The history of the Cold War is replete with stories of daring operations by the U.S. Navy in its defense of the nation against the Soviet Union. The Navy often too had to fight for its existence in Washington D.C. in the corridors of the pentagon, in the halls of Congress, and sometimes inside the oval office. While much has changed in the methods and culture of U.S. navy operations since the Cold War’s end in 1991, some challenges like reduced budgets, recalcitrant civilian leaders, and sometimes even the President of the United States. These stories often get forgotten in the present and following the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 and the end of the Cold War, the vison of fighting admiral seems to have faded from public accounts. As the Navy struggles with a budget that only provides for 287 ships and confronts an environment where a 220-ship navy is not an unfounded fear, it is perhaps useful to remember these Cold War curmudgeon crusaders for the Navy.
Admiral Arleigh Burke. The admiral who served as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for most of the 1950’s often appeared with a smile on his face both at sea, and ashore, but Burke was no stranger to full-contact action with the navy’s domestic opponents. In the famous 1949 “revolt of the admirals,” when still a Captain, he served as the Chief of Staff for the Navy leadership committee seeking to blunt the takeover of all strategic nuclear weapons delivery through the B-36 bomber. The Defense Department and even President Truman sought Navy scapegoats to fire for their temerity in opposing the B-36, Burke was protected by CNO Admiral Forrest Sherman and Presidential Naval aide Rear Admiral Robert Dennison, who both stood up to President Truman’s attempt to remove Burke’s name from consideration for promotion to Rear Admiral. Burke was duly promoted and later provided the same, blunt advice to President Eisenhower. Ike did not always appreciate what Burke had to say, but he respected Burke as the professional chief of the naval service and as a loyal, but honest subordinate.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover: Not a CNO, but probably as powerful as any of those chiefs of the 1980’s, Many in the Navy and outside its organization revered Rickover as the “Kindly Old Gentlemen” (KOG,) or could only repeat his name in expletives, but no one ever doubted his position on nuclear propulsion and its value to the Navy. He was more than willing to speak plainly to members of Congress if he thought the situation required it and cared little for the perceived consequences of such plain talk. One of his nuclear power subordinates later said, “Rickover understood how our government worked and how the Congress worked better than any professor. I was an adjunct faculty at George Washington during this time, so I did have contacts with the academic side of things. He was held up as a tribute to the democratic system, but he was one that the writers of the Constitution had not ever anticipated.”
One of Rickover’s most frequent adversaries was CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, another Navy leader who was equally comfortable in being blunt with civilian superiors. When Zumwalt entered office in June 1970 he assembled an incoming assessment of the Navy entitled “Project Sixty” that was blunt in its assessment of the U.S. Navy’s chances in a fight with the Soviet navy. Zumwalt stated that the Navy had a 55% chance as he released his report, and if he did not get additional funding those chances would drop to 45%. Zumwalt remained blunt and candid with political leaders throughout his CNO term, later saying in his book On Watch ,”Senator Stennis from the Senate Armed Services Committee (SAC,) cautioned me that the Committee expected the CNO to be responsible to be responsible to the President of the United States and to this Committee and to be, “Frank, and full of candor, sound consul and advice. I will have occasion to describe how my candor before the Committee gave me more grief than anything else.”
Zumwalt was followed by another brutally honest officer as CNO. Admiral James Holloway would have no less candor than Rickover and Zumwalt in discussing the Navy’s strengths and weaknesses. Although he supported his civilian boss’ plan to not build another Nimitz class nuclear carrier in 1977, that was predicated on the building of two conventionally powered, medium carriers (CVV.s) in its place. When Brown desired to further reduce naval forces including a reduction in carriers to just 8-9 ships, and a fleet of just 400-455 ships, Holloway boldly told Congress that he disagreed with Brown. Hollway stated he would be somewhat happy with 535 ships but would need 585 to have confidence in success in a war at sea against the Soviet Union.
Finally, thanks to CSPAN there is an also of visual presentation of a curmudgeonly Cold War admiral in action in Congress speaking his vision. In the 17 March 1987 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on a proposed block buy (purchase of multiple units) of aircraft carriers, Vice Admiral Hank Mustin, standing in for the CNO in testimony, boldly states the Navy’s Maritime Strategy and need for aircraft carriers as one of its key components. Mustin unapologetically states the Navy’s case in terms of numbers and types of warships. When questioned by Senator Kennedy (then the SASC chairman,) on the number of carriers needed, Mustin bluntly stated that fifteen carriers were only a peacetime requirement and that more than twenty were need for war.
It was perhaps Admiral Burke who made the most cogent observation on the importance of candor when senior military professionals communicate directly with Congress. In a 1961 interview conducted in the wake of the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba, Burke suggested that honest communication from senior military officers, including himself to President Kennedy during the crisis was deficient. Burke stated,
“There was not enough checking by anybody including the Chiefs. We didn’t insist upon knowing . . . we were not tough enough. Our big fault was standing in awe of the Presidency instead of pounding the table and demanding and being real rough, we were not. We set down our case and then we shut up and that was a mistake.”
To Burke’s credit, he did actually “pound the table” with Kennedy. The Admiral wanted to forcefully support the anti-Communist Cuban invaders stating,
“”Let me take two jets and shoot down the enemy aircraft,” he urged. But President Kennedy said “No,” and reminded them that he had said “over and over again” that he would not commit U.S. forces to combat. Apparently, he did not want the world to find out what it already knew, that the whole expedition had been conceived, planned, and armed by the United States.
According to Potter (Burke biographer,) “Burke suggested sending in a destroyer. Whereupon Kennedy explodes. ‘Burke,’ he snapped, ‘I don’t want the United States involved in this.’ ‘All in all, Mr. President,’ Burke snapped back, ‘but we are involved.'”
Maybe its time again for senior naval officers to “pound the table” and hold back nothing when it comes to proper funding of the capabilities and capacity of the United States Navy in the face of two nuclear-armed peer competitors, two regional adversaries in Iran and North Korea, and the ever-present threat of terrorism, to say nothing of modern Barbary states like the Houthis in Yemen.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills |
Figure 1: Admiral Arleigh Burke, who suggested “pounding the table” to make a point
The history of the Cold War is replete with stories of daring operations by the U.S. Navy in its defense of the nation against the Soviet Union. The Navy often too had to fight for its existence in Washington D.C. in the corridors of the pentagon, in the halls of Congress, and sometimes inside the oval office. While much has changed in the methods and culture of U.S. navy operations since the Cold War’s end in 1991, some challenges like reduced budgets, recalcitrant civilian leaders, and sometimes even the President of the United States. These stories often get forgotten in the present and following the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 and the end of the Cold War, the vison of fighting admiral seems to have faded from public accounts. As the Navy struggles with a budget that only provides for 287 ships and confronts an environment where a 220-ship navy is not an unfounded fear, it is perhaps useful to remember these Cold War curmudgeon crusaders for the Navy.
It was perhaps Admiral Burke who made the most cogent observation on the importance of candor when senior military professionals communicate directly with Congress. In a 1961 interview conducted in the wake of the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba, Burke suggested that honest communication from senior military officers, including himself to President Kennedy during the crisis was deficient. Burke stated,
“There was not enough checking by anybody including the Chiefs. We didn’t insist upon knowing . . . we were not tough enough. Our big fault was standing in awe of the Presidency instead of pounding the table and demanding and being real rough, we were not. We set down our case and then we shut up and that was a mistake.”
To Burke’s credit, he did actually “pound the table” with Kennedy. The Admiral wanted to forcefully support the anti-Communist Cuban invaders stating,
“”Let me take two jets and shoot down the enemy aircraft,” he urged. But President Kennedy said “No,” and reminded them that he had said “over and over again” that he would not commit U.S. forces to combat. Apparently, he did not want the world to find out what it already knew, that the whole expedition had been conceived, planned, and armed by the United States.
According to Potter (Burke biographer,) “Burke suggested sending in a destroyer. Whereupon Kennedy explodes. ‘Burke,’ he snapped, ‘I don’t want the United States involved in this.’ ‘All in all, Mr. President,’ Burke snapped back, ‘but we are involved.'”
Maybe its time again for senior naval officers to “pound the table” and hold back nothing when it comes to proper funding of the capabilities and capacity of the United States Navy in the face of two nuclear-armed peer competitors, two regional adversaries in Iran and North Korea, and the ever-present threat of terrorism, to say nothing of modern Barbary states like the Houthis in Yemen.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.