The Philippines is the most targeted country of Chinese gray zone aggression in the South China Sea today. China claims 80 percent of the South China Sea and often deploys the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) to enforce its illegitimate claims against the Philippines and the other nations whose maritime domains fall within the so-called “Nine-dash Line”. Most blatantly, China seized administrative control and implemented a blockade of the Scarborough Shoal with CCG vessels in 2012. More recently, the CCG clashed with Philippine Navy vessels carrying out a resupply mission for Philippine Marines stationed on the Sierra Madre, a warship beached on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal. CCG vessels rammed the resupply ships, boarded Philippine ships, and injured Philippine personnel.
Aside from statements reaffirming American commitment to the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. response has thus far been hollow. This sends the signal that “gray zone” aggression against Philippine sovereignty will go unpunished. To help avoid a repeat of Scarborough Shoal at the Second Thomas Shoal, the United States must go beyond rhetoric and stand with its ally by imposing meaningful material costs on Beijing in response to Chinese escalation.
Relinquishing the Initiative
In his seminal book, Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling suggests that deterrence can be achieved by relinquishing initiative and arranging the status quo in such a way that the adversary has “the last clear chance” to avoid a disaster. To illustrate this point, Schelling highlights the “quarantine” imposed by the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President John F. Kennedy ceded the initiative to the Soviet Union, placing the onus on Moscow to incur the risk of a wider, more devastating war by attempting to break through the U.S. naval exclusion zone around Cuba.
Applying Schelling’s principle, China’s de-facto seizure of the Scarborough Shoal through blockade has placed the onus on the far weaker Philippines to incur the risk of confronting CCG and Chinese Maritime Militia vessels. Thus far, Beijing’s deterrence has succeeded, and China still controls Scarborough today, twelve years on.
The United States and the Philippines can take a page from China’s playbook. To spare the Philippine outpost on Second Thomas Shoal from a similar fate, Washington and Manilla should take steps to put China in the position of risking a wider war that is not in its interest. By expanding the U.S. Coast Guard presence in the Western Pacific, the United States can “quarantine” the Second Thomas Shoal, intercepting CCG ships that disrupt Philippine efforts to resupply the Sierra Madre. This places the onus on China to incur the risks of escalation with the Philippines and the United States by attacking U.S. vessels to break the “quarantine.” Increasing the perceived danger inherent in Chinese belligerence is precisely what’s required to deter aggression in the South China Sea.
Salami Tactics
China’s assertion of maritime claims through gray-zone tactics often takes the form of “salami tactics”—or minor violations that eventually compound to produce larger strategic gains. The CCG’s seemingly minor “law enforcement” missions and harassment of foreign fishing vessels around contested territory do not existentially threaten Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines. However, acquiescing to China’s initial helping of salami in the Scarborough Shoal eventually led to permanent Chinese de-facto control over the island. The same dynamic plays out today.
The conventional wisdom suggests that effective deterrence rests on clarity and credibility. Therefore—the argument goes—undercutting and deterring salami tactics also requires “clear, consistent, and credible signaling”. However, this is not always true. Establishing consistent red lines and thresholds may induce adversaries to test the credibility of existing commitments, creating more opportunities for crises. Salami slicing tactics are deliberately calibrated to test and exceed these red lines. Therefore, it is more effective to respond to salami tactics with unpredictable and disproportionate force. This creates a reputation for unpredictability that casts a looming shadow of spiraling escalation over attempts to slice the salami further. Although successfully communicating a credible and clear commitment to an adversary is ideal, unpredictable and unreasonable reputations can act as an extra layer of deterrence in instances where adversaries believe commitments are uncredible under rational circumstances. Increasing the array and range of risks makes small slices of salami no longer worth slicing.
The United States should consider adopting the “rational lunatic” position in the South China Sea. In addition to Coast Guard cutters, the United States should also consider occasionally sending destroyers, carriers, and other naval assets to bolster the Philippine forces in the South China Sea. Of course, the United States has interests across the world and should not constantly dedicate a task force to the South China Sea. But by adding an element of unpredictability to the mix of naval forces Chinese vessels are likely to face in the South China Sea, the United States can enhance deterrence without maintaining a constantnaval presence around contested South China Sea islands.
The appeal of gray-zone tactics like salami slicing is that targeted countries feel they lack a sufficient casus belli to respond. By demonstrating that salami tactics can warrant unpredictable and sometimes disproportionate escalation, the appeal of using salami tactics to seize small gains disappears.
Beyond Uncontrolled Escalation
Of course, the threat of uncontrolled escalation itself may not be enough. China may elect to escalate if it believes the United States lacks the resolve or capabilities to credibly execute on its deterrent threats, especially at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. This is especially salient as the United States currently signals an unwillingness to escalate and impose meaningful punishments or roadblocks on China’s gray-zone tactics.
To prevent this type of miscalculation, the United States must convince China that it will fail to achieve its goals of controlling the Second Thomas Shoal—and eventually the entire South China Sea—through conflict. Elbridge Colby correctly points out that U.S. and Philippine interests are fundamentally defensive and align with the status quo. Therefore, the United States only needs to deny China command of the seas in order to achieve its goals. On the other hand, China needs to deny American naval assets the ability to operate in the area and ensure its own operational freedom.
In this sense, “winning” for the United States comes relatively cheap. Washington can learn from China’s denial strategy and invest in mine warfare capabilities, conventional and nuclear anti-ship cruise missiles, and cost-effective unmanned vehicles. This approach heightens the fear of strategic failure alongside fears of uncontrolled escalation to enhance deterrence of American intervention in a war to conquer Taiwan or similar scenarios.
Maintaining a free and open South China Sea is critical to U.S. Indo-Pacific interests. Eighty percent of trade and China’s oil imports travel through the South China Sea. Not only are China’s incursions in the South China Sea detrimental to the international norms surrounding maritime sovereignty, but it is also vital that China is unable to establish a serious naval presence in the South China Sea and thereby threaten to choke off a key artery of commerce and international energy flows in the event of a conflict. Current responses to Chinese incursions in the South China Sea amount to nothing but rhetoric. Because deterrence cannot work if there is no genuine risk of a crisis that can spiral out of control, the United States must take serious steps to punish China’s incursions in the South China Sea.
Alexander Richter is an undergraduate student at University of California, Berkeley studying political science. He has previously interned at INR.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
The Philippines is the most targeted country of Chinese gray zone aggression in the South China Sea today. China claims 80 percent of the South China Sea and often deploys the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) to enforce its illegitimate claims against the Philippines and the other nations whose maritime domains fall within the so-called “Nine-dash Line”. Most blatantly, China seized administrative control and implemented a blockade of the Scarborough Shoal with CCG vessels in 2012. More recently, the CCG clashed with Philippine Navy vessels carrying out a resupply mission for Philippine Marines stationed on the Sierra Madre, a warship beached on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal. CCG vessels rammed the resupply ships, boarded Philippine ships, and injured Philippine personnel.
Aside from statements reaffirming American commitment to the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. response has thus far been hollow. This sends the signal that “gray zone” aggression against Philippine sovereignty will go unpunished. To help avoid a repeat of Scarborough Shoal at the Second Thomas Shoal, the United States must go beyond rhetoric and stand with its ally by imposing meaningful material costs on Beijing in response to Chinese escalation.
Relinquishing the Initiative
In his seminal book, Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling suggests that deterrence can be achieved by relinquishing initiative and arranging the status quo in such a way that the adversary has “the last clear chance” to avoid a disaster. To illustrate this point, Schelling highlights the “quarantine” imposed by the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President John F. Kennedy ceded the initiative to the Soviet Union, placing the onus on Moscow to incur the risk of a wider, more devastating war by attempting to break through the U.S. naval exclusion zone around Cuba.
Applying Schelling’s principle, China’s de-facto seizure of the Scarborough Shoal through blockade has placed the onus on the far weaker Philippines to incur the risk of confronting CCG and Chinese Maritime Militia vessels. Thus far, Beijing’s deterrence has succeeded, and China still controls Scarborough today, twelve years on.
The United States and the Philippines can take a page from China’s playbook. To spare the Philippine outpost on Second Thomas Shoal from a similar fate, Washington and Manilla should take steps to put China in the position of risking a wider war that is not in its interest. By expanding the U.S. Coast Guard presence in the Western Pacific, the United States can “quarantine” the Second Thomas Shoal, intercepting CCG ships that disrupt Philippine efforts to resupply the Sierra Madre. This places the onus on China to incur the risks of escalation with the Philippines and the United States by attacking U.S. vessels to break the “quarantine.” Increasing the perceived danger inherent in Chinese belligerence is precisely what’s required to deter aggression in the South China Sea.
Salami Tactics
China’s assertion of maritime claims through gray-zone tactics often takes the form of “salami tactics”—or minor violations that eventually compound to produce larger strategic gains. The CCG’s seemingly minor “law enforcement” missions and harassment of foreign fishing vessels around contested territory do not existentially threaten Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines. However, acquiescing to China’s initial helping of salami in the Scarborough Shoal eventually led to permanent Chinese de-facto control over the island. The same dynamic plays out today.
The conventional wisdom suggests that effective deterrence rests on clarity and credibility. Therefore—the argument goes—undercutting and deterring salami tactics also requires “clear, consistent, and credible signaling”. However, this is not always true. Establishing consistent red lines and thresholds may induce adversaries to test the credibility of existing commitments, creating more opportunities for crises. Salami slicing tactics are deliberately calibrated to test and exceed these red lines. Therefore, it is more effective to respond to salami tactics with unpredictable and disproportionate force. This creates a reputation for unpredictability that casts a looming shadow of spiraling escalation over attempts to slice the salami further. Although successfully communicating a credible and clear commitment to an adversary is ideal, unpredictable and unreasonable reputations can act as an extra layer of deterrence in instances where adversaries believe commitments are uncredible under rational circumstances. Increasing the array and range of risks makes small slices of salami no longer worth slicing.
The United States should consider adopting the “rational lunatic” position in the South China Sea. In addition to Coast Guard cutters, the United States should also consider occasionally sending destroyers, carriers, and other naval assets to bolster the Philippine forces in the South China Sea. Of course, the United States has interests across the world and should not constantly dedicate a task force to the South China Sea. But by adding an element of unpredictability to the mix of naval forces Chinese vessels are likely to face in the South China Sea, the United States can enhance deterrence without maintaining a constant naval presence around contested South China Sea islands.
The appeal of gray-zone tactics like salami slicing is that targeted countries feel they lack a sufficient casus belli to respond. By demonstrating that salami tactics can warrant unpredictable and sometimes disproportionate escalation, the appeal of using salami tactics to seize small gains disappears.
Beyond Uncontrolled Escalation
Of course, the threat of uncontrolled escalation itself may not be enough. China may elect to escalate if it believes the United States lacks the resolve or capabilities to credibly execute on its deterrent threats, especially at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. This is especially salient as the United States currently signals an unwillingness to escalate and impose meaningful punishments or roadblocks on China’s gray-zone tactics.
To prevent this type of miscalculation, the United States must convince China that it will fail to achieve its goals of controlling the Second Thomas Shoal—and eventually the entire South China Sea—through conflict. Elbridge Colby correctly points out that U.S. and Philippine interests are fundamentally defensive and align with the status quo. Therefore, the United States only needs to deny China command of the seas in order to achieve its goals. On the other hand, China needs to deny American naval assets the ability to operate in the area and ensure its own operational freedom.
In this sense, “winning” for the United States comes relatively cheap. Washington can learn from China’s denial strategy and invest in mine warfare capabilities, conventional and nuclear anti-ship cruise missiles, and cost-effective unmanned vehicles. This approach heightens the fear of strategic failure alongside fears of uncontrolled escalation to enhance deterrence of American intervention in a war to conquer Taiwan or similar scenarios.
Maintaining a free and open South China Sea is critical to U.S. Indo-Pacific interests. Eighty percent of trade and China’s oil imports travel through the South China Sea. Not only are China’s incursions in the South China Sea detrimental to the international norms surrounding maritime sovereignty, but it is also vital that China is unable to establish a serious naval presence in the South China Sea and thereby threaten to choke off a key artery of commerce and international energy flows in the event of a conflict. Current responses to Chinese incursions in the South China Sea amount to nothing but rhetoric. Because deterrence cannot work if there is no genuine risk of a crisis that can spiral out of control, the United States must take serious steps to punish China’s incursions in the South China Sea.
Alexander Richter is an undergraduate student at University of California, Berkeley studying political science. He has previously interned at INR.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.