A Common Hull for New Navy Auxiliaries: The National Security Multi-Mission Vessel
The MOC
By
Dr. Steven Wills
March 6, 2024
The U.S. Navy’s number of auxiliary ships critical for high-end naval warfare has plummeted since the end of the Cold War. For example, in 1991 the Navy had fifteen destroyer (AD) and submarine (AS) tenders, as well as two heavy repair ships (AR,) and two large hospital ships (AH.) In the present just the two hospital ships and two submarine tenders remain. The rest of this large service fleet has been scrapped, or in many cases sunk as targets in exercises. The navy’s two command ships Mount Whitney and Blur Ridge are now as old as the flag officers that use them and will also need to be replaced. Attempts to replace the service fleet over the last 20 years have often foundered on budgetary reefs. The command ship replacement JCC-X was cut from planned purchases in 2003, and two replacement submarine tenders appear headed for a similar fate due to delays in the budget process this year. The need to restore the service fleet to the larger navy is often unseen by both lawmakers and analysts seeking to either field more missiles or drones or find budget savings. A tender or command ship is just as vital to naval warfare as is a missile destroyer. The current National Security Multi-mission vessel is a hot production line and an effective one with ships being delivered on time and on budget. With modifications, it’s the best bet for reconstituting the core of a new service fleet in the next ten years.
The Lost Auxiliary Fleet of the Cold War
At the end of the Cold War in 1990 the United States Navy possessed a relatively robust auxiliary fleet of destroyer and submarine tenders, some elderly repair ships, new and modern hospital ships and the venerable amphibious command ships Mount Whitney and Blue Ridge. Over the course of the next ten years this force disappeared into the untended reserve fleet, and in many cases the scrapyard. Other ships were sunk as targets in the decade of the 2000’s. Getting rid of the auxiliary service fleet was perhaps an easy choice, given that sea control was largely assured without U.S. Navy efforts, and repair and sustainment of ships could occur in many locations around the world free from the danger of all but terrorist attack. The SSBN force’s weapons were much longer ranged with the Trident II and obviated the need for many of the forward-deployed submarine tenders. Many repair capabilities once resident in destroyer tenders and repair ships moved ashore, and much of Navy maintenance moved from the work of individual sailors on ships to shore-based facilities. All of that worked fine in peacetime in the presence of assured sea control.
Why now an Auxiliary Fleet?
The proliferation in both capability and quantity of cruise and ballistic missiles means that large areas of ocean space once fairly peaceful and not in need of direct sea control operations can now be contested from land-based weapons. This situation is playing out now in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb strait region where land-based Houthi missiles have targeted civilian and military vessels using and protecting this key maritime commercial chokepoint. In the past, in periods such as the counter-piracy operations off Somalia of the 2000’s and 2010’s, warship maintenance and resupply was continued in ports relatively near to the operations. That’s more difficult now as those ports and immobilized vessels inside them could be targeted by missiles. This has been the case in the Russian naval base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea where cruise missile strikes have seriously damaged or destroyed multiple Russian warships while they were pier side undergoing repairs. Being in port makes a ship no less a target now than if it were at sea operating. Warship repairs must again become sea-based in some regard to allow for the mobility of the repair base and the flexibility to make those repairs close to the scene of combat but under the active protection of other warships. Tenders are not a substitute for a shipyard, and mobile drydocks are not as mobile as are tenders, but together they are a more secure and sustainable repair installation than ones ashore than cannot be moved when the fighting nears or are in danger of being overrun by adversary forces.
Options Exist to Quickly Return and Auxiliary Fleet
The other potential candidate to fulfill auxiliary fleet roles is the Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ships that are being built at about $533m a unit. Both the ESB and NSMV are capable vessels and could fill auxiliary roles. NSMV, however, is designed to operate in austere environments without tugs, has accommodation for many more persons than does ESB, as well as storage for sixty of the standard, twenty-foot container units. These features, the provision of a crane and drive on/off ramps, as well as ample internal workshop spaces make the NMSV an ideal candidate for continued construction in the repair ship, tender and medium hospital ship configurations.
In a period when there are few shipyards and challenges in constructing larger numbers of warships, it is good that there are open production lines capable of constructing more auxiliary ships at reasonable cost and timeline. The U.S. Navy should propose to Congress that the “hot” NMSV production line in the Philly shipyard with TOTE Services as the vessel construction manager be continued to produce at least two new tenders, two dedicated repair ships, command ship replacements for Mount Whitney and Blue Ridge, and finally two hospital ship variants. These types of platforms have been absolutely necessary in past wars. In his recent remarks at the U.S. Naval Institute West event, prospective Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo bluntly stated, “The logic of food, fuel, ammo, medical, building supplies — that logic is not going to be solved with an app,” he said. “It takes lift, and as the world knows the most effective, efficient lift is over the sea. We’re doing some things about it. It ain’t enough.” That same logic extends to the fleet’s ability to repair and sustain itself for prolonged periods away from even advanced bases. Congress should follow this logic too and demand that the Navy restore its vital auxiliary fleet lost in the long lee calm of 1991.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
The U.S. Navy’s number of auxiliary ships critical for high-end naval warfare has plummeted since the end of the Cold War. For example, in 1991 the Navy had fifteen destroyer (AD) and submarine (AS) tenders, as well as two heavy repair ships (AR,) and two large hospital ships (AH.) In the present just the two hospital ships and two submarine tenders remain. The rest of this large service fleet has been scrapped, or in many cases sunk as targets in exercises. The navy’s two command ships Mount Whitney and Blur Ridge are now as old as the flag officers that use them and will also need to be replaced. Attempts to replace the service fleet over the last 20 years have often foundered on budgetary reefs. The command ship replacement JCC-X was cut from planned purchases in 2003, and two replacement submarine tenders appear headed for a similar fate due to delays in the budget process this year. The need to restore the service fleet to the larger navy is often unseen by both lawmakers and analysts seeking to either field more missiles or drones or find budget savings. A tender or command ship is just as vital to naval warfare as is a missile destroyer. The current National Security Multi-mission vessel is a hot production line and an effective one with ships being delivered on time and on budget. With modifications, it’s the best bet for reconstituting the core of a new service fleet in the next ten years.
The Lost Auxiliary Fleet of the Cold War
At the end of the Cold War in 1990 the United States Navy possessed a relatively robust auxiliary fleet of destroyer and submarine tenders, some elderly repair ships, new and modern hospital ships and the venerable amphibious command ships Mount Whitney and Blue Ridge. Over the course of the next ten years this force disappeared into the untended reserve fleet, and in many cases the scrapyard. Other ships were sunk as targets in the decade of the 2000’s. Getting rid of the auxiliary service fleet was perhaps an easy choice, given that sea control was largely assured without U.S. Navy efforts, and repair and sustainment of ships could occur in many locations around the world free from the danger of all but terrorist attack. The SSBN force’s weapons were much longer ranged with the Trident II and obviated the need for many of the forward-deployed submarine tenders. Many repair capabilities once resident in destroyer tenders and repair ships moved ashore, and much of Navy maintenance moved from the work of individual sailors on ships to shore-based facilities. All of that worked fine in peacetime in the presence of assured sea control.
Why now an Auxiliary Fleet?
The proliferation in both capability and quantity of cruise and ballistic missiles means that large areas of ocean space once fairly peaceful and not in need of direct sea control operations can now be contested from land-based weapons. This situation is playing out now in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb strait region where land-based Houthi missiles have targeted civilian and military vessels using and protecting this key maritime commercial chokepoint. In the past, in periods such as the counter-piracy operations off Somalia of the 2000’s and 2010’s, warship maintenance and resupply was continued in ports relatively near to the operations. That’s more difficult now as those ports and immobilized vessels inside them could be targeted by missiles. This has been the case in the Russian naval base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea where cruise missile strikes have seriously damaged or destroyed multiple Russian warships while they were pier side undergoing repairs. Being in port makes a ship no less a target now than if it were at sea operating. Warship repairs must again become sea-based in some regard to allow for the mobility of the repair base and the flexibility to make those repairs close to the scene of combat but under the active protection of other warships. Tenders are not a substitute for a shipyard, and mobile drydocks are not as mobile as are tenders, but together they are a more secure and sustainable repair installation than ones ashore than cannot be moved when the fighting nears or are in danger of being overrun by adversary forces.
Options Exist to Quickly Return and Auxiliary Fleet
The National Security Multi-Mission Vessel (NSMV) being built at the Philly Shipyard and managed by TOTE servicesseems a good baseline hull for the production of new vessels for the auxiliary fleet. These vessels have significant accommodation and classroom spaces, cranes, cargo storage and a helicopter flight deck, making them an excellent starter for a variety of auxiliary vessels including tenders and smaller hospital ships. Their accommodations and large training spaces suggest them as good command ship candidates to replace the aging USS Mount Whitney and USS Blue Ridge.These vessels are being delivered in thirty-four months at $300m a ship with less than 1% cost growth in construction.
The other potential candidate to fulfill auxiliary fleet roles is the Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ships that are being built at about $533m a unit. Both the ESB and NSMV are capable vessels and could fill auxiliary roles. NSMV, however, is designed to operate in austere environments without tugs, has accommodation for many more persons than does ESB, as well as storage for sixty of the standard, twenty-foot container units. These features, the provision of a crane and drive on/off ramps, as well as ample internal workshop spaces make the NMSV an ideal candidate for continued construction in the repair ship, tender and medium hospital ship configurations.
The Right Platform at the Right Time
Figure 2: Specifications of NMSV from MARAD
In a period when there are few shipyards and challenges in constructing larger numbers of warships, it is good that there are open production lines capable of constructing more auxiliary ships at reasonable cost and timeline. The U.S. Navy should propose to Congress that the “hot” NMSV production line in the Philly shipyard with TOTE Services as the vessel construction manager be continued to produce at least two new tenders, two dedicated repair ships, command ship replacements for Mount Whitney and Blue Ridge, and finally two hospital ship variants. These types of platforms have been absolutely necessary in past wars. In his recent remarks at the U.S. Naval Institute West event, prospective Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo bluntly stated, “The logic of food, fuel, ammo, medical, building supplies — that logic is not going to be solved with an app,” he said. “It takes lift, and as the world knows the most effective, efficient lift is over the sea. We’re doing some things about it. It ain’t enough.” That same logic extends to the fleet’s ability to repair and sustain itself for prolonged periods away from even advanced bases. Congress should follow this logic too and demand that the Navy restore its vital auxiliary fleet lost in the long lee calm of 1991.
Dr. Steven Wills, Navalist
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.