.
Moreover, the current German government still does not have sufficient funds for defense and devotes a significant portion of its budget to other purposes. Despite the navy’s small fleet and aging equipment, the government’s budget emphasizes long-term investments in new technologies, knowing that it will probably not be able to fulfill them. All this now makes it difficult for Germany to fully engage in NATO’s maritime defense efforts in the Baltic Sea region.
Do Germany’s capabilities today allow it to meet Russia’s challenges in the Baltic Sea? Probably not yet. Are the German government’s future investments located in the right areas to improve preparedness in the event of aggression from Russia against NATO’s eastern flank and be effective in the fight against the Russian aggressor? Again, most likely not—but why?
Current Capabilities of the German Navy are Limited
The fact that Russia potentially poses the greatest threat to the Baltic states should further motivate Berlin to increase its investments in the latest naval technologies. Given the current threats from Russia in both the Baltic and North Seas, Germany should be well prepared to respond to any possible attack to effectively protect allies on NATO’s eastern frontUnfortunately, Germany is still unable to contribute as much as it should. Today, Berlin has a small fleet of 62 warships and auxiliaries and about 16,300 sailors, marines, and airmen compared to the 35,000 deployed by Bonn in the 1980s.
Beginning in the 1990s, the German Navy began a significant, politically-motivated program of disarmament, drastically reducing its military personnel to less than 16,000 and its fleet to fewer than 50 ships and vessels.
Although the current German Navy has neither landing forces, aircraft carriers, nor cruisers and destroyers the German government believes that it has advanced technology, a well-developed fleet, surface ships, submarines, and special forces capable of undertaking naval missions. The German Navy’s actual force structure, however, would leave much to be desired in the event of a crisis in the eastern Baltic. Germany’s new maritime strategy for 2035+ lays out an impressive vision for the Navy which is undoubtedly necessary, but plans without the required budget to sustain them will simply not materialize.
German Security and Maritime Defense are Severely Limited
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Germany has been under intense diplomatic pressure from NATO’s eastern members, particularly Poland, as well as from the United States. This pressure on Berlin is motivated by a desire to see Germany—the wealthiest European country with the highest GDP—spend significantly more of its budget on defense and security, invest more in new technologies, and deepen its cooperation with its allies.
However, Berlin did not take any significant action against the diplomatic pressure until the explosion in September 2022 of the Nordstrom 2 gas pipeline, which was mainly intended to supply cheap Russian gas to Germany. Berlin, having “nothing to lose” in bilateral relations with Moscow, which had already been severed after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, began to increase defense spending slightly. It can be surmised that the “termination of Nordstream 2” contributed significantly to the German government’s decision to increase defense spending to two percent of GDP. In addition, the German government earmarked 19 billion Euros for the Navy in 2022, investing in submarines, frigates, corvettes, and other small but agile units.
However, these investments in technology and future capabilities will be wasted if the Bundeswehr neglects the basics of modern warfare. What does it matter that the German government has drafted promising and far-reaching plans for investments that will pay off in the 2030s and beyond, if its armed forces currently have enough ammunition to fight for only two days in the event of a war?
Poland and the United States continue to expect the German government to increase its defense and security spending and to improve its cooperation with NATO partners. Most recently, during a meeting in Warsaw on July 2 with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Europe is “dramatically disoriented” when it comes to defense and that he is hugely “annoyed” not only by the competition for defense contracts and military initiatives across Europe but also by Germany’s refusal to consider defense bonds.
It is worth mentioning that U.S. pressure on Germany on defense matters could increase even futher if Donald Trump wins the presidential election on November 5. The former president noted that he might refuse to protect NATO members who do not pay enough for their own defense and would continue asking Germany to increase its defense spending drastically.
Considering the above aspects, Germany constantly faces the same questions about the current state of its fleet, its operational readiness, and the future of the Navy in an armed conflict on NATO’s eastern front, yet it still does not do enough to prepare its forces for a conflict tomorrow, rather than in the far future.
Although the accession of Sweden and Finland to the alliance has turned the Baltic into a so-called “NATO lake,” Russia still poses a severe threat above and below the waves, both from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and the Baltic coast of metropolitan Russian in St. Petersburg.
The German Government Allocates Its Budget to Areas Besides Maritime Security
Germany’s maritime limitations are even more apparent compared to the naval capabilities of NATO members on the eastern front, such as Poland and the Baltic states. For example, Poland has recently made significant progress in modernizing its Navy, recognizing the strategic importance of securing the Baltic Sea from a potential Russian attack. Although smaller and economically weaker than Germany, the Polish Navy has rapidly invested in modern submarines, coastal defense systems, and surface ships capable of deterring Russian aggression. Warsaw recognizes the gravity of the situation given its vicinity to neighboring Kaliningrad.
The Baltic states have prioritized maritime security despite limited resources, often relying on international cooperation and joint exercises with NATO allies to bolster their defense capabilities. These countries understand the existential threat from Russia and have accordingly directed a significant portion of their defense budgets toward strengthening their navies. By contrast, Germany’s defense spending has remained low relative to its GDP, with most of its budget going to non-defense spending. Germany prefers to invest a large part of its budget in the Green Deal related to climate change, immigration policy, and high social benefits rather than in defense, security, and related innovation. Germany’s slow financial approach to the current crisis undermines the alliance’s overall strategic posture. This disparity in commitment and investment creates a gap in NATO’s collective security, especially in the Baltic region.
The lack of a solid German naval presence in the Baltic Sea weakens NATO’s deterrence and rapid reaction capacity, exposing its eastern flank to potential provocations from Russia. Germany should change its attitude as soon as possible if it does not want to lose its credibility and trust.
Ewa A. Andryjalowicz, M.A., is a Researcher, Analyst, and Advisor at the State Parliament in Germany. She is a multilingual international affairs professional with several years of research experience in Defense and Security Policy, concentrating on transatlantic (E.U./U.S.) long-term collaboration. She can be found on LinkedIn or contacted via e-mail at eandryjalowicz@gmail.com.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Ewa A. Andryjalowicz
German maritime security and defense capabilities play a crucial role in NATO’s collective security, especially on the alliance’s eastern front, which faces increasing threats from metropolitan Russia and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.
In light of this threat, Germany should be essential in supporting its transatlantic partners in this region. However, since the 1990s, Germany’s armed and naval forces, despite the country’s economic strength and central position in Europe, have faced severe constraints.
Moreover, the current German government still does not have sufficient funds for defense and devotes a significant portion of its budget to other purposes. Despite the navy’s small fleet and aging equipment, the government’s budget emphasizes long-term investments in new technologies, knowing that it will probably not be able to fulfill them. All this now makes it difficult for Germany to fully engage in NATO’s maritime defense efforts in the Baltic Sea region.
Do Germany’s capabilities today allow it to meet Russia’s challenges in the Baltic Sea? Probably not yet. Are the German government’s future investments located in the right areas to improve preparedness in the event of aggression from Russia against NATO’s eastern flank and be effective in the fight against the Russian aggressor? Again, most likely not—but why?
Current Capabilities of the German Navy are Limited
The fact that Russia potentially poses the greatest threat to the Baltic states should further motivate Berlin to increase its investments in the latest naval technologies. Given the current threats from Russia in both the Baltic and North Seas, Germany should be well prepared to respond to any possible attack to effectively protect allies on NATO’s eastern frontUnfortunately, Germany is still unable to contribute as much as it should. Today, Berlin has a small fleet of 62 warships and auxiliaries and about 16,300 sailors, marines, and airmen compared to the 35,000 deployed by Bonn in the 1980s.
Beginning in the 1990s, the German Navy began a significant, politically-motivated program of disarmament, drastically reducing its military personnel to less than 16,000 and its fleet to fewer than 50 ships and vessels.
Although the current German Navy has neither landing forces, aircraft carriers, nor cruisers and destroyers the German government believes that it has advanced technology, a well-developed fleet, surface ships, submarines, and special forces capable of undertaking naval missions. The German Navy’s actual force structure, however, would leave much to be desired in the event of a crisis in the eastern Baltic. Germany’s new maritime strategy for 2035+ lays out an impressive vision for the Navy which is undoubtedly necessary, but plans without the required budget to sustain them will simply not materialize.
German Security and Maritime Defense are Severely Limited
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Germany has been under intense diplomatic pressure from NATO’s eastern members, particularly Poland, as well as from the United States. This pressure on Berlin is motivated by a desire to see Germany—the wealthiest European country with the highest GDP—spend significantly more of its budget on defense and security, invest more in new technologies, and deepen its cooperation with its allies.
However, Berlin did not take any significant action against the diplomatic pressure until the explosion in September 2022 of the Nordstrom 2 gas pipeline, which was mainly intended to supply cheap Russian gas to Germany. Berlin, having “nothing to lose” in bilateral relations with Moscow, which had already been severed after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, began to increase defense spending slightly. It can be surmised that the “termination of Nordstream 2” contributed significantly to the German government’s decision to increase defense spending to two percent of GDP. In addition, the German government earmarked 19 billion Euros for the Navy in 2022, investing in submarines, frigates, corvettes, and other small but agile units.
However, these investments in technology and future capabilities will be wasted if the Bundeswehr neglects the basics of modern warfare. What does it matter that the German government has drafted promising and far-reaching plans for investments that will pay off in the 2030s and beyond, if its armed forces currently have enough ammunition to fight for only two days in the event of a war?
Poland and the United States continue to expect the German government to increase its defense and security spending and to improve its cooperation with NATO partners. Most recently, during a meeting in Warsaw on July 2 with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Europe is “dramatically disoriented” when it comes to defense and that he is hugely “annoyed” not only by the competition for defense contracts and military initiatives across Europe but also by Germany’s refusal to consider defense bonds.
It is worth mentioning that U.S. pressure on Germany on defense matters could increase even futher if Donald Trump wins the presidential election on November 5. The former president noted that he might refuse to protect NATO members who do not pay enough for their own defense and would continue asking Germany to increase its defense spending drastically.
Considering the above aspects, Germany constantly faces the same questions about the current state of its fleet, its operational readiness, and the future of the Navy in an armed conflict on NATO’s eastern front, yet it still does not do enough to prepare its forces for a conflict tomorrow, rather than in the far future.
Although the accession of Sweden and Finland to the alliance has turned the Baltic into a so-called “NATO lake,” Russia still poses a severe threat above and below the waves, both from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and the Baltic coast of metropolitan Russian in St. Petersburg.
The German Government Allocates Its Budget to Areas Besides Maritime Security
Germany’s maritime limitations are even more apparent compared to the naval capabilities of NATO members on the eastern front, such as Poland and the Baltic states. For example, Poland has recently made significant progress in modernizing its Navy, recognizing the strategic importance of securing the Baltic Sea from a potential Russian attack. Although smaller and economically weaker than Germany, the Polish Navy has rapidly invested in modern submarines, coastal defense systems, and surface ships capable of deterring Russian aggression. Warsaw recognizes the gravity of the situation given its vicinity to neighboring Kaliningrad.
The Baltic states have prioritized maritime security despite limited resources, often relying on international cooperation and joint exercises with NATO allies to bolster their defense capabilities. These countries understand the existential threat from Russia and have accordingly directed a significant portion of their defense budgets toward strengthening their navies. By contrast, Germany’s defense spending has remained low relative to its GDP, with most of its budget going to non-defense spending. Germany prefers to invest a large part of its budget in the Green Deal related to climate change, immigration policy, and high social benefits rather than in defense, security, and related innovation. Germany’s slow financial approach to the current crisis undermines the alliance’s overall strategic posture. This disparity in commitment and investment creates a gap in NATO’s collective security, especially in the Baltic region.
The lack of a solid German naval presence in the Baltic Sea weakens NATO’s deterrence and rapid reaction capacity, exposing its eastern flank to potential provocations from Russia. Germany should change its attitude as soon as possible if it does not want to lose its credibility and trust.
Ewa A. Andryjalowicz, M.A., is a Researcher, Analyst, and Advisor at the State Parliament in Germany. She is a multilingual international affairs professional with several years of research experience in Defense and Security Policy, concentrating on transatlantic (E.U./U.S.) long-term collaboration. She can be found on LinkedIn or contacted via e-mail at eandryjalowicz@gmail.com.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.