Vilnius’ Implications for Alliance Naval Power​

By Professor James Henry Bergeron

The upcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania is not intended to be a pivotal event. It follows Warsaw, where the ambitious NATO Force Model and Strategic Concept was agreed and precedes Washington in 2024, to mark the 75th anniversary of the Alliance. But events intervened, thrusting several key issues onto the agenda for the Heads of State and Government – events that cannot wait.

Not all NATO Summits have substantial and direct implications for the maritime area, but this one arguably does. These issues include Ukraine, Regional Plans, Sweden, critical undersea infrastructure, China, and nuclear planning. As with most important Summits, several of the key deliverables are undecided and will be resolved at, or just prior to, the Summit itself.

Beginning with Ukraine: Offering Ukraine a solid path to NATO membership has been a hot debate in the run up to Vilnius, and the outcome will likely be remembered as the main “deliverable” of the Summit. Of course, admitting Ukraine as a member now would immediately put NATO at war with Russia, which most Allies view as a non-starter. The trending alternative is a hard commitment by Allies to support Ukraine’s ability to prevail in the war and to modernize its armed forces, akin to the U.S. guarantee of materiel support to Israel. To date, NATO as an organization has provided non-lethal assistance while Allies provided weaponry, but a multi-year funding program has been announced for agreement at the Summit. A new NATO-Ukraine Council is expected to meet that could take executive decisions. And there is the question of a Membership Action Plan, whether one should be granted to Ukraine or is even needed. As Carl Bildt noted, there now be will no doubt that Ukraine will become a NATO member one day. These decisions appear to advance the conditions for a rapid accession to NATO, should the politics and the strategic situation allow.

These moves have maritime implications, given Ukraine’s need to secure access to the Black Sea. A closer NATO-Ukraine partnership is likely to foster enhanced maritime cooperation. Future NATO cooperation in vessel certification, mine clearance, and maritime security is foreseeable, particularly if some pause or ceasefire is achieved.

A major question for the Alliance’s deterrent posture is the return of non-regional NATO warships to the Black Sea, where they have been absent since December 2021. The issue – a classic dilemma in striking the correct balance between deterrence and escalation – is under regular review, but not likely to be decided at Vilnius. The Summit’s stress in defending all Allies and the approval of new Regional Plans will, however, strengthen the case. In any event, the routine presence of Allied Carrier Strike Groups in the Adriatic Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Sea, well capable of responding to contingencies in the Black Sea, provides a powerful deterrent signal to Russia.

The Baltic Sea is also in play at Vilnius, should Türkiye and Hungary join consensus and approve Swedish accession to NATO. An Alliance that includes Sweden and Finland as members would confirm the dramatic changes to the deterrent dynamics of the Baltic Sea since 2021, a fundamentally maritime area of operations. New planning on multi-layered defence in depth drawing lessons from Ukraine, including the use of loitering drones, low signature units, share based anti-ship missiles, HIMARS, improved MSA, and mining capabilities, is already in play and would likely be accelerated.

There is also the question of regional maritime coordination and tactical command functions, as well as how Sweden and Finland would position themselves in the NATO Command Structure (“NCS”). As the Theatre Maritime Commander across the entire NATO Area of Responsibility, MARCOM needs an expert Commander Task Force (“CTF”) and regional coordinator in the Baltic to deliver tactical command. NATO Allies will also need to agree on how the Nordic and Baltic region aligns with NATO Joint Force Commands in Brunssum and Norfolk. Those questions will also not be resolved at Vilnius, but approval of the Regional Plans may drive progress on them.

The second main deliverable at Vilnius is approval of those new Regional Plans. These specify Allied actions for deterrence and defence in much greater detail than anything since the Cold War. More, they are intended to directly link into NATO’s Defence Planning Process. There is a strong maritime dimension, including application of carrier strike and amphibious power projection, as well as multi-domain Anti-Submarine Warfare (“ASW”) capabilities. The result will be much needed clarity on what NATO expects from its maritime forces, qualitatively and quantitatively. This should feed back into national force development. Command and control will be clarified with an emphasis on unified command across the NATO Command and Force Structures.

The third maritime deliverable, and the most direct, will be confirmation of a maritime security initiative that will enhance NATO’s focus on critical undersea infrastructure (“CUI”). Following the Nord Stream pipeline explosions in October 2022, NATO has considered how it can support nations in securing CUI. A Coordination Cell has been established at NATO Headquarters that will be the strategic-level hub of the enterprise. A Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure will be established at MARCOM as the operational hub. The challenge is considerable. Russian activities at sea have made clear their interest in this infrastructure. Maritime and air assets cannot guard every inch of maritime CUI space, nor should they, as the other deterrence and defence requirements are still with us. But rapid response, new surveillance technology to map the threat, and sharing best practices in close networks with nations and industry can allow NATO to enhance its support in securing CUI for its Allies. The challenge is not limited to the Baltic. It includes all the strategic seas of the Alliance and elements as diverse as gas pipelines, Information Technology (“IT”) cables, oil rigs, and wind farms.

NATO’s nuclear dimension will get emphasis at Vilnius, with the Nuclear Planning Group meeting alongside the Summit to consider new national commitments and additional measures to enhance the Alliance’s deterrent posture. This follows the ending of most nuclear arms control agreements with Russia in recent years and President Putin’s aggressive rhetoric on nuclear use in Ukraine or against NATO. The strategic value of Allied submarine capabilities – both SSBNs and SSNs – are major elements in that collective deterrent posture.

Finally, the Summit is expected address, at length, the challenge posed by China and to engage the “P4” Asia-Pacific Partners Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, represented by their heads of government for the second time at a NATO Summit. The Pacific is another predominantly maritime theatre of operations. But the concern over China extends back into Europe with Chinese control of important ports and infrastructure, as well as IT networks. The closeness of Russia and China will likely be a concern at the Summit. Although probably not articulated, the risk of a weakened and embattled Russia sharing advanced submarine technology with China, or opening up the Arctic to Chinese naval presence, may quietly press on the mind.

As with all Summits, Vilnius will be a stock take on implementation of the commitments made in Madrid last year. Its own impact will be scrutinized in Washington in 2024. Vilnius could be a watershed moment for the Alliance on several issues and is heavy with maritime decisions and implications.

Professor James Henry Bergeron is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Maritime Strategy, Political Advisor to the Commander at NATO Allied Maritime Command, and Honorary Professor at the University of Plymouth.

Disclaimer: This article is offered in a personal capacity.  The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or of any Ally.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.