Too Soon to Call: Betting against Warship Retirement
The MOC
Image from Defense News.
By
Anna Matilde Bassoli
August 22, 2023
In 1921, President of the American Flying Club Laurence La Tourette Driggs argued that the once-feared dreadnoughts were becoming obsolete in the face of fast-growing air power. Not only were dreadnoughts – once the pride and joy of every navy – expensive, but they also could not defend against a low-altitude air attack. “Wouldn’t it be wise to sacrifice one of our warships rather than to accumulate more expensive warships to be destroyed by an enemy?”, he asked provocatively. His suggestion rings true today.
After the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva, observers announced a new age of warfare that is shifting away from today’s Western platform-centric forces. Likewise, Admiral James Stavridis asserted that the unbecoming end of the largest warship deployed in a war theatre since the Falkland War in 1982 was a stark warning for all navies. In particular, the Neptune-driven attack from the Ukrainian coast should be a reminder of the vulnerability of surface ships to low-cost missiles, even less powerful than Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Capabilities that China has used to build up its coastal defenses. However, betting against warships is dangerous in this phase of the competition against China, especially without a viable substitute for dominance across the Pacific Ocean vastness.
The argument against warships certainly has its merits. Warships are by far the most expensive pieces of equipment in modern navies. For instance, in 2020, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that building the U.S. Navy’s new Frigate would cost roughly $12.3 billion for 10 ships, with operational costs ranging from $40 to $90 billion between 2026 and 2060. In a similar fashion, the Royal Navy received two new aircraft carriers in 2020. One of the two warships, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, reportedly required a $5.7 billion program to develop. By contrast, a cruise missile similar to the Ukrainian R-360 Neptune that sunk the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is significantly less expensive. For instance, the Harpoon Block II – similar to the Ukrainian Neptune but superior in quality and capability – has a price tag of roughly $1.4 million per unit. Cost-benefit evaluations do not bode well for the future of warships.
Additionally, warships have yet to prove their suitability for conventional naval operations with unprecedented efficacy and effectiveness levels of twenty-first century’s long-range weapons precision. Yet, as World War II demonstrated, dreadnoughts were not obsolete because they were battleships; rather, they did not have planes taking off from their decks. The birth of the aircraft carrier, now under the threat of old age like its dreadnought predecessor, eventually proved La Tourette Driggs wrong. Although it is hard to identify the successor of warships in the current conventional naval arsenal, it is worth considering three key factors that may delay warships’ retirement plans.
No Clear Alternatives
First, critics provide no clear alternative to warships that would seal their fate. In hindsight, the shift from dreadnoughts to aircraft carriers was smooth. The Mahanian concept of “the capital ship” remained intact as the aircraft carrier made its way to the center of naval striking groups and naval warfare. As Captain Thomas Beall notes, “Mahan’s sea power theory holds that the mission of the capital ship battle force was and is to control the seas … and project combat power to any place on Earth.” Nowadays, however, the validity of such a concept is under test. In a 2021 wargaming exercise, U.S. forces lost miserably against their Chinese counterparts. This devasting result reinforced the perception that aircraft carriers are vulnerable to attacks from new Chinese anti-ship missiles, which could easily reach such a visible target. To contrast visibility, submarines seem to be the ideal solution, especially in the waters around Taiwan. However, hailing submarines as the best defenders of Taiwan is a case-specific solution, not the silver bullet against the warship-stacked Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. Declaring “the age of the carriers is over” before getting to battle or finding a new center of gravity for naval forces is dangerous. Not only would scraping warships now hamper naval plans during the uncharted waters of the Ukrainian crisis, but it would also pit Western navies against the growing size of China’s PLAN. If history serves as a teacher, bigger navies always win. To forget this precious lesson means further endangering Western naval posture rather than modernizing it for the win.
Before pensioning warships, bringing Western naval standards to the quality they once enjoyed would be wiser. For instance, the United Kingdom’s Carrier Strike program cannot shake troubles off its shoulders. In 2020, questions were raised about the British ability to form a fully effective carrier strike group, despite the newly operational aircraft carriers. While those concerns were mostly financial, the renewed preoccupation with the Royal Navy’s ability to become the pivot of Global Britain strategy regarding aviation. In 2022, indeed, the United Kingdom’s Carrier Strike program was deficient in ensuring the naval-air jointness of its carrier strike groups, which inevitably diminishes its effectiveness in the operational theatre. Before considering warships – especially aircraft carriers – a relict, it would be advisable to recover mastery of their potential and capabilities.
Uncertain Financial Payoff
Second, it is unclear whether scrapping off warships would bring financial benefits to navies worldwide. There is no doubt that warships are expensive. Because there is no substitute for them, it is not possible to make appropriate financial calculations over their cost-benefit trade-off. Building warships, however, is not merely about defense budgets. Due to the current structure of defense industries in the United States and the United Kingdom the dismissal of warships could bring devastating financial repercussions to the sector. Considering the strain that the war in Ukraine is forcing upon American and British arsenals, a drastic turn in naval planning and production could break the stability of the defense industry. Because Western weapon-makers are already struggling to boost production despite the current high demand, it is unlikely that delaying planned warship acquisition will diminish the pressure not only to deliver faster results for land forces but for navies too. Radical changes are not what the industry needs now.
Inaccurate Comparisons
Third and last, how can experts be so confident that warships are obsolete if they have not fought a major war since 1945? This is perhaps the most complicated question no warship critic wants to answer. The lack of a major naval conflict is forcing navies to plan for unknown contingencies and uncertain strategies. Additionally, if the dismissal of warships must come from evidence of ineffectiveness in naval combat, the Moskva better not be the litmus test. Russian naval crews are not at the same quality level as their Western – and maybe Chinese – counterparts. Also, the pre-Ukraine Russian military reforms mostly focused on increasing naval capabilities rather than substantially analyzing naval doctrine and its operational posture.
Whether warships could become obsolete is still unclear. The U.S. Navy found a quick solution to the problem that La Tourette Driggs exposed in 1921: it simply put planes on ships. It is difficult to envision such a straightforward solution for the current troubles affecting warships and their reputation – even the birth of aircraft carriers was no easy fix. However, their dismissal does not offer a genuine answer to the naval doubts plaguing experts and practitioners. Or, at least, not without a proper plan for maintaining Mahan’s mantra of naval supremacy.
Anna Matilde Bassoli is a second-year graduate student at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. She also has a Master of Letters in Strategic Studies from University of St Andrews. Anna currently works at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Anna Matilde Bassoli
In 1921, President of the American Flying Club Laurence La Tourette Driggs argued that the once-feared dreadnoughts were becoming obsolete in the face of fast-growing air power. Not only were dreadnoughts – once the pride and joy of every navy – expensive, but they also could not defend against a low-altitude air attack. “Wouldn’t it be wise to sacrifice one of our warships rather than to accumulate more expensive warships to be destroyed by an enemy?”, he asked provocatively. His suggestion rings true today.
After the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva, observers announced a new age of warfare that is shifting away from today’s Western platform-centric forces. Likewise, Admiral James Stavridis asserted that the unbecoming end of the largest warship deployed in a war theatre since the Falkland War in 1982 was a stark warning for all navies. In particular, the Neptune-driven attack from the Ukrainian coast should be a reminder of the vulnerability of surface ships to low-cost missiles, even less powerful than Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Capabilities that China has used to build up its coastal defenses. However, betting against warships is dangerous in this phase of the competition against China, especially without a viable substitute for dominance across the Pacific Ocean vastness.
The argument against warships certainly has its merits. Warships are by far the most expensive pieces of equipment in modern navies. For instance, in 2020, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that building the U.S. Navy’s new Frigate would cost roughly $12.3 billion for 10 ships, with operational costs ranging from $40 to $90 billion between 2026 and 2060. In a similar fashion, the Royal Navy received two new aircraft carriers in 2020. One of the two warships, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, reportedly required a $5.7 billion program to develop. By contrast, a cruise missile similar to the Ukrainian R-360 Neptune that sunk the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is significantly less expensive. For instance, the Harpoon Block II – similar to the Ukrainian Neptune but superior in quality and capability – has a price tag of roughly $1.4 million per unit. Cost-benefit evaluations do not bode well for the future of warships.
Additionally, warships have yet to prove their suitability for conventional naval operations with unprecedented efficacy and effectiveness levels of twenty-first century’s long-range weapons precision. Yet, as World War II demonstrated, dreadnoughts were not obsolete because they were battleships; rather, they did not have planes taking off from their decks. The birth of the aircraft carrier, now under the threat of old age like its dreadnought predecessor, eventually proved La Tourette Driggs wrong. Although it is hard to identify the successor of warships in the current conventional naval arsenal, it is worth considering three key factors that may delay warships’ retirement plans.
No Clear Alternatives
First, critics provide no clear alternative to warships that would seal their fate. In hindsight, the shift from dreadnoughts to aircraft carriers was smooth. The Mahanian concept of “the capital ship” remained intact as the aircraft carrier made its way to the center of naval striking groups and naval warfare. As Captain Thomas Beall notes, “Mahan’s sea power theory holds that the mission of the capital ship battle force was and is to control the seas … and project combat power to any place on Earth.” Nowadays, however, the validity of such a concept is under test. In a 2021 wargaming exercise, U.S. forces lost miserably against their Chinese counterparts. This devasting result reinforced the perception that aircraft carriers are vulnerable to attacks from new Chinese anti-ship missiles, which could easily reach such a visible target. To contrast visibility, submarines seem to be the ideal solution, especially in the waters around Taiwan. However, hailing submarines as the best defenders of Taiwan is a case-specific solution, not the silver bullet against the warship-stacked Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. Declaring “the age of the carriers is over” before getting to battle or finding a new center of gravity for naval forces is dangerous. Not only would scraping warships now hamper naval plans during the uncharted waters of the Ukrainian crisis, but it would also pit Western navies against the growing size of China’s PLAN. If history serves as a teacher, bigger navies always win. To forget this precious lesson means further endangering Western naval posture rather than modernizing it for the win.
Before pensioning warships, bringing Western naval standards to the quality they once enjoyed would be wiser. For instance, the United Kingdom’s Carrier Strike program cannot shake troubles off its shoulders. In 2020, questions were raised about the British ability to form a fully effective carrier strike group, despite the newly operational aircraft carriers. While those concerns were mostly financial, the renewed preoccupation with the Royal Navy’s ability to become the pivot of Global Britain strategy regarding aviation. In 2022, indeed, the United Kingdom’s Carrier Strike program was deficient in ensuring the naval-air jointness of its carrier strike groups, which inevitably diminishes its effectiveness in the operational theatre. Before considering warships – especially aircraft carriers – a relict, it would be advisable to recover mastery of their potential and capabilities.
Uncertain Financial Payoff
Second, it is unclear whether scrapping off warships would bring financial benefits to navies worldwide. There is no doubt that warships are expensive. Because there is no substitute for them, it is not possible to make appropriate financial calculations over their cost-benefit trade-off. Building warships, however, is not merely about defense budgets. Due to the current structure of defense industries in the United States and the United Kingdom the dismissal of warships could bring devastating financial repercussions to the sector. Considering the strain that the war in Ukraine is forcing upon American and British arsenals, a drastic turn in naval planning and production could break the stability of the defense industry. Because Western weapon-makers are already struggling to boost production despite the current high demand, it is unlikely that delaying planned warship acquisition will diminish the pressure not only to deliver faster results for land forces but for navies too. Radical changes are not what the industry needs now.
Inaccurate Comparisons
Third and last, how can experts be so confident that warships are obsolete if they have not fought a major war since 1945? This is perhaps the most complicated question no warship critic wants to answer. The lack of a major naval conflict is forcing navies to plan for unknown contingencies and uncertain strategies. Additionally, if the dismissal of warships must come from evidence of ineffectiveness in naval combat, the Moskva better not be the litmus test. Russian naval crews are not at the same quality level as their Western – and maybe Chinese – counterparts. Also, the pre-Ukraine Russian military reforms mostly focused on increasing naval capabilities rather than substantially analyzing naval doctrine and its operational posture.
Whether warships could become obsolete is still unclear. The U.S. Navy found a quick solution to the problem that La Tourette Driggs exposed in 1921: it simply put planes on ships. It is difficult to envision such a straightforward solution for the current troubles affecting warships and their reputation – even the birth of aircraft carriers was no easy fix. However, their dismissal does not offer a genuine answer to the naval doubts plaguing experts and practitioners. Or, at least, not without a proper plan for maintaining Mahan’s mantra of naval supremacy.
Anna Matilde Bassoli is a second-year graduate student at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. She also has a Master of Letters in Strategic Studies from University of St Andrews. Anna currently works at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.