The Navy and the New NDS: Opportunities and Challenges​

By Dr. Steven Wills

The unclassified National Defense Strategy (NDS), along with the latest Nuclear Posture Review, and National Missile Defense Review (MDR) document have now been released by the Biden administration. How do their provisions affect the Navy, specifically the CNO’s 2022 Navigation Plan and Force Design 2045 concept?

The language of all three documents is supportive of a larger navy in that integrated deterrence and specifically the concept of “campaigning” justifies the use of a larger number of warships. The force requirements detailed in the NDS is remarkably like the Navy’s own Naval Doctrine Publication One of 2020, that also highlights lethality, agile and responsive, survivable, and sustainable forces. Forward deployed naval forces that need not worry about status of forces agreements or re-supply in foreign territory are eminently the premier choice for many of the nation’s integrated deterrence needs, and much of the campaigning effort, in conjunction with the Marine Corps which is returning to its maritime roots after two decades supporting wars ashore in Southwest Asia. The U.S. Navy ought to be highlighting these skills as it campaigns for a larger and more capable fleet.

Campaigning Requires a Larger Navy

The global campaigning plan envisioned by the new NDS will have to rely on a shrinking Navy to accomplish many of its goals, especially in the more remote areas of interest including the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic. A larger number of smaller but still capable ships such as the FFG-62 class and amphibious warfare vessels can serve as regional station ships, as demonstrated for years in the Africa Partnership Station program, and the Navy’s vital command ships that may be the only platforms capable of hosting requisite battle staffs in the event that national caveats do not allow for shore-based command, as was the case in the 2011 Odyssey Dawn operation against Libya. Despite this superb operational record, the Navy is proposing to retire the USS Mount Whitney by 2026 without a replacement, despite a service life extension designed to take the ship into the 2030s. Bases ashore are vulnerable, as the U.S. found out in Vietnam and more recently in Iraq.

Global campaigning should not be limited to vulnerable, land-based headquarters. The Joint Force needs the ability to base both afloat and ashore, and the retirement of the only suitable headquarters ships does not support the kind of global campaigning the NDS demands.

The global campaigning effort will require a larger combat logistics force whose operational scheme must be more than the “hub and spoke, just in time” delivery system of the last 30 years – the current 82 ship logistics fleet planned in the CNO’s Force Design 2045 are insufficient for distributed joint force campaigning, especially in wide Indo-Pacific and remote Arctic seas. Distributive operations cannot take place without effective, distributive logistics, and the Navy needs more logistics vessels; manned and unmanned, as well as merchant marine vessels to meet global joint needs.

No SLCM-N and Low Yield Nukes for SSBNs?

The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review was clear on its opposition to a new, nuclear, sea launched cruise missile (SLCM-N,) stating it was, “no longer necessary given the deterrence contribution of the new W76-2” low-yield nuclear warhead to be carried by the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and a nuclear-armed Air Force F-35A aircraft armed with the B61-12 nuclear bomb. It seems that the “tyranny of jointness” is again present as the SLCM-N to be carried by U.S. Navy attack submarines (SSNs) is a more survivable platform than land-based aircraft vulnerable to attack on the ground and required to penetrate enemy integrated air and missile defenses before even releasing its nuclear weapon. The nuclear Long Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon mentioned in the NDS is only planned now for fielding on the B-52H and B-21 strategic bombers – however, not until 2030 for the aging B-52H. The B-21 capability could come sooner, circa 2027, and would support 10 LRSO with at least 8 being nuclear-tipped with the same class of weapon that would have gone on a SLCM-N.

The Biden Administration seems to have decided without explanation that only the Air Force will field the so-called tactical nuclear weapons without offering an explanation as to why this choice was made. This decision may have been more financial than strategic as the Congressional Budget Office said in 2018 that, “one B-21 with 10 Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missiles and capable of launching eight nuclear warheads would cost $500 million, and $40 million a year (in 2020 dollars) to maintain.” Navy leadership would prefer ships and attack submarines to concentrate on conventional warfare missions, however, allowing the SSN force to support SLCM-N would revive their Cold War deterrence mission. The whole point of the 1986 Goldwater Nichols legislation was to create the best force structure that optimized service contributions rather than doling them in a parochial fair deal. The Navy ought to at least consider equipping SSN units with SLCM-N capability as no other platform is best optimized to support it.

No Official Pass on Regional Missile Defense

On missile defense, much of the burden of regional and integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) has fallen on Navy AEGIS destroyers armed with the SM-3 missile. While capable, and unlike ground based IADM systems much more mobile, the Navy now needs its destroyer (DDG) force for sea control rather than missile defense. The MDR might have better specified a path forward that continued the turnover of the IAMD mission to other services, as the Navy desires turns over its AEGIS ashore facility in Romania to the Army, but has seen opposition to this change. The Navy needs to campaign for every DDG with integrated air and missile defense capabilities to be assigned to sea control forces. Given the rate of new constructions by the “pacing threat” Chinese Navy, there is no excess DDG capacity for regional missile defense.

Campaign for both the Integrated Deterrence and Campaigning Missions

This most recent group of Biden administration documents offer great opportunities for the Navy, and the service must actively campaign to connect its own force requirements to the Administration’s strategy documents. The requirements from the NDS support the need for a larger and more capable fleet, especially in terms of lower-end combatants and amphibious warfare vessels as well as the combat logistics force needed to keep them distributed . The Navy must also campaign for the SLCM as the more flexible and survivable submarine-based deterrent. Finally, the Navy must accelerate its turnover of the regional ballistic missile defense to the Army and the Air Force. IAMD-equipped Navy ships can still support the missile defense mission, but the service needs them much more for sea control operations.

As it is the ideal force for the campaigning element of the NDS, the Administration’s strategy offers the Navy an exceptional opportunity to argue for its goal of a larger and more capable fleet.

Dr. Steven Wills is the Navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms, and military history.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.