The Founders Wanted a Powerful Navy: The Constitution Was Built for It
The MOC
By
Michael Lucchese
September 17, 2024
Constitution Day offers an opportunity to reflect with gratitude on the splendor of our nation’s founding document. The document’s animating concepts, such as limited government, checks and balances, and popular sovereignty should be celebrated—our Founders designed the greatest form of government the world has ever seen.
Historical accounts of the Constitutional Convention often downplay the centrality of one of the goals articulated in the document’s preamble: “to provide for the common defense”. The Articles of Confederation proved insufficient to the task, so the Founders gathered in Philadelphia to establish a new form of government to better secure their liberties and maintain the country’s security. The Constitution they drafted was built on explicitly navalist principles and infused with their understanding that sea power was the most efficacious tool to defend American liberty. Ultimately, the Founders’ preference for a strong navy reveals their intention to build a free, commercial republic.
Despite the American victory in the War for Independence, in 1787 the young republic still faced threats to its security. Colonial powers including Great Britain menaced the nation’s borders. Many—especially on the frontier—feared that European empires would use wars on their continent to seize American lands. The French and Spanish empires still held lands in the New World and both were intent on expanding their territory and suppressing rebellions inspired by the American Revolution within their own colonies.
In Federalist 34 Publius (the pseudonym shared by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison) called this colonial competition “a cloud” that “has been for some time hanging over the European world.” Even with the natural protection of the Atlantic Ocean, he argued that if a war broke out in Europe then “in its progress a part of its fury would” be “spent on us.” Publius also believed the Confederation government was too weak to address the looming crisis. “In the present condition of America, the states more immediately exposed to these calamities, have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general government which now exists,” he wrote in Federalist 41, “and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the danger, the objects to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them.”
Beyond this clear-sighted perception of national interest, Publius’s wariness towards European empires is also rooted in a deeper realism about the human heart. Unlike other more optimistic Enlightenment thinkers, he understood mankind’s imperfections and the need to guard against the power-hungry and ambitious instincts he called “the weaker springs of the human character” Elsewhere in Federalist 34 he observed: “Let us recollect, that peace or war will not always be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition, of others.” The Constitution is not founded on fanciful dreams about “perpetual peace”—its Framers wanted the country to be prepared to vindicate her liberties should the need arise.
At the time of the American Founding, most of the republic’s leading statesmen held a Whiggish political philosophy that was skeptical of absolutism in all its forms. They believed that European monarchies were able to oppress their people in part due to the overwhelming power central governments derived from standing armies. Navies, however, could not be used to impose a tyrant’s will on the people—frigates and brigs do not patrol the streets and are not quartered in American homes like British soldiers were before independence. A strong navy, therefore, was a means to genuine national security that did not empower would-be despots the way a standing army would.
What kind of regime did Publius envision for America? Throughout The Federalist (especially Nos. 24 and 34), he wrote that Americans “mean to be a commercial people.” The republic could leverage her vast natural resources to becoming a great trading force in the world economy. That meant “it must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce.” The economic vision at the center of The Federalist depended on free access to the seas for American merchants. Only a strong navy could secure that freedom.
Publius made his most sustained navalist case for the Constitution in Federalist 11. He warned that disunion would permit foreign powers to interfere with American commerce. The Dutch or British could exploit American weakness to confine our merchants to a “passive commerce” under which the “unequalled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost.”
Federalist 11 also argued that constructing a navy would foster national unity. No one state possessed all the resources necessary to build ships at scale. But combining the industry of each section would allow the Union to construct an unmatched fleet. The navy would be both a tool of security and a spur towards unity.
Publius concludes the essay with a rousing patriotic peroration:
“Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the European: it belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the Thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connexion between the old and the new world!”
Of course, Publius was not the only federalist advocating for the Constitution on navalist grounds. William Duer, a New York lumber merchant, wrote a pamphlet concurring with Federalist 11 under the pseudonym “Philo-Publius”. “Will force be necessary to repel foreign attacks, or to guard the national rights against the ambition of particular members?” he asked. “A navy will be a much safer as well as a more effectual engine for either purpose. If we have a respectable fleet there will be the less call on any account for an army.” Duer considered this a strong navy a superior policy for the “preservation of liberty” than a standing army.
Another supporter of the Constitution, physician and South Carolina historian David Ramsay, put the constitutional case for a strong navy in even starker terms. He argued that the Constitution meant Americans “will be protected with the force of the union, against domestic violence and foreign invasion” because Congress could build “a navy to defend your coasts” with the combined resources of the several states. Ramsay believed a navy was precisely the show of strength America needed to make to deter European aggression.
After ratification, the Constitution absolutely succeeded in giving the federal government the powers necessary to “provide for the common defense.” The first president, George Washington, worked with Congress to build a navy of (initially) six frigates, which protected American trade from diverse threats including the Barbary Corsairs, French revolutionaries, and an antagonistic British Royal Navy. Today, the United States Navy remains an essential—perhaps the most essential—pillar of American national security.
On Constitution Day, Americans should look back on the arguments for ratification made by Publius and others and remember the kind of nation the Founders wanted us to become. They saw sea power as the key to national greatness—and a strong Constitution as the best way to secure it. What was true in their day remains true in ours.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Michael Lucchese
Constitution Day offers an opportunity to reflect with gratitude on the splendor of our nation’s founding document. The document’s animating concepts, such as limited government, checks and balances, and popular sovereignty should be celebrated—our Founders designed the greatest form of government the world has ever seen.
Historical accounts of the Constitutional Convention often downplay the centrality of one of the goals articulated in the document’s preamble: “to provide for the common defense”. The Articles of Confederation proved insufficient to the task, so the Founders gathered in Philadelphia to establish a new form of government to better secure their liberties and maintain the country’s security. The Constitution they drafted was built on explicitly navalist principles and infused with their understanding that sea power was the most efficacious tool to defend American liberty. Ultimately, the Founders’ preference for a strong navy reveals their intention to build a free, commercial republic.
Despite the American victory in the War for Independence, in 1787 the young republic still faced threats to its security. Colonial powers including Great Britain menaced the nation’s borders. Many—especially on the frontier—feared that European empires would use wars on their continent to seize American lands. The French and Spanish empires still held lands in the New World and both were intent on expanding their territory and suppressing rebellions inspired by the American Revolution within their own colonies.
In Federalist 34 Publius (the pseudonym shared by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison) called this colonial competition “a cloud” that “has been for some time hanging over the European world.” Even with the natural protection of the Atlantic Ocean, he argued that if a war broke out in Europe then “in its progress a part of its fury would” be “spent on us.” Publius also believed the Confederation government was too weak to address the looming crisis. “In the present condition of America, the states more immediately exposed to these calamities, have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general government which now exists,” he wrote in Federalist 41, “and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the danger, the objects to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them.”
Beyond this clear-sighted perception of national interest, Publius’s wariness towards European empires is also rooted in a deeper realism about the human heart. Unlike other more optimistic Enlightenment thinkers, he understood mankind’s imperfections and the need to guard against the power-hungry and ambitious instincts he called “the weaker springs of the human character” Elsewhere in Federalist 34 he observed: “Let us recollect, that peace or war will not always be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition, of others.” The Constitution is not founded on fanciful dreams about “perpetual peace”—its Framers wanted the country to be prepared to vindicate her liberties should the need arise.
At the time of the American Founding, most of the republic’s leading statesmen held a Whiggish political philosophy that was skeptical of absolutism in all its forms. They believed that European monarchies were able to oppress their people in part due to the overwhelming power central governments derived from standing armies. Navies, however, could not be used to impose a tyrant’s will on the people—frigates and brigs do not patrol the streets and are not quartered in American homes like British soldiers were before independence. A strong navy, therefore, was a means to genuine national security that did not empower would-be despots the way a standing army would.
What kind of regime did Publius envision for America? Throughout The Federalist (especially Nos. 24 and 34), he wrote that Americans “mean to be a commercial people.” The republic could leverage her vast natural resources to becoming a great trading force in the world economy. That meant “it must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce.” The economic vision at the center of The Federalist depended on free access to the seas for American merchants. Only a strong navy could secure that freedom.
Publius made his most sustained navalist case for the Constitution in Federalist 11. He warned that disunion would permit foreign powers to interfere with American commerce. The Dutch or British could exploit American weakness to confine our merchants to a “passive commerce” under which the “unequalled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost.”
Federalist 11 also argued that constructing a navy would foster national unity. No one state possessed all the resources necessary to build ships at scale. But combining the industry of each section would allow the Union to construct an unmatched fleet. The navy would be both a tool of security and a spur towards unity.
Publius concludes the essay with a rousing patriotic peroration:
“Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the European: it belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the Thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connexion between the old and the new world!”
Of course, Publius was not the only federalist advocating for the Constitution on navalist grounds. William Duer, a New York lumber merchant, wrote a pamphlet concurring with Federalist 11 under the pseudonym “Philo-Publius”. “Will force be necessary to repel foreign attacks, or to guard the national rights against the ambition of particular members?” he asked. “A navy will be a much safer as well as a more effectual engine for either purpose. If we have a respectable fleet there will be the less call on any account for an army.” Duer considered this a strong navy a superior policy for the “preservation of liberty” than a standing army.
Another supporter of the Constitution, physician and South Carolina historian David Ramsay, put the constitutional case for a strong navy in even starker terms. He argued that the Constitution meant Americans “will be protected with the force of the union, against domestic violence and foreign invasion” because Congress could build “a navy to defend your coasts” with the combined resources of the several states. Ramsay believed a navy was precisely the show of strength America needed to make to deter European aggression.
After ratification, the Constitution absolutely succeeded in giving the federal government the powers necessary to “provide for the common defense.” The first president, George Washington, worked with Congress to build a navy of (initially) six frigates, which protected American trade from diverse threats including the Barbary Corsairs, French revolutionaries, and an antagonistic British Royal Navy. Today, the United States Navy remains an essential—perhaps the most essential—pillar of American national security.
On Constitution Day, Americans should look back on the arguments for ratification made by Publius and others and remember the kind of nation the Founders wanted us to become. They saw sea power as the key to national greatness—and a strong Constitution as the best way to secure it. What was true in their day remains true in ours.
Michael Lucchese is the founder of Pipe Creek Consulting, an associate editor of Law & Liberty, and a contributing editor to Providence.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.