The One Year Anniversary of Hamas’ Attack: Implications for the United States Navy in the Red Sea and Beyond
The MOC
By
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
October 7, 2024
One year ago today, Hamas executed a well-planned and coordinated attack on an Israeli music festival and nearby Kibbutzim in the Israeli countryside. Hamas militants acted with cold and calculated brutality killing over 1200 Israeli civilians and security personnel and taking over 240 hostages—including American citizens, seven of whom are still being held. The Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) initial response targeted Hamas fighters and infrastructure in Gaza itself; however, the conflagration has expanded in the year since, as other members of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” have joined the fight. In recent weeks, the IDF has conducted a decapitation campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Meanwhile, in the Red Sea, Yemen’s Houthis have spent ten months attacking commercial vessels and the U.S. warships sent to protect them. Iran itself has launched multiple missile salvos against Israel.
While American public opinion remains divided—particularly on college campuses gripped by months of protests last spring—the U.S. government has continued to provide diplomatic, information, military, and economic assistance to its ally Israel. In particular, the performance of the United States Navy has been nothing short of impressive and has cemented the service’s reputation as the sine qua non of American military power projection on both the high seas and on distant shores.
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the President deployed two carrier strike groups (CSGs)—USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower—and an expeditionary strike group to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East to blunt further aggression from Iran and its terrorist proxies throughout the region. After Israeli strikes against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targets in Damascus, Hezbollah launched a few rockets, but Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah did not commit to an all-out war on Israel’s exposed flank. One might conclude that deterrence was working.
In April, Iran responded with a massive missile barrage of over 170 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. U.S. warships and naval aviation were integral to the allied and Israeli response, which shot down 99 percent of the Iranian weapons before they reached Israel. After this dismal failure, Iran signaled that it was standing down.
Meanwhile the Houthis continue to mount an escalating campaign of violence against civilian shipping traffic in the Red Sea, sinking one ship (the Rubymar) and damaging many others. Rubymar’s cargo of nitrate fertilizer poses an environmental risk to the Red Sea and the beaches of adjacent nations. The more recent attack on the oil tanker M/V Sounion, which is still foundering and burning in the Red Sea, poses an even more serious environmental risk. Despite continued efforts to down Houthi missiles and drones by U.S. and coalition Navy destroyers and frigates, the Houthis continue their attacks apply lessons learned to increase the risk to commercial or military shipping. Most recently, a three-ship surface action group of U.S. Navy destroyers and one littoral combat ship shot down 23 Houthis missiles or drones while entering the Red Sea from the Bab-Al-Mandab straits. U.S. warships are performing admirably in the Red Sea, but because Washington is unwilling to carry the fight against the Houthis ashore, U.S. naval forces are left to play indefinite defense in the Red Sea.
Despite a monumental effort, neither President Biden nor U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken have obtained an agreement between Israel and Hamas on a ceasefire or another prisoner exchange. Hamas recently executed five Israeli and one American hostage in cold blood to prevent them from being liberated by a nearby IDF rescue team, further exacerbating the situation. Meanwhile negotiations with the Houthis have proven futile and there is an increasing appetite for more robust strikes ashore to go after missile storage facilities, launchers, and command and control nodes.
Upon the departure of the Eisenhower CSG from the Middle East theater of operations, Secretary Austin ordered two additional carrier strike groups (USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Theodore Roosevelt) from the Pacific to the Middle East to maintain deterrence until the arrival of the Harry S. Truman strike group, deploying from the East Coast. Not surprisingly, the Chinese took the opportunity of no U.S. carriers in the Western Pacific to deploy all three of their own carriers simultaneously for the first time, sending a very pointed message to American leadership: while you are distracted elsewhere, we remain present and engaged in the South China Sea. This action should only reinforce our appreciation for the military as well as the diplomatic and symbolic power that even a single American carrier strike group represents.
The recent killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and his C-Suite and Board of Directors has heightened tension in the region to a new level. Subsequent missile strikes on Israel by Iran were mostly defeated by combined U.S. and Israeli efforts, showcasing the U.S. Navy’s ability to interdict Iranian ballistic missiles from the sea at distant ranges.
All in all, the United States has deployed five carrier strike groups to the Middle East over the last twelve months. Two of these strike groups were extended on station from seven to nine months at sea. While absolutely necessary to reduce the risk of a broader war in the Middle East, this strategy will have a long-term impact on Navy maintenance, readiness, ordnance stockpiles, and retention. Leaders in defense policy and our legislators must take this into account as we look at Navy funding in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). That the U.S. Navy’s carrier force has been the tool of choice for leaders in the White House and Pentagon over the past year speaks volumes about the Navy’s foundational importance to American national security. Congress needs to allocate defense funds accordingly.
The Center for Maritime Strategy hosted a private Red Sea Security panel discussion last week at the Navy League of the United States headquarters in Arlington, VA. This event comes as the conflict reaches its one-year mark, highlighting the significant security implications for the broader Middle East, particularly in the Red Sea. Although the violence continues and there is no endpoint in sight, these high-level discussions are crucial in understanding multifaceted challenges and the broader implications for global security. We hope that we will have no cause to continue these discussions on the second anniversary of October 7th in 2025.
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (ret.), Dean
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
One year ago today, Hamas executed a well-planned and coordinated attack on an Israeli music festival and nearby Kibbutzim in the Israeli countryside. Hamas militants acted with cold and calculated brutality killing over 1200 Israeli civilians and security personnel and taking over 240 hostages—including American citizens, seven of whom are still being held. The Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) initial response targeted Hamas fighters and infrastructure in Gaza itself; however, the conflagration has expanded in the year since, as other members of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” have joined the fight. In recent weeks, the IDF has conducted a decapitation campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Meanwhile, in the Red Sea, Yemen’s Houthis have spent ten months attacking commercial vessels and the U.S. warships sent to protect them. Iran itself has launched multiple missile salvos against Israel.
While American public opinion remains divided—particularly on college campuses gripped by months of protests last spring—the U.S. government has continued to provide diplomatic, information, military, and economic assistance to its ally Israel. In particular, the performance of the United States Navy has been nothing short of impressive and has cemented the service’s reputation as the sine qua non of American military power projection on both the high seas and on distant shores.
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the President deployed two carrier strike groups (CSGs)—USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower—and an expeditionary strike group to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East to blunt further aggression from Iran and its terrorist proxies throughout the region. After Israeli strikes against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targets in Damascus, Hezbollah launched a few rockets, but Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah did not commit to an all-out war on Israel’s exposed flank. One might conclude that deterrence was working.
In April, Iran responded with a massive missile barrage of over 170 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. U.S. warships and naval aviation were integral to the allied and Israeli response, which shot down 99 percent of the Iranian weapons before they reached Israel. After this dismal failure, Iran signaled that it was standing down.
Meanwhile the Houthis continue to mount an escalating campaign of violence against civilian shipping traffic in the Red Sea, sinking one ship (the Rubymar) and damaging many others. Rubymar’s cargo of nitrate fertilizer poses an environmental risk to the Red Sea and the beaches of adjacent nations. The more recent attack on the oil tanker M/V Sounion, which is still foundering and burning in the Red Sea, poses an even more serious environmental risk. Despite continued efforts to down Houthi missiles and drones by U.S. and coalition Navy destroyers and frigates, the Houthis continue their attacks apply lessons learned to increase the risk to commercial or military shipping. Most recently, a three-ship surface action group of U.S. Navy destroyers and one littoral combat ship shot down 23 Houthis missiles or drones while entering the Red Sea from the Bab-Al-Mandab straits. U.S. warships are performing admirably in the Red Sea, but because Washington is unwilling to carry the fight against the Houthis ashore, U.S. naval forces are left to play indefinite defense in the Red Sea.
Despite a monumental effort, neither President Biden nor U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken have obtained an agreement between Israel and Hamas on a ceasefire or another prisoner exchange. Hamas recently executed five Israeli and one American hostage in cold blood to prevent them from being liberated by a nearby IDF rescue team, further exacerbating the situation. Meanwhile negotiations with the Houthis have proven futile and there is an increasing appetite for more robust strikes ashore to go after missile storage facilities, launchers, and command and control nodes.
Upon the departure of the Eisenhower CSG from the Middle East theater of operations, Secretary Austin ordered two additional carrier strike groups (USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Theodore Roosevelt) from the Pacific to the Middle East to maintain deterrence until the arrival of the Harry S. Truman strike group, deploying from the East Coast. Not surprisingly, the Chinese took the opportunity of no U.S. carriers in the Western Pacific to deploy all three of their own carriers simultaneously for the first time, sending a very pointed message to American leadership: while you are distracted elsewhere, we remain present and engaged in the South China Sea. This action should only reinforce our appreciation for the military as well as the diplomatic and symbolic power that even a single American carrier strike group represents.
The recent killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and his C-Suite and Board of Directors has heightened tension in the region to a new level. Subsequent missile strikes on Israel by Iran were mostly defeated by combined U.S. and Israeli efforts, showcasing the U.S. Navy’s ability to interdict Iranian ballistic missiles from the sea at distant ranges.
All in all, the United States has deployed five carrier strike groups to the Middle East over the last twelve months. Two of these strike groups were extended on station from seven to nine months at sea. While absolutely necessary to reduce the risk of a broader war in the Middle East, this strategy will have a long-term impact on Navy maintenance, readiness, ordnance stockpiles, and retention. Leaders in defense policy and our legislators must take this into account as we look at Navy funding in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). That the U.S. Navy’s carrier force has been the tool of choice for leaders in the White House and Pentagon over the past year speaks volumes about the Navy’s foundational importance to American national security. Congress needs to allocate defense funds accordingly.
The Center for Maritime Strategy hosted a private Red Sea Security panel discussion last week at the Navy League of the United States headquarters in Arlington, VA. This event comes as the conflict reaches its one-year mark, highlighting the significant security implications for the broader Middle East, particularly in the Red Sea. Although the violence continues and there is no endpoint in sight, these high-level discussions are crucial in understanding multifaceted challenges and the broader implications for global security. We hope that we will have no cause to continue these discussions on the second anniversary of October 7th in 2025.
Admiral James G. Foggo, U.S. Navy (ret.), Dean
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.