The CMV-22 OSPREY: A Game-Changer for Today’s COD and Tomorrow’s Contested Combat Logistics Support ​

Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld rightly observed: “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” 

The same can be said for the Navy’s combat fleets; the Marine Corps’ littoral expeditionary and amphibious forces; naval air forces; and all the supporting combat logistics shipping, conventional aviation, and tiltrotors. 

When war erupts, sailors and Marines will have to fight and be supplied by whatever logistics capabilities are available at the time. They will also have to adapt to meet and perform a larger set of emerging missions as best they can. 

Despite the concern about retiring the venerable C-2 Greyhound fleet, the Navy has presciently fielded a more capable, flexible, and adaptable replacement in the CMV-22B Osprey. Like the C-2, the CMV-22 can deliver 6000 pounds of internal cargo at distances ranging to 1150 nautical miles and cruising speeds of 250 knots. 

Yes, there are operational integration challenges for tiltrotor aircraft within the carrier strike group (CSG) and carrier flight deck operations. But the Navy has been there before. These challenges have always been overcome with time, experience, and innovation. They ultimately lead to adaptation and new levels of operational performance, mission efficiency, and combat effectiveness within the fleet logistics multi-mission (VRM) squadrons, CSGs and Surface Action Groups (SAGs).  

The CMV-22 Osprey VRM squadrons are better configured to enable and sustain the combat fleets and facilitate Distributed Maritime Operations, Stand-In Force, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and theater-wide Combat Logistics Force (CLF) operations than the C-2. 

During the critical transition from peacetime to wartime, the adaptability and flexibility of the VRM Osprey supporting CLF operations is an inherent advantage for the Navy and Marine Corps. 

In peacetime and contingency operations, where the U.S. fleet and joint force dominated, the C-2 was an optimized, capable and highly efficient cargo movement platform. It was the appropriate and cost-efficient fixed-wing aircraft for its time with a limited but important mission set. 

Though beloved and respected, the C-2 Greyhound required the use of lengthy commercial or military runways for its cargo and passenger movement missions. It was also deemed unsafe to launch and recover at night aboard the carrier. Dependence on catapults and arrested landings during daylight hours severely limited the C-2’s operational utility. All these inherent constraints would negatively impact its performance in any future Indo-Pacific war. 

It is an entirely different story for the CMV-22. The ability of VRM CMV-22s to operate in high and low altitude flight regimes and all-terrain environments, and take off and land vertically in day, at night, or in night vision goggle conditions allows it to deliver critical combat logistics support where and when most needed, unrestricted by a lack of access to physical aviation infrastructure. 

The Osprey’s mission flexibility, expanded flight regimes, and operational capabilities provide the CLF with new and unmatched support options and opportunities. In the future the small but expandable number of VRM squadrons could be employed to rapidly create and support networks of Forward Logistic Support Sites (FLSS), much closer to the fight than would have previously been possible. 

Almost like a constantly reconfiguring, mobile, mini hub-and-spoke system, networks of FLSSs could be organized for mobility, and regularly shifted and displaced to complicate targeting and use the existing airfield infrastructure located throughout the first and second island chains of the Indo-Pacific region.    

In this way, distributed VRM CMV-22 detachments would be the tip of the CLF spear, reaching back to the United States, yet closely positioned to fully support high intensity Navy combat fleet and Marine littoral combat operations. 

Additionally, with the Osprey’s capability for vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL), VRM detachments of three to four aircraft could be organized to bed down on even smaller outlying airfields or be embarked upon mobile Expeditionary Support Bases (ESB), operating as ad hoc vertical launch system reloading, refueling, and destroyer tender platforms. Networked detachment mobility, distribution, dispersion, and regular displacement increases survivability and keeps the CLF and its VRM squadrons in the fight longer and better. 

In addition to combat logistic mission support, the same CMV-22 tiltrotor aircraft could also be tasked to perform medevac, search and rescue, and logistics delivery duties critical to the submarine force. 

If an Indo-Pacific war comes, whether already organized, trained, equipped and ready – or not – VRM CMV-22 Ospreys and their crews will be asked to execute these kinds of missions. They will be the most ready, capable, and available squadrons in the region to get the job done, to save lives, and to keep the US Navy and Marine Corps forces fighting.  

In the near term and while time is available, our existing VRM CMV-22 squadrons, tiltrotors, and personnel can and should be expanded and prepared so they can successfully “fly and fight tonight”. 

The Ospreys’ game-changing effectiveness will only grow in the case of an Indo-Pacific war and continue to increase as the conflict continues. Particularly in the early and dark days of the conflict, it will be the heroic efforts of the combat logistics force operators—mal-organized, ill-equipped, few in numbers and often operating alone, unescorted and unafraid—that will enable and ensure victory.  

Now is the time to think, plan and invest in acquiring larger numbers of CMV-22s and adding their capabilities to the CLF and the combat fleets while time remains. 

MajGen Tim Hanifen, USMC (ret.) was a combined arms MAGTF officer and OPNAV N95 Navy Expeditionary Warfare Requirements & Resource sponsor; as an aviator he has flown over 3300 hours in a number of rotorcraft, including the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.