For much to the Cold War the concept of missile warfare at sea remained largely relegated to the laboratory and the world of mathematics, along with a few isolated Arab/Israeli and India/Pakistan naval battles involving small combatants. The Israeli destroyer Eilat sunk by Egyptian missiles in October 1967 was a relatively small, World War 2-era ship of 1700 tons. The fatal wounding of HMS Sheffield by an Argentine Exocet cruise missile perhaps fully awakened the world to the actual effect of missile weapons on naval warfare. Arguably since that time missile combat has been at the forefront of naval warfare theory. Salvos of missiles would quickly destroy any surface combatant short of the size of an aircraft carrier, and it was suggested even one carefully placed missile hit would register a mission kill on a large flattop. Following the Falklands war, however, missile combat became rarer, but much less lopsided in favor of the missile weapon in actual practice. Iranian and Iraqi forces fired few missile weapons at U.S. forces in combat during the 1988 Operation Praying Mantis and during the Gulf War, and those either malfunctioned or were shot down (in 1991 by Falklands veteran HMS Gloucester,) without loss to the defending ships. Fast forward from the end of Desert Storm to the present, and while the Israelis and the Russians have not come off well in missile defense, the United States and its close NATO allies (Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany to date,) have done very well in the air and missile defense role in the ongoing Red Sea defense of free trade. The recent, large Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel also seems to suggest a lack of understanding of salvo warfare as a way to penetrate defenses. The Houthis too appear to have not read Wayne Hughes Fleet Tactics books and have not fired large salvos of weapons at any target in the Bab al Mandeb or Red Sea… This all said, what is the state of cruise and ballistic missile warfare outside the laboratory, beyond the salvo equations and as practiced by potential adversaries? What do the respective Russian and Allied Red Sea experiences say about missile warfare? Finally, has AEGIS and other modern combine systems made naval vessels significantly safer than during most of the Cold War, or does the menace of the missile remain to further haunt surface fleets of the world deeper into the 21st century?
The Laboratory Experience of Missile Warfare, 1945-1991
Plenty of naval missile combat did occur over the course of the Cold War, including significant periods such as the Arab-Israeli wars of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and the Falklands War, but not at the level of peer competitor. The 1994 Schulte report, a Masters thesis written by Naval Postgraduate student Lt. John Schulte, a student of naval tactics expert Professor Wayne Hughes gives an excellent account of the performance of systems largely designed in the 1950’s through 1970’s, as employed in battle 1967-1991. The Schulte report is data-driven and well crafted. It concluded that advantage in combat lay with the attacker stating, “The trend in this data favors the anti-ship cruise missile, with a marked increase in the probability of hitting a defended target.” That assessment of the data is reflected in this chart with breakout descriptions of each engagement where a ship is actively defending against missile attack, able to defend but does not, or has no self-defense weapons against missiles.
Figure 2: Data breakout on target types from the 1994 Schulte Report
Combat in the Falklands war got its own category with higher rates of missile hits on targets without defensive systems and even those ships that were defended (shot back) at incoming missiles. It would indeed appear that the missile was on the march as a lethal weapon.
That report, however, could only survey actual missile combat engagements. Those events never included modern missiles or modern aid defense capabilities such as the U.S.-built AEGIS system. The report focuses also on smaller warships, stating, “It is also emphasized that because most anti-ship missile victims were small warships, this analysis is unreliable when extended to warship larger than 7,000 tons displacement.” Today’s US Navy surface warships, excepting the littoral combat ship, are larger than 7000 tons displacement. That includes the incoming Constellation class frigate. Since the report concluded in 1994, it does not include more current examples of missile combat, that while few in number, suggest defense improvements.
Missile Combat “In the Wild” 1994-2024
While the Schulte report featured 30 examples of surface missile combat from 1967 to 1991, the past thirty years have seen far fewer with only four examples up to the point of the U.S. and Allied campaign to protect shipping in the Red Sea from late 2023 to the present. Those engagements were:
This list omits those Russian ships attacked by surface to surface (Storm shadow) missiles in port Sevastopol during the Russo-Ukraine war as they were immobile and were dependent on shore-based defenses not under their direct control. The period of November 2023-March 2024 Red Sea operations perhaps rates a special block just as the 1982 Falkland’s War did in the original Schulte analysis. Accounts range from 40 to as many 70 merchant ships attacked with missiles and two of those ships hit, with one sunk. If one uses the Schulte Report’s breakout descriptions of each engagement where a ship is actively defending against missile attack, able to defend but does not, or has no self defense weapons against missiles, the following breakout data emerges:
Incidents 2006 to 2023 probability of missile hit%
Incidents in the Red Sea from November 2023 to present (estimate)
Defenseless target
100%
2% to 5%
Defendable target
100%
0%
Defended target
0%
0%
While interesting, there is still not enough hard data from existent missile engagements since 1994 to make conclusive statements on the viability of missile offense verses missile defense at sea. Most of the cruise and ballistic missiles employed by the Houthis against Red Sea shipping are of a decidedly older design or have been home built by the group themselves from parts smuggled into Yemen from Iran. The Iranian attack on Israel also featured older ballistic missile designs and some reports suggested a high degree of failure of those weapons to achieve initial launch and flight to their targets. While U.S. and Allied ships have so far been successful, there are many variables in readiness of ships, detection ability, and even weather conditions that might combine to result in a missile hit on one of the warships guarding trade. The integration challenges of the Danish frigate Iver Huitfeldt that took her out of the Red Sea operation, and similar problems with the Belgian frigate Louise Marie should remind all that material readiness is essential to success in missile combat. The longer this operation continues, the greater the risk to the warships involved as fatigue in both the ships’ systems and the people that operate them could allow for a missile to penetrate defenses. Missiles and defensive measures have greatly improved over the last thirty years. The mass missile salvo, as described in books like Fleet Tactics and recent wargames has not been attempted against a naval force, so beyond the laboratory its still hard to determine outcomes once real missiles fly in large numbers. What can be said is something that Captain Hughes said in his books that, “people matter most,” and that the training and care of those people; both in peace and in combat, will be a key determinant in the outcome of future missile mayhem at sea.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
Figure 1: USS Gravely missile firing 2023
For much to the Cold War the concept of missile warfare at sea remained largely relegated to the laboratory and the world of mathematics, along with a few isolated Arab/Israeli and India/Pakistan naval battles involving small combatants. The Israeli destroyer Eilat sunk by Egyptian missiles in October 1967 was a relatively small, World War 2-era ship of 1700 tons. The fatal wounding of HMS Sheffield by an Argentine Exocet cruise missile perhaps fully awakened the world to the actual effect of missile weapons on naval warfare. Arguably since that time missile combat has been at the forefront of naval warfare theory. Salvos of missiles would quickly destroy any surface combatant short of the size of an aircraft carrier, and it was suggested even one carefully placed missile hit would register a mission kill on a large flattop. Following the Falklands war, however, missile combat became rarer, but much less lopsided in favor of the missile weapon in actual practice. Iranian and Iraqi forces fired few missile weapons at U.S. forces in combat during the 1988 Operation Praying Mantis and during the Gulf War, and those either malfunctioned or were shot down (in 1991 by Falklands veteran HMS Gloucester,) without loss to the defending ships. Fast forward from the end of Desert Storm to the present, and while the Israelis and the Russians have not come off well in missile defense, the United States and its close NATO allies (Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany to date,) have done very well in the air and missile defense role in the ongoing Red Sea defense of free trade. The recent, large Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel also seems to suggest a lack of understanding of salvo warfare as a way to penetrate defenses. The Houthis too appear to have not read Wayne Hughes Fleet Tactics books and have not fired large salvos of weapons at any target in the Bab al Mandeb or Red Sea… This all said, what is the state of cruise and ballistic missile warfare outside the laboratory, beyond the salvo equations and as practiced by potential adversaries? What do the respective Russian and Allied Red Sea experiences say about missile warfare? Finally, has AEGIS and other modern combine systems made naval vessels significantly safer than during most of the Cold War, or does the menace of the missile remain to further haunt surface fleets of the world deeper into the 21st century?
The Laboratory Experience of Missile Warfare, 1945-1991
Plenty of naval missile combat did occur over the course of the Cold War, including significant periods such as the Arab-Israeli wars of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and the Falklands War, but not at the level of peer competitor. The 1994 Schulte report, a Masters thesis written by Naval Postgraduate student Lt. John Schulte, a student of naval tactics expert Professor Wayne Hughes gives an excellent account of the performance of systems largely designed in the 1950’s through 1970’s, as employed in battle 1967-1991. The Schulte report is data-driven and well crafted. It concluded that advantage in combat lay with the attacker stating, “The trend in this data favors the anti-ship cruise missile, with a marked increase in the probability of hitting a defended target.” That assessment of the data is reflected in this chart with breakout descriptions of each engagement where a ship is actively defending against missile attack, able to defend but does not, or has no self-defense weapons against missiles.
Figure 2: Data breakout on target types from the 1994 Schulte Report
Combat in the Falklands war got its own category with higher rates of missile hits on targets without defensive systems and even those ships that were defended (shot back) at incoming missiles. It would indeed appear that the missile was on the march as a lethal weapon.
That report, however, could only survey actual missile combat engagements. Those events never included modern missiles or modern aid defense capabilities such as the U.S.-built AEGIS system. The report focuses also on smaller warships, stating, “It is also emphasized that because most anti-ship missile victims were small warships, this analysis is unreliable when extended to warship larger than 7,000 tons displacement.” Today’s US Navy surface warships, excepting the littoral combat ship, are larger than 7000 tons displacement. That includes the incoming Constellation class frigate. Since the report concluded in 1994, it does not include more current examples of missile combat, that while few in number, suggest defense improvements.
Missile Combat “In the Wild” 1994-2024
While the Schulte report featured 30 examples of surface missile combat from 1967 to 1991, the past thirty years have seen far fewer with only four examples up to the point of the U.S. and Allied campaign to protect shipping in the Red Sea from late 2023 to the present. Those engagements were:
This list omits those Russian ships attacked by surface to surface (Storm shadow) missiles in port Sevastopol during the Russo-Ukraine war as they were immobile and were dependent on shore-based defenses not under their direct control. The period of November 2023-March 2024 Red Sea operations perhaps rates a special block just as the 1982 Falkland’s War did in the original Schulte analysis. Accounts range from 40 to as many 70 merchant ships attacked with missiles and two of those ships hit, with one sunk. If one uses the Schulte Report’s breakout descriptions of each engagement where a ship is actively defending against missile attack, able to defend but does not, or has no self defense weapons against missiles, the following breakout data emerges:
While interesting, there is still not enough hard data from existent missile engagements since 1994 to make conclusive statements on the viability of missile offense verses missile defense at sea. Most of the cruise and ballistic missiles employed by the Houthis against Red Sea shipping are of a decidedly older design or have been home built by the group themselves from parts smuggled into Yemen from Iran. The Iranian attack on Israel also featured older ballistic missile designs and some reports suggested a high degree of failure of those weapons to achieve initial launch and flight to their targets. While U.S. and Allied ships have so far been successful, there are many variables in readiness of ships, detection ability, and even weather conditions that might combine to result in a missile hit on one of the warships guarding trade. The integration challenges of the Danish frigate Iver Huitfeldt that took her out of the Red Sea operation, and similar problems with the Belgian frigate Louise Marie should remind all that material readiness is essential to success in missile combat. The longer this operation continues, the greater the risk to the warships involved as fatigue in both the ships’ systems and the people that operate them could allow for a missile to penetrate defenses. Missiles and defensive measures have greatly improved over the last thirty years. The mass missile salvo, as described in books like Fleet Tactics and recent wargames has not been attempted against a naval force, so beyond the laboratory its still hard to determine outcomes once real missiles fly in large numbers. What can be said is something that Captain Hughes said in his books that, “people matter most,” and that the training and care of those people; both in peace and in combat, will be a key determinant in the outcome of future missile mayhem at sea.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.