What to Watch 2023: Three Things the Next CNO Should Know
The MOC
Photo By Lloyd Burgess.
By
Dr. Steven Wills
January 26, 2023
Incumbent Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Gilday’s term of office will likely end in the next six months. His successor should soon be announced. Regardless of who that person is, he or she will be confronted with challenges not seen in the last fifty years. The Nation faces two aggressive peer competitors – China and Russia – with capable navies that conduct global operations. Iran and North Korea remain troublesome regional powers, and the global threat posed by terrorism remains. The Nation is politically divided, recruitment and retention of sailors are down, and the ships built in the last act of the Cold War are rapidly aging out of effective service.
The next CNO should look to the most revolutionary CNO and Secretary of the Navy of the past 50 years for solutions to these challenges. CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt faced similar challenges in 1970 when he took office with an aging fleet focused on power projection ashore while the Soviet Navy was rapidly expanding and conducting global exercises like OKEAN 70. While best known for his “programs for people” that removed many “Mickey Mouse” dated personnel regulations and opened opportunities for women and minorities in the Navy, Zumwalt was primarily a strategist who trained under Paul Nitze and a consummate naval analyst who stood up the Navy’s first systems analysis office (OP 96) in 1966. Zumwalt led the Navy to radically re-invent itself for sea control in the face of this rising Soviet navy. Zumwalt’s brutal assessments of U.S. weaknesses, his force structure for the future, and his focus on sea control strategies laid the groundwork for the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s 600 Ship Navy of the 1980s that is credited with helping to win the Cold War.
The three most important things the next CNO ought to know based on the experiences of Admiral Zumwalt are:
1. Be Brutally Honest in Your Assessment of the Threat:
The next CNO also faces the uncomfortable truth that while the U.S. Navy is spread across the globe, the Chinese Navy is concentrated in its home waters and has significant local superiority over the U.S. and its allies in the region in nearly all categories of platforms and payloads. Like Zumwalt, the next CNO must keep this issue in the minds of Congress and that it is their responsibility to fix the deficit in fleet strength in the region. Zumwalt did secure additional funding for the Navy in his CNO term, but force structure numbers continued to precipitously drop as many Second World War-era ships aged out of the force.
The next CNO will similarly preside over a reduced fleet as Cold War-era ships retire, demanding important choices in new force structure. Expanding the number of lower-end ships, such as the FFG-62 Constellation class frigate, at the expense of high-end units like the DDG-51 Flight 3 or future DDGX destroyer class could help to increase the overall size of the combatant fleet for global missions. Further development of unmanned units for a host of missions including surveillance, strike, and combat logistics can further grow the size and capabilities of the fleet. The aging CG-47 class cruisers and LSD-41 amphibious ships have served the nation well, but it is time to retire them and move their crews and capabilities to other platforms. The Littoral Combat Ship remains a challenge. It could be used as the interim light amphibious warship until the Navy and Marine Corps decide on a smaller amphibious warship. The next CNO will need to also balance the need to field next-generation weapons like hypersonic missiles and laser missile defense weapons against the costs involved in achieving those goals on what will likely remain a limited budget. That said, the next CNO will have the opportunity to influence the Navy of 30 years hence as Zumwalt did on the Navy of the 1980s through the 2000s.
The next CNO will also need to operationalize new navy concepts such as distributive maritime operations and a distributive logistics operations concept to support it. New systems entering the fleet such as the MQ-25A tanker, other unmanned surface ships, hypersonics, and laser missile defense will need to be fit into existing fleet structures just as the Composite Warfare Commander concept fit into the carrier battle group organization and new frigates and AEGIS ships joined the surface fleet.
Zumwalt’s efforts are chronicled in the U.S. Naval War College Newport Paper U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, as well as his own memoir On Watch published after he left the CNO billet in 1974. Both should be required reading for the next CNO as that individual grapples with strategic, operational, and force structure challenges like those of half a century in the past.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
Center for Maritime Strategy
By Dr. Steven Wills
Incumbent Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Gilday’s term of office will likely end in the next six months. His successor should soon be announced. Regardless of who that person is, he or she will be confronted with challenges not seen in the last fifty years. The Nation faces two aggressive peer competitors – China and Russia – with capable navies that conduct global operations. Iran and North Korea remain troublesome regional powers, and the global threat posed by terrorism remains. The Nation is politically divided, recruitment and retention of sailors are down, and the ships built in the last act of the Cold War are rapidly aging out of effective service.
The next CNO should look to the most revolutionary CNO and Secretary of the Navy of the past 50 years for solutions to these challenges. CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt faced similar challenges in 1970 when he took office with an aging fleet focused on power projection ashore while the Soviet Navy was rapidly expanding and conducting global exercises like OKEAN 70. While best known for his “programs for people” that removed many “Mickey Mouse” dated personnel regulations and opened opportunities for women and minorities in the Navy, Zumwalt was primarily a strategist who trained under Paul Nitze and a consummate naval analyst who stood up the Navy’s first systems analysis office (OP 96) in 1966. Zumwalt led the Navy to radically re-invent itself for sea control in the face of this rising Soviet navy. Zumwalt’s brutal assessments of U.S. weaknesses, his force structure for the future, and his focus on sea control strategies laid the groundwork for the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s 600 Ship Navy of the 1980s that is credited with helping to win the Cold War.
The three most important things the next CNO ought to know based on the experiences of Admiral Zumwalt are:
1. Be Brutally Honest in Your Assessment of the Threat:
Admiral Zumwalt was forthright and honest in making his case that the U.S. Navy’s chances of defeating the Soviet Navy in combat at sea were at best slightly better than half (55%), if the service was provided adequate funding to slow the shrinking size of the fleet, but only 20% if the decline continued. Zumwalt brought his arguments for a larger navy with force and conviction to national press outlets and was fearless in pushing his Joint Chief peers and elected officials for a larger fleet. Testifying before Congress in 1971, Zumwalt stated that the fleet of 1971 was weaker with 594 ships vice the 657 of the preceding year. Zumwalt also stated, “we are erring in favor of the future while taking greater risk in the present within the budgets the country will support.”
The next CNO also faces the uncomfortable truth that while the U.S. Navy is spread across the globe, the Chinese Navy is concentrated in its home waters and has significant local superiority over the U.S. and its allies in the region in nearly all categories of platforms and payloads. Like Zumwalt, the next CNO must keep this issue in the minds of Congress and that it is their responsibility to fix the deficit in fleet strength in the region. Zumwalt did secure additional funding for the Navy in his CNO term, but force structure numbers continued to precipitously drop as many Second World War-era ships aged out of the force.
2. Make Hard Choices in Force Design:
In response to that aging, shrinking fleet, Zumwalt charged into office with his Project Sixty plan designed to create a U.S. force design for the 1980s and into the 21st Project Sixty’s basic premise was that the Navy needed a mix of high- and low-end platforms to best execute a sea control strategy against the rising Soviet fleet. Zumwalt correctly decided that the Navy could not be an all-high-end force as desired by some leaders like Admiral Hyman G. Rickover who wanted many fleet escorts to be nuclear-powered and hence expensive. Zumwalt supported lower-end choices, such as the patrol frigate that later became the successful FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class and the DDG-47 which later became the Ticonderoga class cruiser. Both could be produced in larger numbers at lower cost than higher-end warships such as the proposed nuclear-powered strike cruiser and the Spruance class destroyers. Zumwalt also supported achievable improvements in capability, including improved missile defense for the fleet as well as offensive weapons like the Harpoon and later the Tomahawk cruise missiles. Some of Zumwalt’s low-end capabilities did not come to fruition, like the Sea Control Ship (an aviation ship focused on antisubmarine warfare) and the Pegasus class Hydrofoil Missile Craft, of which only five instead of thirty were built. Yet Zumwalt was still able to set the stage for a more balanced fleet with both high and lower-end capabilities in the 1980s.
The next CNO will similarly preside over a reduced fleet as Cold War-era ships retire, demanding important choices in new force structure. Expanding the number of lower-end ships, such as the FFG-62 Constellation class frigate, at the expense of high-end units like the DDG-51 Flight 3 or future DDGX destroyer class could help to increase the overall size of the combatant fleet for global missions. Further development of unmanned units for a host of missions including surveillance, strike, and combat logistics can further grow the size and capabilities of the fleet. The aging CG-47 class cruisers and LSD-41 amphibious ships have served the nation well, but it is time to retire them and move their crews and capabilities to other platforms. The Littoral Combat Ship remains a challenge. It could be used as the interim light amphibious warship until the Navy and Marine Corps decide on a smaller amphibious warship. The next CNO will need to also balance the need to field next-generation weapons like hypersonic missiles and laser missile defense weapons against the costs involved in achieving those goals on what will likely remain a limited budget. That said, the next CNO will have the opportunity to influence the Navy of 30 years hence as Zumwalt did on the Navy of the 1980s through the 2000s.
3. Operationalize Sea Control:
Admiral Zumwalt laid the groundwork for a global maritime strategy with a resurgence in strategic thinking and a return to emphasizing sea control and the platforms to succeed in that mission. His successors, Admirals Jim Holloway and Tom Hayward continued this concept in developing methods and plans to execute sea control. Holloway created the Composite Warfare Commander concept during his tenure. This effort re-oriented the aircraft carrier battle group organization to the sea control fight by creating an organization enabling the carrier to combat missile threats from Soviet forces. His successor Hayward brought with him from his Pacific Fleet command the concept of offensive strike missions (Sea Strike) against the Soviet homeland designed to help take the pressure of the Fulda Gap if Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces attacked NATO in Germany. All this planning, especially by individual fleet commanders helped to develop the 1980s Maritime Strategy and the aggressive exercise program to make it operational in the fleet.
The next CNO will also need to operationalize new navy concepts such as distributive maritime operations and a distributive logistics operations concept to support it. New systems entering the fleet such as the MQ-25A tanker, other unmanned surface ships, hypersonics, and laser missile defense will need to be fit into existing fleet structures just as the Composite Warfare Commander concept fit into the carrier battle group organization and new frigates and AEGIS ships joined the surface fleet.
Zumwalt’s efforts are chronicled in the U.S. Naval War College Newport Paper U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, as well as his own memoir On Watch published after he left the CNO billet in 1974. Both should be required reading for the next CNO as that individual grapples with strategic, operational, and force structure challenges like those of half a century in the past.
Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.