A Newly Rising Sun? Clarifying Japan’s Defense Changes​

By Benjamin E. Mainardi

Prefaced with an acknowledgement of the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy is distinctly informed by the threats posed by China and North Korea. For the first time, whereas the 2013 National Security Strategy noted North Korea as most troublesome in the region, today China has been affirmed as presenting “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan.” While Japan’s military modernization in the face of China’s mounting military capabilities has been steadily advancing for some time now, the new strategy codifies key capability acquisition and capacity building efforts that signal a new phase in Japan’s national security development.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has already called for increased defense spending – $315 billion over the next five years. Through the National Security Strategy, this goal of bringing annual spending in line with the NATO defense spending target of two percent of national GDP has now been established as official policy.

On the heels of the announcement of a joint fighter project with Britain and Italy, announced earlier this year, changes to Japan’s force posture enumerated in the new strategy notably include the acquisition of counter-strike missile capabilities. Specifically, the short-term acquisition of American-made Tomahawk cruise missiles with ranges of roughly 1600 kilometers and the revamping of the Japanese Type-12 missile to extend its effective range.

Far from simply focusing on acquiring new capabilities, the strategy enumerates a variety of capacity-building areas, including in revamped recruitment and training efforts, securing sufficient munitions stocks, and investing in the resiliency of defense facilities. Perhaps most intriguing, however, is the endorsement of the much-discussed “active cyber defense” measures that aim to bring the nation to the forefront of the cybersecurity landscape.

“A changing of” or “changing with” the Tides

While many have described the changes in Japan’s national security priorities as shedding the shackles of a “pacifist” defense posture, this assertion belies the fact that Japan has long maintained one of the world’s largest militaries and was already among the top ten nations in terms of global defense expenditures. Rather, the key shift in national security policy is not in “re-arming” and “moving away from the Constitution” but towards acquiring the capabilities needed to sufficiently defend itself in a region where would-be adversaries are ever-increasingly arming themselves.

During the Cold War, Japan’s defensive posture was fundamentally informed by a United States that was clearly dominant at sea, decidedly more powerful than China, and, if not comprehensively more so than the Soviet Union, at least a match for it. Today, however, Northeast Asia is increasingly overshadowed by a China undertaking an unprecedented nuclear buildup and constructing a fleet that now out-scales that of the United States, all while North Korea continues to develop and test its own robust ballistic missile program.

The decision of the Kishida government, much in the shadow of the late-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s legacy, to further bolster Japan’s national defense capabilities is profoundly tied to the United States’ own changing perspective on the China challenge. Japan’s new strategy is replete with references to bringing its own defense efforts in line with those of the United States, stating Tokyo’s intention to deepen defense cooperation and integration. In this vein, it continues the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision first laid out by the Abe government in 2016, emphasizing the international rule of law and values-based collaboration with like-minded countries.

Nonetheless, Japan’s posture remains distinctly defensive and oriented towards bolstering the alliance with the United States and its relationships with liberal democratic nations. Rather than an unexpected change in the winds, Japan’s new national security strategy is a timely and proportionate response to an evolving strategic context where its key ally is no longer dominant in the region. What remains to be seen is whether the Kishida government can execute its lofty defense aims effectively. Other nations who have introduced national security shifts in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s ongoing aggression have started off with mixed results, most prominently Germany’s ambivalent zeitenwende.

Whereas many Europeans have been slow to react to Russia’s aggression in the Black Sea throughout the past few decades, China’s ongoing military expansion and modernization has been felt especially acutely in Japan. Sino-Japanese tensions over the Senkaku Islands have flared on and off for well over a decade. Chinese aircraft continually intrude upon the Japanese air defense identification zone. Given these frequent and direct instances of aggression, Tokyo has consistently invested in its Self-Defense Forces over the past decade – perhaps the greatest legacy of Prime Minister Abe. Thus, rather than a watershed moment, the new strategy represents the culmination of existing and nascent military modernization efforts. As such, Japan appears better poised than most to follow through on its defense priorities.

Benjamin E. Mainardi is an analyst at the Center for Maritime Strategy. He holds a master’s in War Studies from King’s College London. His primary research interests are in strategic studies and military history.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.